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CIS: POLICY

Yeltsin Nearly 'Hoodwinked' on Military Law

MK3001130593 Moscow MOSKOVSKIY
KOMSOMOLETS in Russia 28 Jan 93 p 1

[Article by Anatoliy Kravtsov: "Nightmare: Who Will Apologize to the President?"]

[Text] The interminable debates between the executive and legislative powers over which of them is more important have somehow made people completely forget another traditionally strong power in Russia—the power of the apparatus. Yet it is most probably this power that determines the course of the reforms today.

The scandal that erupted in the White House on 14 January this year was not covered by the press in the way it thoroughly deserved. On that day it became clear that certain people in the White House can easily deceive both the President and the Supreme Soviet itself and that they (the apparatus) can get away with it.

On the agenda that day were the President's remarks on the law "On Military Duty and Military Service" passed by the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet on 27 November 1992. The People's Deputies were handed out amendments to the law that were drawn up following the President's letter. Generals took their seats in the guest box together with a representative of the president.

At this point it was quite suddenly found that the text had been switched, and the president had been sent the wrong law—not the one that passed its second reading, but something entirely different.

Amazingly, no less than 17 passages in the law approved by the deputies had been "revised" by someone. Thus "revised," it came to even more resemble the notorious Union law "On Universal Military Obligation."

One has to admire the Speaker's reaction. He quickly saw that a furor could erupt on the floor and immediately took the issue off the agenda himself and adjourned discussion of it until after lunch.

The lawmakers, however, never rose to speak about the issue, either after lunch or the next day. There was a week of maneuvering to reach a consensus—or in ordinary people's language, to filibuster the issue and hide the secret workings of the parliament.

But a week later, when the law, still in its "revised version," was again brought up for discussion at the session, even unemotional deputies became incensed.

What about the top people in parliament? Were they really not involved in this "impropriety?" Was it really done without their knowledge? If it was, it is a disaster, because every law will now have to be checked against the verbatim records to make sure that other law drafters and lawmakers are not doing the same thing.

I would add, incidentally, that the president's legal aides also partly showed their true faces. They are passive and uninquisitive people (they do not read verbatim records). Even when they were told last December that the law had been emasculated, they paid no attention. As a result of cheating on the part of some people and complete idleness on the part of others, the president of the Russian Federation has been in an ambiguous position for two months. Put simply, he came close to being hoodwinked (he could very well have signed the law). The Russian Federation president was set up once again: He signed five pages of trivial proposals, never suggested any major ones, and axed yet another condition for deferment of military service.

Today [28 January] the Supreme Soviet will debate this law for what is now the eighth time. In a normal country, a parliamentary investigation into such an affair would have been launched long ago. The proper question is, of course: Who is guilty, and who is going to apologize to the president of the Russian Federation?

Shaposhnikov Meets With CIS Envoys in Moscow

PM2502163193 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 20 Feb 93 p 2

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Oleg Falichev report: "It Is Not Only the Economy Which Unites Us"]

[Text] A meeting took place at the High Command of the CIS Joint Armed Forces on 18 February between Marshal of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov, Commander-in-Chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, and the Commonwealth states' ambassadors and permanent representatives. The military/political results of the Minsk summit meeting, the orientation of the High Command's work to carry out the instructions of the Council of Heads of State in questions of defense organizational development, as well as problems of the legal regulation of military questions and of the CIS Joint Armed Forces High Command's military and diplomatic activities, were discussed at the meeting.

Russian Federation Law on Servicemen's Benefits for Service in Trouble Spots

Text of Law

93UM0385A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
5 Feb 93 pp 1,3

[Russian Federation Law, signed by Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin, Moscow, The Russian House of Soviets, 21 January 1993: "Russian Federation Law 'On Additional Guarantees and Compensations for Servicemen Who Are Performing Military Service on the Territories of the States of the Transcaucasus, the Baltic Region, or the Republic of Tajikistan, and Who Are Also

Carrying Out Missions for the Protection of the Constitutional Rights of Citizens Under Conditions of a State of Emergency and During Armed Conflicts"]

[Text] This Law establishes the socio-legal guarantees of servicemen who are performing military service on the territories of the states of the Transcaucasus, the Baltic Region, or the Republic of Tajikistan, and who are also carrying out missions for the protection of the constitutional rights of citizens under conditions of a state of emergency and during armed conflicts.

Article 1

1. Salaries based upon positions and ranks held in the amount of 1.5 times normal salaries are established for:

officers, army and naval warrant officers, and extended service military personnel who are performing military service on the territories of the states of the Transcaucasus, the Baltic Region, or the Republic of Tajikistan; and,

Salaries based upon positions and ranks held in the amount of two times normal salaries are established for:

officers, army and naval warrant officers, and extended service military personnel who are carrying out missions for the protection of the constitutional rights of citizens under conditions of a state of emergency and during armed conflicts.

2. The Russian Federation Government, in coordination with the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet, defines the armed conflict areas and the time of fulfillment of missions by servicemen for the protection of the constitutional rights of citizens in these areas in each specific case.

3. Salaries based on 1-4 wage categories and monthly supplemental types of monetary compensation based on the standards stipulated for extended service military personnel are established for servicemen who are performing military service based upon conscription in all of the cases cited in Paragraph 1 of this article and they are paid lump-sum grants in the amount of two months salary upon release from military service.

Article 2

1. One month of military service equals 1.5 months when calculating years of service when granting a pension to officers, army and navy warrant officers, and extended service military personnel who are performing military service on the territories of the states of the Transcaucasus, the Baltic Region, or the Republic of Tajikistan.

2. One month of military service equals three months when calculating years of service (the period of work) when granting a pension to servicemen who are performing military service on the territories of the states of the Transcaucasus, the Baltic Region, or the Republic of Tajikistan and also for those who are carrying out missions for the protection of the constitutional rights of

citizens in these states under conditions of a state of emergency and during armed conflicts.

This provision also applies to servicemen who are performing military service on Russian Federation territory under conditions of a state of emergency.

Article 3

1. In the event of the death of a serviceman as a result of his performance of his military duties or death (prior to the expiration of one year after his release from military service) as a result of trauma, contusions, or illness suffered during the period of performance of military service, the family of the deceased and his dependents is paid a lump-sum grant in the amount of 10-years salary for this serviceman.

The guarantees and compensations that are in force with regard to family members of servicemen who were killed in the Great Patriotic War apply to the family members of the indicated servicemen.

2. When a serviceman suffers trauma, wounds, contusions, or illness as a result of his performance of military duties that exclude the possibility of further performance of military service, a lump-sum grant in the amount of his 5-year salary is paid to that serviceman.

3. The payments listed in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article are carried out from the calculation of monetary salaries without taking into account the guarantees and compensations that are stipulated by Article 1 of this Law from the Russian Federation federal budget.

Article 4

1. Additional leave of 14 calendar days duration is granted on an annual basis to officers, army and navy warrant officers, and extended service military personnel who are performing military service on the territories of the states of the Transcaucasus, the Baltic Region, or the Republic of Tajikistan and additional leave of 10 calendar days duration for each three months of military service to those officers, army and navy warrant officers, and extended service military personnel who are carrying out missions for the protection of the constitutional rights of citizens in these states under conditions of a state of emergency and during armed conflicts. Travel time to and from the leave location is not calculated in the leave period.

2. An additional short-term leave is granted to servicemen who are performing military service based upon conscription, upon expiration of six months service on the territories of the states of the Transcaucasus, the Baltic Region, or the Republic of Tajikistan: to NCO's and sergeants—30 calendar days, to soldiers and seamen—25 calendar days. Travel time to and from the leave location is not calculated in the leave period.

Article 5

Besides those prescribed by Articles 1-4 of this Law, the following guarantees and compensations are established for officers, army and navy warrant officers, and extended service military personnel who are performing military service on the territories of the states of the Transcaucasus, the Baltic Region, or the Republic of Tajikistan:

housing is reserved for them during the entire time that they are performing military service in the states listed and their place on the list to receive it is preserved at the previous duty location for those personnel who do not have housing;

actual expenditures to lease (sublet) housing are reimbursed at the residence locations of their family members who have been evacuated but not exceeding three times the amount of the payment prescribed by law to lease (sublet) housing;

the cost of transporting family members who are dependents of the indicated servicemen is paid during their joint travel to and from the location where they will spend their leave;

the cost of transporting family members of the indicated servicemen and to transport their personal effects to their residence location during evacuation is paid and lump-sum material assistance is allocated to each evacuated family member in the amount of the minimum monthly salary prescribed by law.

Article 6

Organs of executive power of republics, autonomous oblasts, autonomous okrugs, krais, and oblasts within the Russian Federation allocate housing for the temporary quartering of personnel, utilities, communications lines and circuits, transportation resources and POL [petroleum, oil, and lubricants] materials, and also additional food for personnel to military units and subunits who are on the indicated territories to carry out missions for the protection of the constitutional rights of citizens under conditions of a state of emergency and during armed conflicts at the expense of resources allocated from the Russian Federation federal budget.

Article 7

The force of this Law extends to rank and file and command personnel, cadets and students of educational institutions of the Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs who are carrying out missions for the protection of the constitutional rights of citizens in these states under conditions of a state of emergency and during armed conflicts.

Article 8

The guarantees and compensations stipulated by Article 3 of this Law extend to servicemen who are performing

military service on the territory of the Republic of Moldova and to their family members.

[signed] B. Yeltsin
Russian Federation President
Moscow, The Russian House of Soviets
21 January 1993

SupSov Decree on Implementation

93UM0385B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 5 Feb 93 p 3

[Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Decree, signed by Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Chairman R.I. Khasbulatov, Moscow, The Russian House of Soviets, Russia, 21 January 1993: Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Decree "On the Procedures for Implementing the Russian Federation Law 'On Additional Guarantees and Compensations for Servicemen Who Are Performing Military Service on the Territories of the States of the Transcaucasus, the Baltic Region, or the Republic of Tajikistan, and Who Are Also Carrying Out Missions for the Protection of the Constitutional Rights of Citizens Under Conditions of a State of Emergency and During Armed Conflicts'"]

[Text] The Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Decree resolves:

1. To implement the Russian Federation Law "On Additional Guarantees and Compensations for Servicemen Who Are Performing Military Service on the Territories of the States of the Transcaucasus, the Baltic, or the Republic of Tajikistan, and Who Are Also Carrying Out Missions for the Protection of the Constitutional Rights of Citizens Under Conditions of a State of Emergency and During Armed Conflicts" from the moment of its publication.

2. To establish that the armed conflict areas, the time of performance of missions for the protection of the constitutional rights of citizens in them, the amounts (no lower than prescribed by this Law) and the procedures for granting additional payments, guarantees, and compensations to servicemen who are directly carrying out these missions in the indicated areas are determined by the Russian Federation Government in each specific case in coordination with the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet.

3. The Russian Federation Government will establish within a month the procedures for granting the additional payments, guarantees, and compensations and their amounts to workers and employees of military units and subunits that are deployed on the territories of the states of the Transcaucasus, the Baltic Region, or the Republic of Tajikistan and also for those who are carrying out missions for the protection of the constitutional rights of citizens in these states under conditions of a state of emergency and during armed conflicts.

[signed] R.I. Khasbulatov

Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Chairman
Moscow, The Russian House of Soviets
Russia
21 January 1993

CIS: GROUND TROOPS

Status of Russian Helicopter Fleet: Age Begins To Tell

93UM0388A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
3 Feb 93 p 2

[Article by Russian Federation Honored Military Pilot, Colonel Aleksey Novikov and KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Major Sergey Prokopenko, under the rubric: "Timely Topic": "The Russian Helicopter Fleet: What It Will Be"]

[Text] Realization of the idea of creating mobile forces in the structure of the Russian Army will, as we all know, require the solution of many problems. It seems that the problem associated with the current state of Russia's helicopter fleet and Ground Forces Aviation will turn out to be among them.

We think that there is no need to convince anyone of the role that helicopter aviation plays in the resolution of combat training, combat, special and other missions. This has been proven by the entire history of its existence. Let's recall Afghanistan, Chernobyl, the earthquake in Armenia, and the martial law situations in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia. The experience of the armies of the world's leading countries, in particular, the United States which widely uses helicopters as part of its rapid reaction forces, also attests to that. Operation Desert Storm confirmed one of the leading trends in the theory and practice of armed combat—the increased role of aircraft in Ground Forces operations. Approximately 80% of the firing missions, one fourth of which had to be assigned precisely to helicopters, were completed by aviation during the course of Desert Storm.

What is Russia's Ground Forces Aviation helicopter fleet?

As of today, it has MI-6 and MI-26 transport, MI-8 combat transport and MI-24 fire support helicopters in its inventory. All of them, except the MI-26, had already been developed in the 1950's-1960's. During that time the aircraft have become worn out and obsolete. They don't suit aviators for many reasons, but first of all because they can't be utilized 24-hours per day and can't fly under any weather conditions, and also in the presence of smoke or dust clouds. These helicopters do not meet contemporary requirements for service ceiling, range, or flight speed. They also do not have automated onboard defense suites. Specialists think that our aircraft are 15 or more years older as compared to the American helicopter fleet.

By way of illustration, let's take the flight technical safety level of this type of aircraft. It is determined first of all by the quality of design and manufacture of the equipment. Here the figures speak for themselves. Over half of all flying accidents caused by aircraft equipment failure occur due to design-manufacturing shortcomings and, more than half of these failures are repeat failures.

To complete the picture we only have to add that the helicopters about which we are talking have practically reached their maximum operating periods based on calendar year calculations. And by the year 2000, according to expert calculations, our air forces' helicopter fleet may be reduced by one third just due to wear and writing off of helicopters for scrap. Today renewal of the helicopter fleet has practically been terminated due to the lack of adequate financing.

That is only the general picture. An especially unfavorable situation is developing with the MI-24 strike helicopter fleet. Having been in the inventory for already more than 20 years, based upon their combat potential they significantly lag behind aircraft of this class that are in the inventories of the leading countries' armies, first of all the AN-64 Apache.

According to expert predictions, beginning this year, the process of writing off MI-24 helicopters will become avalanche-like in nature and the MI-24 fleet will be reduced by 40-45% by the year 2000. It remains to be added that industry ceased production of these helicopters in 1989.

Army aviation's transport helicopter fleet also does not meet contemporary troop support requirements.

Here a special role has been assigned to MI-26 helicopters. They are regarded as the primary transport system for airlifting and assault landing MSB [motorized-rifle battalion] combat vehicles, outsized cargoes, and munitions for first echelon troops and to support maneuvering in a tactical air assault. However even these helicopters, with all of their qualities, will not be able to totally carry out the missions. This is first of all explained by their high vulnerability to PVO [Air Defense] systems. And that is why they will be able to carry out flights only outside the range of these systems. And we clearly don't have enough MI-26's.

Therefore, the MI-8 "slogger" currently has to perform the lion's share of the transport load. But it already does not meet contemporary demands for cargo capacity and survivability. All the more so that the number of these aircraft is being reduced by nearly one third, and that we cannot expect them to be replaced by new, more modern types of aircraft in the current situation.

It is incorrect to think that attempts have not been undertaken to improve the qualitative composition of army aviation during all of these years. So, say the KA-60 and MI-38 combat helicopters, designed by leading native helicopter manufacturing firms, were supposed to replace the MI-24. However, for a whole series

of reasons, the development of these aircraft was dragged out for 10 or more years. Therefore, their equipment had to become obsolete and they need modernization right now and the drastic reduction of financing for defense has completely hampered the introduction of new equipment into the troops. And if helicopter deliveries are maintained at the 1991-1992 level, Ground Forces aviation potential could be reduced by more than one third.

What can change the situation?

It's obvious that we shouldn't count on the adoption of radical steps under conditions of today's crisis of the state economy. But, according to specialists from the Ground Forces Aviation Directorate, we can make real steps toward improving the situation based on current appropriations. Indeed, the appropriations allocation system for the development of equipment and the formation of orders that has developed is a serious obstacle on the path to that. So, the Air Force Weaponry Service continues to remain the general orderer for Ground Forces aviation, for which, in the opinion of many people, army aviation was in the role of a stepchild even before, and even more so now, when Ground Forces has been made an independent combat arm. Therefore, the percentage of the appropriations that has been allocated for its needs was too small and inadequate. We all know that it was left approximately 2.6% of the total amount allocated for the needs of all aviation. Let's assume that quite a bit of the subjective information in these assessments of this percentage could be different. But here's a fact. If qualitative improvement is present in the Air Force—fourth generation aircraft like the SU-27, MIG-29, MIG-31, TU-160, AN-124, and others have already entered the inventory there, army aviation is solidly mired in second generation helicopters. We can balance this situation by transferring the function of helicopter orderer to those people who operate them and who are vitally interested in them.

Incidentally, scientific research organizations and native KBs [design bureaus] that develop the ideology of development and that are directly developing helicopters persistently advocate that. It is clear to them as to no one else that the state of the current helicopter fleet has approached a crisis situation.

Let's cite this example. A demonstration of our latest native helicopters had a quite unanticipated impact under conditions when the United States is resolving the issue of whether it is worthwhile for the Army to develop the Comanche, a more modern helicopter than the AN-64 Apache. The simplicity of Russian helicopters, noted ROTOR & WING magazine, is viewed as the greatest potential threat for the Comanche program and maybe even for the European Tiger program. That, in the opinion of some Western specialists, is a good argument in favor of stopping progress along the road to new technologies on which the West currently feels there is no need to progress. "If this is the technological level that we have attempted to overtake," noted one

observer, "maybe we don't need to go that far or to move that quickly". We think that commentary is superfluous.

Right now, it is extremely necessary to define the strategy of the issue, otherwise Russia risks being left without a helicopter fleet.

CIS: NAVAL FORCES

Adm Gromov: 'The Russian Navy: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow'

93UM0408A Moscow *MORSKOY SBORNIK* in Russian
No 1, Jan 93 pp 3-8

[Article by Russian Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral F. Gromov, under the rubric: "Time and the Navy": "The Russian Navy: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow"]

[Text] The understandings that have been reached in recent years on the limitation, reduction and destruction of certain types of arms is making the peace more reliable and more stable. Both here in our country and across the ocean some people are prepared to think that we have already done everything possible. However, this is far from the case. There are still enormous unresolved problems that threaten the security of the world and democracy. And first of all—the nearly total absence of dynamics on the issue of the limitation and reduction of naval forces.

Nevertheless, no matter how events develop in the country and abroad, Russia's Navy continues to remain on guard of the Fatherland's maritime borders. The nearly three centuries that separate us from the time of its creation are irrefutable evidence that the navy is vitally necessary for our country.

Individual representatives of state military thought abroad express the opinion that a strong navy is a luxury for Russia since Russia is a continental power and it does not have and cannot have national interests beyond the seas. However, that opinion not only does not correspond to contemporary views on the role and tasks of navies in peacetime and in wartime but also contradicts Russia's history, the history of its difficult struggle for access to the seas and its formation as a great naval power.

The Slavs' striving for the seas was long-standing and thoroughly natural. Many written sources and archaeological finds attest to that.

The failure of the first Azov Campaign (1695) convincingly pointed out the need to have a regular navy. It did not manage to seize the fortress that was supplied by sea and the opportunity not only to transport a significant portion of the army to Azov only but also to blockade the fortress from the sea appeared only with the assistance of the flotilla that had been built, after which the fortress surrendered.

On 4 November 1696, the Boyar Duma, at the insistence of Peter I, adopted a decision on the creation of a regular navy on a permanent basis.

The 300-year history of the Russian Navy, reflecting the state's attitude toward naval power, attests to the alternation of its brilliant golden age with periods of profound decline, aggressive activity, and glorious victories—with inactivity and defeat.

In those periods when the navy's importance was understood by the state and proper attention was paid to it, it defended Russia's interests on the Black and Baltic seas in a fitting manner and promoted the increase of its international prestige.

Russia's first victories at sea—at Hangö, Osel and Grengam forced recognition of her supremacy in the Baltic. There were victorious expeditions to the Mediterranean Sea by the squadrons of Spiridov, Ushakov and Senyavin, the round-the-world cruise of Krusenstern and Lisianskiy, and the exploration of Antarctica by Lazarev and Bellingausen.

However, the Navy served Russia not only through its military deeds but its very presence repeatedly created a favorable situation for our country on the international arena and prevented dangerous crises.

The Navy promoted our country's emergence from political, economic and cultural isolation and Russia's introduction to the values of world civilization.

Expenditures for the Navy lay like a heavy burden on the state treasury. But at the same time the Navy's requirements to a significant degree stimulated first the development of metallurgy and the textile industry, and later—machine building, instrument building and other sectors. Many achievements of native mathematics, astronomy, geography, physics, and chemistry were generated by the Navy's requirements.

The Russian state was reformed and the Navy was reformed. Metal came to replace wood and steam and electricity came to replace the sail. Later the Russian Navy became an armored Navy.

The economic strengthening of the state ensured the renewal of ships but the half measures of political and military reforms did not permit them to correctly define the Navy's role and place in ensuring Russia's national interests. Furthermore, the required steps were not taken to bring the Navy's administrative organization into conformity with its mission and combat force level. And history does not forgive errors. Russian sailors paid with the pain of Port Arthur and the tragedy of Tsushima for the shortsightedness of the politicians and military departments.

During the years of the First World War, Russian sailors successfully combated the German Navy in the Baltic, tightly blockaded the Turks in the Bosphorous and established supremacy on the Black Sea.

The Revolution and the Civil War once again reduced the country's naval might to naught and if they managed to preserve the foundation of the Baltic Fleet, the Black Sea Fleet was almost completely destroyed. The ships that avoided being scuttled at Tsemesskiy Bay were sailed abroad and found their last shelter at far away Bizerte.

The native Navy began to recover from its losses only toward the end of the 1930's. The latest cruisers and destroyers, submarines and torpedo boats appeared. Battleships were built at the building slips. According to the government's plans, the Navy was to have become an ocean Navy by the end of the 1940's. But the Great Patriotic War, which the Navy entered having mainly coastal forces, crossed out these plans.

During the war, our Navy fought a strong maritime enemy, ensured the stability of the strategic flanks of the fronts and supported them in defense and offense, accomplishing assigned missions at the cost of incredible efforts.

Despite enormous difficulties, the country continued construction of the Navy at an accelerated pace. During the war, it received two light cruisers, 19 destroyers, 38 minesweepers, 54 submarines and nearly 900 various small combatants from industry. The quality of arms and combat technical systems was improved: artillery, torpedoes, mines, hydroacoustics, and communications. Radar appeared on ships. Naval aviation, especially torpedo aviation, increased quantitatively and qualitatively.

The Second World War disproved the prewar notion on the role and place of heavy artillery ships in combat operations at sea and emphasized the decisive role of aviation and submarines.

The voluntaristic decisions of the country's political and military leadership, that affected the surface Navy and ship artillery, the cessation of work to improve ship armor and underwater structural protection, had a negative impact on the development of our Navy during the 1950's-1960's. The direct destruction of previously built ships, aircraft, military equipment and weapons, as not corresponding to the views on the nature of a possible war, began.

At that time, the significance and priority of the development of all naval forces support systems were underestimated. It is at that time that the distortion in the structural development of the Navy and the imbalance in the development of its forces were noted. New ships that were under construction that had a great degree of readiness for launching were cut into scrap along with obsolete ships. The ratio of major surface ships in the shipbuilding program was drastically reduced. Soon their construction was terminated in general. On 14 May 1956, the government of the USSR adopted a decree, in accordance with which 375 combat ships were placed into mothballs above the reduction in the Navy that have been conducted in 1955.

However, for the sake of fairness, we need to point out that scientific-research and experimental-design work were being intensively conducted as before. In 1960-1961 alone, 78 designs of ships and vessels, of them eight submarine designs, including seven with nuclear power plants, 19 surface combatant designs and 20 auxiliary ship designs, were in development at scientific ship-building organizations. The installation of the latest weapons and technical systems were envisioned on these ships. Ultimately this was a major scientific beginning for the construction of fundamentally new submarines, surface ships and naval aviation aircraft that are equipped with missile weapons and modern technical systems.

Approximately from the mid 1950's, the primary directions of the qualitative transformation of the Navy became: the transition to construction of a nuclear submarine fleet, introduction of missile and nuclear weapons, and development of naval strategic nuclear-missile systems; equipping the Navy with long range aviation, and the introduction of aircraft on ships; the qualitative change of underwater situation coverage systems; the development of antisubmarine warfare men and equipment; and the introduction of various electronic systems and the automation of command and control of forces and weapons.

A review of our traditional ideas on the Navy's role and place in the country's defense system is occurring during the period of the world community's transition from confrontation to cooperation and mutual understanding. Our views on the Navy's combat force level, its organizational structures, primary operational missions, and the methods and techniques for accomplishing them are being reexamined and are being made more precise while taking into account the stages of military reform. The number and spatial scale of training exercises and the composition of naval forces and troops that participate in them are being substantially reduced.

Under contemporary conditions, our common approach to the future development of the Navy is based upon an understanding of the objective need for an orientation on qualitative parameters and maintenance of close contact with the other services of the Armed Forces, on a more complete utilization of the country's overall scientific and military-technical potential and maximum standardization of combat systems and weapons.

Techniques for accomplishing new missions under peacetime conditions that are associated with ensuring Russia's interests in the World Ocean and with the protection of its maritime borders are already being worked out and verified in practice along with traditionally existing combat missions of navies.

For the first time in 1992, Pacific Ocean Fleet ships were involved with the accomplishment of missions in cooperation with the multinational forces in the Persian Gulf

and Black Sea Fleet ships were involved with the accomplishment of peacekeeping functions and the evacuation of the peaceful population from the so-called "hot spots" of the Transcaucasus.

However, as before the Navy's primary mission remains ensuring the Russian Federation's reliable defense, sovereignty and territorial integrity from threats from without.

While assessing the Navy's role and place, we must take into account that Russia's integration into the world economic system with its market economy is unthinkable without the development of transportation routes, without the utilization of sea and ocean lines of communication, exploitation of the World Ocean's resources and their protection, first of all on the continental shelf. The Russian Navy must be one of the effective instruments of its foreign policy that is directed at ensuring our state's political interests and national security, that is, so that it can use its combat force level, structure and combat might to accomplish deterring and peacekeeping functions under the aegis of the UN.

The multinational forces combat operations in the Persian Gulf convincingly demonstrated the increase of the role of navies in the accomplishment of an exclusively wide circle of missions and their enormous capabilities to conduct offensive operations. We have submitted a number of initiatives on stabilizing and reducing military confrontation in the World Ocean since naval forces (other than strategic nuclear forces) remain the only type of armed forces which thus far have not been encompassed by the treaty process and the leading naval powers are constantly building up the striking power of their navies. The policy toward massive "missile-ization" of their naval forces that is being conducted by the Western countries attests to that. They are also continuing the construction of modern nuclear submarines and surface combatants and they are increasing the strategic mobility of their armed forces as a whole.

NATO's ocean strategy has also not undergone any substantial changes whatsoever which as before assumes a global naval presence to strengthen its dominant position in the world and the attainment of supremacy in the ocean and sea theaters with the initiation of war.

In the structural development of the Russian Navy, we must proceed from a possible threat to our interests from the ocean and sea axes and the country's real economic capabilities. Furthermore, part of the Russian Navy's forces may participate in multilateral naval formations, under the aegis of the UN, that operate on a permanent or temporary basis on behalf of the world community. The UN Charter sets forth the procedures for forming and employing forces of this type under the strategic leadership of the Security Council's Naval Staff Committee for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. The indicated Naval Forces will be able to accomplish the missions of ensuring freedom and safety of navigation, combating maritime terrorism,

piracy, narcotics trafficking, investigating mine damage areas and zones, and conducting required steps to combat ecological disasters.

As for ensuring security from the sea axes, this problem must also be accomplished through the coordinated efforts of all interested states based on a collective, well thought-out examination and discussion.

While assessing our country's geostrategic position and possible ocean and sea theaters of military operations, it becomes obvious that Russia must have the following active forces for the protection of its own interests: Northern, Baltic, Black Sea and Pacific Ocean fleets, and also a task force of small combatants and patrol boats in the Caspian Sea.

A modern Navy is a complex and very expensive combat system that can be developed only in peacetime over a prolonged period of time, over decades. It would be irrational and economically unjustifiable to attempt to maintain the strength of the Russian Navy at a level that corresponds to the strength of the USSR Navy. In the situation that has been created in the country's economy, we, while striving to reduce resources for defense, must proceed from the minimally required combat force level for the Russian Navy. In the structural development of the Russian Navy, primary attention, in our view, must be concentrated on increasing the quality of new ships, equipping them with precision-guided weapons, improving command and control systems and all types of support. At the same time, we need to remove obsolete and already ineffective ships in a combat sense from the combat force in a planned manner.

In the future, while taking into the planned removal of ships, the reduction of naval strategic nuclear forces and the elimination of a significant portion of the aircraft fleet in accordance with international obligations, the Russian Navy will be substantially reduced by 1995. The organizational structure of the fleets will also be simplified.

The imbalance in combat and support forces will be smoothed over as the level and structure of combat forces are reduced.

We propose to reduce the Navy's personnel strength by 22% by 1995.

The maritime component of the triad of strategic nuclear forces—missile submarines with intercontinental ballistic missiles—will be preserved in the Navy. However, their number will be substantially reduced.

General purpose forces will also be substantially reduced. Special attention will be devoted to optimizing models of submarines which will permit us to more rationally expend allocated appropriations to maintain their high combat readiness.

As for surface forces, the multi-mission destroyer, equipped with practically all types of missile weapons, including missiles with OBCh [conventional warheads] for destruction of ground-based targets, a unified

weapons control system, its own effective target designation systems, and which will also have a number of other qualities will become the primary class of major ships.

Small-displacement escort ships that have a multi-mission designation to combat the enemy will be developed as the primary classes of coastal patrol ships.

We plan deliveries to the fleets of modern ocean mine-sweepers of a new design with mine searchers and destroyers ahead along the course and other mine-sweeping weapons.

Naval aviation remains one of the Navy's primary combat arms. However, its combat force level will be reduced by approximately 40%.

Primary attention in the development of naval aviation will be devoted to the improvement of carrier-based fighter, missile-equipped, and antisubmarine warfare aircraft.

At the same time, we need to stress that there are serious problems in the realization of these ideas.

In 1992, a drastic reduction of appropriations for the construction and operation of ships and weapons occurred.

In the next 2-3 years, we envision reducing shipbuilding and conversion of production at a portion of Russia's enterprises and a substantial reduction of the volume of defense production at others.

Under these conditions, we have been compelled to concentrate the resources allocated to finance the completion of ships with a high degree of technical readiness. Obviously, for the time being we will have to build a limited number of submarines, and 2-3 classifications of surface ships and small combat vessels.

Examining the prospects for the structural development of the Russian Navy, we consider maintaining the high combat readiness of its men and equipment to be a necessary condition while its combat force level and strength is being reformed and reduced.

It is important that the Navy's Central Staff, scientific-research and educational institutions, ship repair enterprises and other organizations achieve the maximum utilization of the latest achievements of science and leading technologies for the development of qualitatively new arms and military equipment.

We need to ensure the balanced development of the Navy's combat arms and special troops. In the process, assign the priority to the development and production of effective precision-guided weapons systems, command and control communications, reconnaissance, electronic combat, and information systems.

We need to substantially reduce the arms and military equipment (VVT) stock list, the time periods and expenditures for their development by increasing the advisable degree of standardization of components, assemblies, instruments, subsystems and systems. Conduct a committee of experts of series produced and developed models of arms and military equipment to determine the conformity of their combat and operational specifications to contemporary requirements and economic conditions.

Under the new economic conditions, we will obviously be required to carry out a reorganization of the system of orders, operation and repair of arms and military equipment.

To increase the effectiveness of expenditures for the development and creation of arms and military equipment and the effectiveness of NIOKR [Scientific Research and Experimental Design Work], we need to shift to a competitive basis when conducting them with an assessment of the existing scientific-technical and technological beginning for the contracts being concluded or for economic contracts with industrial organizations. We anticipate a close link between the Military Production Conversion Program and the Arms Programs, and with arms and military equipment mobilization preparation and scrapping programs. Raise the role of the experimental facility as the most important way to ensure a high level of quality of the models of weapons and military equipment that are being developed. Implement a series of measures that ensure an independent assessment of the combat and operational specifications of ships, arms and military equipment.

Training of commanders and staffs must be directed toward improving command and control of forces during the course of bringing them to readiness, their deployment in designated areas and the conduct of combat operations, and the organization of their comprehensive support.

The accomplishment of the missions of qualitative improvement and preparation of our Navy makes special demands on the professional competence of the cadres which must become the criterion for their future service prospects. The ability to make substantiated decisions and to implement them under new conditions must be a naval officer's most important quality.

We need to strive for mastery in handling weapons and military equipment and for thorough knowledge of regulations and other guiding documents in individual training of personnel.

With all of the importance of other factors for the qualitative improvement of the Navy, a special role belongs to strengthening military discipline. A retreat from its requirements and standards, manifestation of carelessness, irresponsibility, neglect and callousness inevitably has a negative impact on a ship's or unit's

combat readiness and combat capability. Strong, conscious military discipline is simultaneously both a condition, a tool, and a guarantee of the renewal of military life.

And in conclusion, I want to stress that in its development the Russian Navy has accumulated many glorious traditions and customs. Under contemporary conditions, military sailors, while preserving and multiplying the best of them, must be taught initiative, independence, and creativity, while directing them toward the attainment of the new qualitative state of the naval forces, toward the further increase of their combat readiness, and strengthening military order and discipline. This is the foundation of the successful implementation of military reform.

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Change in Balance of Power Due To Black Sea Fleet Division

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in Russian No 57, 23 Dec 92 p 11

[Article by KOMMERSANT-DAILY Correspondents Vladimir Alekseyev and Aleksandr Stukalin, under the rubric: "The Black Sea Fleet Problem": "The Division of the Fleet Will Entail a Serious Alteration of the Balance of Power"]

[Text] The meeting of the Presidents of Russia and Ukraine, Boris Yeltsin and Leonid Kravchuk, that was planned for tomorrow has been postponed until the second half of January 1993. Thus, the anticipated agreement on the future of the Black Sea Fleet and the appointment of the new commander will be prepared no earlier than a month from now. Meanwhile the process of its division has already begun and is gaining momentum.

In accordance with the agreements on the fleet that were achieved in 1992 by Russia and Ukraine at Dagomys and Yalta, the transition period in the Black Sea Fleet's fate must extend for two years. However, the division of the fleet is gaining momentum in violation of the agreements: Kiev is actively forming the structure of its own naval forces.

The process of forming the Ukrainian Navy is occurring. The combat ship SKR-112, that was redeployed from the Crimea to Odessa, has already found itself under the command of Ukraine. Furthermore, the command and control ship Slavutich is undergoing trials and the large intelligence-gathering ship Pridneprovye is nearing completion. According to Ukrainian Navy Commander-in-Chief Rear Admiral Boris Kozhin's statement, the new escort vessel Getman Sagaydachnyy is being prepared for launch; construction of a Zubr Class hydrofoil is also nearing completion. At one time these ships were planned for the USSR's single Navy but right now they have been unilaterally resubordinated to Ukraine—since the primary shipbuilding plants are on its territory.

An artillery regiment, two combat application centers, a special center for anti-saboteur forces, and the only carrier-based aircraft pilot training center in the former Union and the range at Saki have also been transferred to the Ukrainian Navy.

According to observers, the Ukrainian program to create its own navy envisions a comprehensive approach which consists of the formation not only of combat potential but also of the appropriate rear services and auxiliary structures. Issues of rear services support can entirely be considered to be resolved—due to the resubordination of Black Sea Fleet aircraft repair and shipbuilding plants, the construction directorate and the reserve forces base. They have created their own materiel, financial and medical support systems. Ukraine proposes training national cadres for the Navy at the two higher naval schools in Sevastopol which are being reorganized into one naval institute and also at Sevastopol Naval Warrant Officer School and at the junior aircraft specialist school.

Independent experts suggest that the transfer of the coastal infrastructure into Ukraine's hands can doom the task forces and naval units that have remained with Russia to actual inaction which as a result of that will find themselves without rear services support. According to the experts, this fact, along with the appearance of the independent fleets of Ukraine and Georgia on the Black Sea, will result in a noticeable regrouping of naval forces in the region. In the process, it is obvious that the parties will hardly approach parity.

Under new conditions, the naval forces of Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, and moreover, Georgia, will hardly be able to dominate in the Black Sea region. Naval experts think that Turkey will obtain a certain operational-strategic advantage. Although the Turkish Navy is not distinguished by any special novelty (with the exception of several frigates built in 1985-1988 and missile boats), we must not forget that it holds the keys to the Black Sea: it is sufficient to blockade the Bosphorous Straits and ships of any state will find themselves locked in the water area of the internal sea. At the same time, that "shut-off" valve will be able to continue to operate as an entrance from without and to promote the buildup of the naval potential of Turkey's allies.

Besides the military aspect, the Black Sea countries will also have to take into account the economic aspect. It is here that the most suitable trade routes to the countries of Western Europe and the Middle and Near East, Africa and America lie (especially for Ukraine and Russia). Consciousness of that compelled Russia to conduct wars for control of the Black Sea straits for decades but right now the distribution of power has turned out to be not in her favor. Although experts think that, in a strategic context, the security of the maritime borders and freedom of navigation are determined not by the number of bases or even by the number of ships and Russia will certainly have to undertake significant steps in reply in that direction.

Meanwhile, observers assert that the Black Sea region is already being viewed as a NATO sphere of naval activity. The actual penetration of leading echelons of the North Atlantic bloc into the Black Sea is occurring under the aegis of the official thesis that the West must know who controls the ships in the Black Sea that are capable of carrying nuclear weapons and concern with the conflict in Abkhaziya. Military experts think that sending ships to the shores of Georgia under peace-keeping flags is entirely possible and, with the expansion of the Georgian-Abkhaziyan conflict—even a naval blockade under the aegis of the UN, as it is being observed in the former Yugoslavia. Involving significant naval forces of countries of other regions in Black Sea conflicts could result in the creation of a real threat to the southern flanks of Russia and Ukraine.

Under these conditions, only the rapid and civilized resolution of the Russian-Ukrainian contradictions can prevent that development of events—quite undesirable for both states.

CIS: REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

Provisions Chief, Maj-Gen Savinov, on Food-Supply Challenges

93UM0387A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
3 Feb 93 pp 1,3

[Interview with Major General Vyacheslav Savinov, chief, Central Food Directorate, RF [Russian Federation] Ministry of Defense, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Petr Altunin: "Food Supplies for the Russian Army: Not By Calories Alone"; date and place not given; first two paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] Although a poet some time in the past uttered the words: "One can live without food for a day, even longer," words which have become an aphorism, regulations and indeed the entire way of life led in the Army dictate an immutable rule: The soldier must be provided hot food three times a day, and he should be given all that the ration calls for, down to the last gram.

How can the above be observed under the conditions of today's difficult economic situation? This is the subject of our discussion with Major General Vyscheslav Savinov, chief of the Central Food Directorate, RF Ministry of Defense.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Vyacheslav Nikolayevich, about 18 months ago, your predecessor in an interview with KRASNAYA ZVEZDA spoke of the intense food supply situation in the Army. This was even reflected in the article's headline: "Whence to Obtain Food Items?" What about today?

[Savinov] The fact that the country's food supply situation has not improved to this day is no secret to anyone,

and this has a telling effect, as it did previously, on food provisioning for the Army. Nonetheless, I can say with confidence that the food ration situation in the Army and the Navy has taken a turn for the better.

The leadership of the Ministry of Defense and of the Central Food Directorate was able to prove to the government that the Army cannot be combat-ready if commanders and chiefs are burdened with hourly concerns over how to feed their personnel.

Thus the issuance of the Edict of the President of Russia on The Organization of Food Supply for Military and Equivalent Consumers. The edict directed that food supplies for servicemen as well as the military trade are to be made available on a priority basis, as a part of republic state needs of the Russian Federation.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Was that the intent of that document and others in the case of issuance of RF Ministry of Defense Order No 200 of 15 October 1992?

[Savinov] Yes, that document served as the basis of the 1 January implementation of the Statute on Food Supply for the Russian Federation Armed Forces in Peacetime.

That document continues the effort to standardize rations. There is definitely a difference between the various categories: for flying, the submariner's, the diver's, the therapeutic, and, as sometimes called, the "northern" ration. Nonetheless, today's general military ration is the same for enlisted men, noncommissioned officers, Army warrant officers, Navy warrant officers, commissioned officers, and generals on duty at stations located in the middle latitudes.

In spite of the food difficulties the country is experiencing, the government considered it necessary to add to the daily ration of the Navy 25 grams of meat and 50 grams of juice; to the general military ration, 20 grams of fish in addition to that. Taking into account the substantial "weight makeups" introduced in the last 5 years (with the larger amounts of meat and butter, and the introduction of 100 grams of milk on a daily basis and four eggs instead of the two on a weekly basis), the resulting caloric value places the ration into the highest category, which is the fourth energy requirement group.

In addition, the list of areas considered to be equivalent to Far Northern regions has been lengthened. The list now includes the cities of Mirny, Arkhangelsk, Novodvinsk, and Onega; the rayons of Verkhnetoyemskiy, Vinogradovskiy, Lenskiy, Onezhskiy, Plesetsk, Primorskiy, and Kholmogorskiy of Arkhangelsk Oblast, and Usinskiy Rayon of Komi Republic. Servicemen on duty there will be provided with the new, enlarged ration.

The statute also includes a provision whereby, based on a recommendation made by military medical board, each conscript 190 centimeters and greater in height is to be issued a "ration and a half" with no time limitation. (The previous period of issue was not to exceed 3 months).

Authorization is now granted to issue each officer either his full ration or individual food items comprising the ration. He is to be granted monetary compensation for any items not available for issue. This right is to be extended to each cadet having a family.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What about the smoking ration? The editors receive many letters dealing with this topic.

[Savinov] The matter is more difficult in the case of a smoking ration. The country's acute shortage of tobacco products renders their inclusion into a ration for enlisted personnel and noncommissioned officers unrealizable at present, but we nonetheless are attempting to raise the question of monetary compensation. It is true however that in Order No 200 there is something new: Servicemen on conscripted duty and those on extended tours of duty who smoke and are serving aboard submarines and surface ships located beyond territorial waters are to be issued cigarettes, while non-smokers are to receive 700 grams of sugar a month.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Vyacheslav Nikolayevich, it is no secret that effecting an improvement in quality of the ration and knowing its exact caloric value is one thing, but delivering the latter to the individual soldier is another.

[Savinov] I know what you mean. It may be said that this problem is eternal, but that does not mitigate its urgency. On the contrary, the country's limited food resources renders the problem even more topical. I can answer your question by saying this: In all cases where commanders and other superiors observe regulation-set requirements for supervision over the storage, delivery from depot, and kitchen preparation of food items, and over the weighing and portioning of dishes handed the individual serviceman, the latter does indeed receive everything in accordance with regulations. The situation is generally more satisfactory in this regard in the Leningrad and Volga Military Districts.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] But the editors do receive quite a number of letters complaining about poor preparation and incomplete portions of food. This kind of letter recently arrived from the Northern Fleet.

[Savinov] Such instances have come to our attention also, and we are according them our full consideration. Thus, inspections carried out in mess halls of the Kamchatka Flotilla and the Lomonosov Military Aviation Technical School have uncovered repeated failure to actually cook the prescribed amounts of meat, fish, and other food items. Those findings are the cause of an investigation presently under way.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] How is the food provision situation in the case of servicemen serving in nearby countries, in "hot spots"?

[Savinov] As far as CIS member countries are concerned, Russian Army personnel stationed there are provided

with food in the required amounts. Provisioning in the Baltics and in Georgia is proceeding on the basis of intergovernmental agreements. In "hot spots," this is another matter. There have been cases where extremists have raided food depots. Military authorities granted permission to draw from the NZ [emergency reserve], and the latter was soon replenished.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] On visits to units, I was often interested in how well potato peelers and dishwashing machines were operating, discovering on almost every occasion that they were either working poorly or not at all. On the other hand, on a visit to the GDR [German Democratic Republic], I noticed in a military unit that a potato peeler was functioning extremely well. A German officer told me, "This is one of your machines. Just look here: there is the Tula stamp."

[Savinov] Yes, I would say that our kitchen appliances are of solid design. But they in many cases have problems of fit and finish, but these are minor. The Germans apparently put the finishing touches to the equipment.

The picture is the same today. The situation not only has not improved, it has become worse, if anything. And now that we have brought that up, I say that there are more than enough problems in that regard. Mechanical bread slicers are manufactured only in Latvia; vegetable shredders and meat grinders, only in Belarus; electric skillets, in Ukraine. And now, with the severance of economic ties, in addition to a drop in product output we are running into customs formalities, which manifest themselves in an 18-percent surcharge on production costs.

A universal shortage has also descended on non-mechanical equipment: tables for washing vegetables; vessels for brewing tea; various pedestals and stands. The food supply service does have its own repair enterprises, but they are also beset by quite a few problems caused by the sharp rise in prices of lumber and metal.

Instead of entertaining hopes in vain, we took action to manufacture field kitchen devices and vessels in two plants subordinated to the TsPU [Central Food Directorate]. Under this arrangement, troops stationed in the European part of Russia will be supplied by a Bryansk military plant, while those on duty in the Asiatic part will be serviced by a Chita plant.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What goals are you setting for the future?

[Savinov] We have a goal that is quite definite: a continual transition to the industrial method of organization of feeding. What we have in mind is preparation on some scale - on that of the garrison, say, of potatoes, vegetables, meat, and fish; portioning of butter in specialized shops; and delivery of the items in ready-to-use form to mess halls. These kinds of ready-to-cook foods should subsequently be supplied by industry.

I would also like to point out the need for psychological realignment, in that the change to the territorial supply system would require our suppliers to become more concerned with developing their own—I would say—market characteristics. The goszakaz [state order] is a good thing, of course, but we still must contract with suppliers, and the degree to which we exert ourselves will weigh heavily on both the quantity and quality of products.

FROM THE EDITORS: Provisioning of food supplies for personnel of the Armed Forces is accorded priority, in spite of the difficult food situation existing in the country. Both the edict of the Russian President and the Ministry of Defense order discussed in today's interview are permeated by a concern for satisfying the Russian soldier's dietary needs.

Assuming a position of great importance however is proper implementation of the decisions, such that the individual serviceman receives the full military ration. This unfortunately is not always the case. This is brought out in the newspaper's interview with the chief of the Central Food Directorate. According to information in our possession, complaints of poor feeding are sometimes received by other echelons, including those of higher levels.

It is highly important that not a single instance of this sort escape the attention of unit commanders and rear service officers, so that they can take action to institute decisive measures to eliminate shortcomings. The editors will do their part by keeping a watchful eye on the problem of the soldiers' food supply.

Defense Ministry Budget, Finance Chief Interviewed

PM1002160593 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 10 Feb 93 pp 1-2

[Interview with Lieutenant General Vasilii Vorobyev, head of the Russian Defense Ministry Main Directorate for Military Budget and Finance; date, place not given: "Military Budget: Myths and Reality. Strategic Policy of Reducing Military Spending Maintained"—first two paragraphs are introduction]

[Text] KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's publication of the discussion article "The Social Status of a Russian Serviceman Should Not Be Reduced" evoked extensive interest among readers. A range of questions, of which the two main ones are of fundamental importance, have emerged from numerous letters to the editorial office and the Russian Defense Ministry. First, what kind of social status can there be for servicemen if a military budget has not yet been approved? And, second, if it has been decided to raise the military's wages, does this mean that military spending will increase again and the military budget will rise? The following aspect of the problem is also arousing universal interest: How is defense spending discussed by the Russian parliament, and what rules operate in countries with democratic,

presidential forms of government. And, lastly, when will the military budget be approved and in what form, and what is being done to adopt this highly important decision most speedily. There are also fears that, like last year, the absence of an approved military budget will cause holdups with the payment of army and navy personnel's pay and will not enable troop units to settle their accounts for food, fuel, heating, and supplies of the requisite equipment.

In view of the unusual nature and subject of the questions, the editorial office has once again asked Lieutenant General Vasily Vorobyev, head of the Russian Defense Ministry Military Budget and Finance Main Directorate, to answer a number of questions for our readers and for everyone who is worried by problems pertaining to the country's defense capability and the life and activity of the Russian Armed Forces.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Vasily Vasilyevich, the Russian Supreme Soviet has, over the last few months, been examining Russia's budgetary system for 1993. Legislators are taking a particularly painstaking approach to the problem of outlining state spending, defense spending included. Could you please tell us how the examination of the budget is progressing and whether there will be a repeat of last year's situation when almost six months was spent on debates and arguments?

[Vorobyev] Extensive discussion of the military budget by central economic organs, the government and the Russian Supreme Soviet is something new for Russia. Open access to information about the organizational development of the Armed Forces, their provisioning, and the military budget enables everyone to look at the problem and voice his opinion openly since it is quite natural for citizens, military professionals, and representatives of the authorities to want to resolve their doubts and see what use is made of money allocated for defense. That is why there is also a logic behind the heated disputes that arise when discussing the military budget, its structure, and size.

I think that this is a quite normal process, one in keeping with accepted standards in all countries with democratic forms of statehood although restrictions exist there too despite the open publication of a great deal of information and figures pertaining to military spending and its proportion of GNP. In France, for instance, the Defense Ministry is free to choose the information submitted to government organs and organs of representative power when discussing and upholding the draft military budget. The United States by no means openly discusses all items of military spending. But their success undoubtedly lies in the clarity of the whole procedure involved in getting the budget through and completing the job, hard as it may be, within a rigorously prescribed timeframe.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] We can, certainly, only dream of that at the moment. Nonetheless, what is the draft military budget for 1993 like? How big is it?

[Vorobyev] At first glance, the size of the military budget requested by the Defense Ministry and also incorporated by the Russian Government in the budget message may seem astronomical—over 3 trillion rubles [R]. However, it is also obvious that the state's economic problems lie behind the absolute figure for the military budget—financial instability, inflation, and interminable price and wage hikes. The sizeable—even by comparison with 1992—increase in the amount of appropriations requested for the army's needs has also been largely affected by these factors.

It is easy to see the relativity of the big figures from a very simple example. We all well remember that quite recently the level of the minimum wage was R70 a month, and as of 1 February this year this level was raised to unprecedented heights—R2,250 (a 32-fold increase). But there are figures showing that the cost of a single-person consumer basket in January was at least R5,000-7,000, thus canceling out the effect of the minimum wage growth indicator.

In order to be able to reliably pass judgment on the 1993 draft military budget, we reduced it to a single base figure [priveli ego k yedinoi baze], to comparable prices, using 1991 prices as a base. The picture became more realistic. At 1991 prices the military budget is estimated at R66.4 billion. For comparison's sake let me say that at this year's prices and employing identical methods of calculation military spending in 1991 and 1992 totaled R80.9 and 66.5 billion respectively, or a 19-percent drop over the year.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] A number of countries openly publish figures, give military spending as a proportion of GNP, and calculate per capita spending. What can be said about Russia's draft military budget using these, world-accepted indicators for estimating military spending?

[Vorobyev] Military spending as a proportion of Russia's GNP has dropped steadily since 1989. Whereas in 1989 it represented 8.5 percent, in 1992 the figure was 5.2 percent. Military spending as a proportion of gross domestic product [proizvedennyi natsionalnyi dokhod] also dropped from 15.6 to 9.1 percent. Today Russia's military spending as a proportion of GNP is close to U.S. figures, but somewhat higher than in France (4 percent) and Britain (3.9 percent). If we take another indicator—per capita military spending—the picture is somewhat different. Russia's per capita military spending is one of the lowest among developed countries. I am by no means in favor of increasing military spending. Each country, like a family, lives according to its means, its potential. The sum we have requested for defense is by no means the optimum figure, just the minimum necessary figure. It cannot be smaller because there are critical limits that cannot be overstepped. Some state structures' attempts to fail to see and understand this are hard to explain and often, to put it mildly, cause bewilderment.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Vasilii Vasilievich, tell us about items of the military budget, its priorities. Many people are interested as to the precise requirements for which the money allocated is used.

[Vorobyev] Traditionally the military budget comprises a number of sections, the main ones being: army and navy pay, arms and military hardware, scientific and technical output, capital construction, and servicemen's pensions.

I would like to stress straightaway that over the last few years the military budget has assumed an increasing social thrust. In 1993 it is planned to channel more than 50 percent of all appropriations into pay and training for army and navy personnel. Three years ago this expenditure represented only a fourth of the military budget. The conclusion is self-evident that ill-conceived and hasty cuts in defense appropriations affect above all, and to a greater extent the interests of personnel and their material security since difficulties arise with paying wages, paying for food and fuel, and with the upkeep of military camps, and combat training has to be cut back.

We cannot have another repeat of last year's situation where the Defense Ministry was unable to pay for fuel allocated under the state order as a result of the Finance Ministry's failing to earmark the requisite appropriations to pay for quotas allocated by the Ministry of the Economy. Lack of coordination among these eminent state structures resulted in a situation where pilots virtually stopped flying, tank personnel stopped driving tanks, and there was no means of transporting shift personnel to alert duty. On the other hand, oil refineries were put in a difficult position, having nothing to pay their workers' wages owing to late payment of accounts. When tackling the tasks of paying for fuel last year, we often recalled the years of "stagnation" when this problem simply did not exist since the requisite appropriations always arrived to pay for the allocated stocks (state order).

Many readers evidently do not know how much it costs today to clothe a soldier, or how much a soldier's greatcoat and other items of clothing cost. I will therefore cite a few figures. A greatcoat costs more than R7,000. Whereas in winter 1991 you could fully kit out a draftee for R368, for that money we can now, excuse me for saying so, only buy an undershirt and shorts; they cost exactly the same as we used to spend on a full set of uniform. The set now costs more than R40,000. In winter a sentry at a guard post needs a sheepskin coat and felt boots. They are being offered to us at prices of R32,000 and R1,300 respectively. Last January a soldier's daily food ration cost R21, this January this figure rose to R140, and in February the price soared to almost R200. Take questions of military pay. As you know, throughout the last year compensatory increases in servicemen's pay, even though they rushed to keep up with consumer price hikes, always lagged behind. Calculations show that the mean per capita income of the largest

category of servicemen—junior officers—taking subsidies, compensation, wives' earnings, and services in kind into account, amounted to no more than 85 percent of the mean per capita income in Russia. This at a time when most officers cannot find jobs for their wives due to the specific nature of military labor and are unable to place their children in kindergartens and creches, while many are in private apartments.

I am citing these examples to stress yet again that the main factor influencing the level of military spending in 1993 is price growth and inflation. For this reason amendments and clarifications have been made to more than one draft of the military budget. This January alone the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet examined two drafts.

If you take the first section of the military budget as a whole, there has been a noticeable drop in the sums being requested over the past three years in comparable prices. It could not be otherwise, since the Russian Defense Ministry is doing everything to cut spending. In particular, troops and Naval forces are being reorganized, numbers are being cut, the administrative component is becoming more compact, armaments are being reduced, and other restrictions are being brought in. We realize that many Russian citizens are experiencing difficulties, and we do not need any special treatment. I think that not a single soldier, officer, or general would even consider prospering at the expense of their fellow citizens. This idea is always reaffirmed when I am working with the troops. Our people, however complex the conditions they find themselves in, are prepared to make do with very little—and we should all be deeply grateful to them for that.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Is there anything new in the sections relating to payment for arms, military hardware, property, and scientific and technical products?

[Vorobyev] There is an insignificant increase in expenditure under section two. This is due to the fact that last year production and deliveries of armaments were sharply cut. Very insignificant appropriations were allocated to the Defense Ministry to pay for these armaments. This has left many military-industrial complex enterprises and large numbers of people associated with them in a very difficult position. Things have reached the point where the Army and Navy have stopped receiving even necessities. This year we will have to clear away last year's obstacles, organize relations with suppliers, and pay our old bills.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Great hopes have been pinned in the recent past on conversion. It was thought that once the military-industrial complex switched to a civil footing everything in the Russian garden would be rosy...

[Vorobyev] That's another myth. It has long been calculated that conversion only yields one ruble for every two invested. And not immediately either—only after a certain number of years. There is world experience in this area and we cannot fail to take note of it. References to

Russia being an exception are utterly misplaced. Even scrapping arms requires a considerable amount of expenditure. So far, the military-industrial complex has been forced to prosper by taking one approach—increasing its product prices, which are zooming up. Although I think it would not be quite right to accuse military-industrial complex enterprises of deliberately hiking prices. The employees who work there are dedicated people on whom the state's economic and defense potential depends today and will clearly continue to depend in the future. Defense enterprises too need to pay their workers, maintain kindergartens, medical centers, and other facilities. I will quote just a few figures: Quite recently—last year, actually—the country's central economic organs told us for accounts planning purposes that the price index for 1993 would be within the range 1.3-1.4; this January they issued a more precise forecast of 2.9, but life has made its own amendments even to this. Prices in January grew far faster than forecast. The Army is prepared to adopt proposals on cutting the second section of the military budget, but on condition that tanks, aircraft, and military property are supplied at acceptable (fixed) prices. It would be naive to expect this to happen because, on the basis of present-day realities, we will be upholding Defense Ministry positions at all levels of state administration.

The expenditure requested for military science is lower in comparable prices than last year, although the need for research in defense areas is quite great. After all, military science is having a hard time at the moment too. Some world-class institutes have been forced to go looking for orders that are very far removed from what they usually produce, with the sole aim of getting funds to pay their workers' wages. Cutbacks are being forced on the science sector, and scientists whose experience is invaluable are being dispatched to the reserves.

The question of space and space centers is a special subject. In January I visited Baykonur and saw for myself the plight that this unique complex finds itself in. Energy, heat, and water supplies are in a bad way and physical structures are disintegrating—all because of uncertainties about funding. Political solutions would seem to have been found and statements made about parity principles [paritetnyye nachala] in the utilization of the complex, but the declarations have not yet been followed up by financial backing. It is possible, of course, to debate the profitability of space work and technology, but who will take care of Baykonur officers' children freezing in schools and kindergartens, or of soldiers who cannot get a regular wash or change of linen? As we can see, it all comes back to the military budget again, because it is historically the case that we, the military, have to look after this space installation. As you can see, beyond section three of the budget there are to be perceived not only scientific aspects, but what will happen to people too.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Vasilii Vasilyevich, the fourth and fifth sections of the military budget (capital construction and servicemen's pensions) are linked by a

common idea—the social thrust of the spending they involve. After all, for a number of the past few years capital construction at the Defense Ministry has been associated more with the concept of the construction of housing—including housing for discharged servicemen—and buildings in the social sphere. I think the word "pensions" speaks for itself.

[Vorobyev] Yes, the number one task for many military leaders is housing construction. The Russian Armed Forces are currently short of apartments for more than 100,000 officers and warrant officers. Even larger numbers need their housing conditions improved. The Defense Ministry is doing a great deal to normalize the situation. In particular, officers are not discharged from military service as a rule unless there is housing available.

The draft military budget for 1993 provides more than R280 billion for housing construction, more than R98 billion for cultural and consumer construction, and, in all, it is planned to allocate to the development of the social sphere around 75 percent of the appropriations requested by the Defense Ministry for capital construction. By way of comparison I will say that the share of spending on these purposes was just 36 percent in 1989, 46 percent in 1990, and 60 percent in 1991. Few people realize that a large proportion of even the appropriations for capital construction is accounted for by payments to workers employed in the construction complex, who cannot be thrown out onto the street by a stroke of the pen cutting expenditure under this section.

It is planned to use these appropriations to build a total of 3.7 million square meters of housing (61,700 apartments) in 1993—25 percent more than in 1992. Along with housing it is planned to build more than 320 social, cultural, consumer, and municipal buildings—schools, preschool institutions, canteens, and suchlike.

As for the appropriations requested for pension payments, their growth and the amount included in the budget reflect the trend toward Army downsizing. The more people discharged, the more pensioners there are. There is no way around it, and that has to be recognized. We're now faced with a different task—how to recalculate pensions in time to prevent pensioners feeling vulnerable and defenseless in the face of market forces.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Tell me, how, for instance, will troop withdrawals from our immediate and more distant neighbors be financed? How will our commitments to eliminate weapons be met?

[Vorobyev] When it assumed the former USSR's commitment to withdraw troops from Germany, Poland, Cuba, Mongolia, and the Baltic states, the Russian Federation also inherited the burden of extra spending on the redeployment [peremeshcheniye] of and provision of amenities for troops. This is a tidy sum. In 1992 prices it amounted to around R200 billion at the start of the year, and in current prices is clearly nearing the trillion mark. But there are structures which believe that

spending on troop withdrawals should be financed out of the military budget funds allocated for the upkeep of the Army and Navy, without any additional appropriations for these purposes. This way of approaching the issue could lead to a failure to meet troop-withdrawal timetables and schedules because of a lack of the necessary financial resources.

We do have experience in solving similar issues. To my mind, we acted quite sensibly in 1986 when we started implementing measures to cut and eliminate certain types of arms. Given that implementation of this work required considerable financial outlay and called for different ministries and departments to coordinate their efforts, the decision was made to provide targeted budget financing for this kind of measure. This spending was not part of the military budget, although some of the money was allocated to the Defense Ministry.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] The Defense Ministry is often accused of not taking measures to restore order to the financial and economic activities of troops and Naval forces and to prevent wastage of resources allocated to defense. The mass media have been picking up on this subject too. What can you say about this issue?

[Vorobyev] The deteriorating crime situation in the country has undoubtedly left its mark on the Armed Forces as well. But I categorically disagree with those who claim that everything in the Defense Ministry is bad. In order to ensure the rational and strictly targeted utilization of state funds various organizational measures are being taken, controls have been stepped up, and demands have been increased on officials who permit violations of the use of material assets and funds. These issues are discussed at virtually every Defense Ministry Collegium session. Proceedings have been instituted for negligence against almost 18,000 people in the Far

Eastern Military District alone over the past year, and the state has recovered more than R23 million. The fact that the Russian defense minister's very first order this year was devoted to improving financial provision for Russian Federation Armed Forces organizational development and training can be seen as an unusual event too. Working on the basis of this pathfinder document instructions for improving organizational work and for seeking internal sources of finance for the troops' requirements have been worked out and issued to the Army and Navy financial service. I'm not going to comment in detail on the order and instructions, but I will say that they provide for a whole range of measures to ensure the rational utilization of state funds and to beef up controls, and I daresay that every measure will continue to be taken to ensure that the military budget is spent economically, for the good of the Russian Armed Forces.

In closing, I would like to stress that the Defense Ministry understands the need to cut military spending as one of the measures for reducing state spending and cutting the federal budget deficit. But there are limits to any reduction—particularly when it affects the interests of actual people—which, if exceeded, would have irreparable destructive consequences. This applies fully to the military budget as the economic basis for funding the activities of the Russian Army and Navy. When formulating the draft military budget for 1993 the Defense Ministry proceeded on the basis of the Armed Forces' minimum requirements. At the same time, as regards the most important items of expenditure, this requirement is calculated at a level which ensures defense sufficiency, the survivability of troops and Naval forces, and their ability to defend Russia's interests.

The discussion on the budget system for 1993 restarts in the next few days. I hope that parliamentarians will accept our conclusions and ratify the military budget.

INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

Russian Troops in Latvian Down to 27,000

934K0145B Riga DIENA in Latvian 12 Jan 93 pp 1, 8

[Article by Janis Silis: "Russian Army's Contingent Shrinks to 27,000"]

[Text] The numerical composition of the Russian military contingent stationed on Latvian territory has decreased by about 40 percent since the beginning of the withdrawal. This data was submitted by the commander of the Northwestern Group of Forces and has been corroborated by the Latvian Ministry of Defense. The Ministry of Defense has calculated that as of 1 Jan this year, 681 Russian military units with about 27,000 servicemen remain. (According to earlier reports from various sources, the number of military personal in Latvia was originally 60,000 -120,000.)

Units of the ground forces, navy, air force, and air-defense forces of the Russian army currently occupy 70,000 hectares of Latvian territory. The Latvian Foreign Ministry prepared this information based on the observations of local inhabitants and employees of rayon civil service administrations.

According to the ministry's information bulletin, the Russian armed forces have at their disposal 29 tanks, 73 AFV's and APC's, 12 anti-aircraft weapons systems, 36 self-propelled howitzers of various calibres, over 2,500 vehicles, 30 fighter-bombers, 20 tactical bombers, 11 transport aircraft, 11 helicopters, 12 submarines, 29 warships of various types, and about 100 auxiliary vessels.

The Defense Ministry reports that the 25th Motorized Rifle Brigade was illegally formed this year, and that the NWGF Command has been unable to convincingly argue the need for it. It is stationed in the immediate vicinity of Riga, at Adazi and Dobeles (18 and 70 kilometers, resp. from Riga). It consists of three tank battalions, two motorized rifle battalions, three artillery battalions, and other subunits. The Defense Ministry believes that this, coupled with the concentration of armed forces in Riga, in the Riga rayon, Liepaja, and Daugavpils, destabilizes the political situation and poses a constant threat to Latvia's independence.

The Ministry reports that the intelligence and counterintelligence services of the Russian security service and military (over twenty units in all) continue their activities.

Nevertheless, the Russian army is gradually leaving Latvia, although violations of the procedures for withdrawal established in the 1 Feb 1992 communique signed by the delegations of the Latvian and Russian governments occur regularly. Thus, during the second half of last year, the Russian army withdrew from 90 installations occupied by the military. Thirty-three military units have left Latvian territory. "In addition, 50 military units have been disbanded and 15 have illegally

been sold to commercial entities," states the bulletin. Last year there were 54 confirmed instances of Russian replacement troops entering illegally (2630 soldiers), as well as hundreds of other violations of various kinds. Mercenaries are recruited into Russian military units from among residents of Latvia.

In a meeting with representatives of the Kuldiga rayon municipal government, the head of the Bureau for Oversight of Russian Troop Withdrawal, Ilgonis Upmalis, noted there being reports that this year, Russian troop withdrawal could take place on a much greater scale. From the Russian point of view, the deadline for troop withdrawal might be 1994; the Latvian position is September 1993. Nevertheless, as Upmalis notes, there are certain installations that could not be withdrawn this year even with the best of intentions. These would be army munitions storage facilities.

Today, representatives of the Latvian delegation for international talks and the Kuldiga rayon municipal government discussed how to resolve the sore point over the closure of the Skrunda radar site. According to the information that the rayon municipal government has, the Russians could supposedly set up a new kind of mobile station based on a new principal on their own territory within six months.

Russian Troop Locations Pinpointed

934K0144C Riga DIYENA in Russian 16 Jan 93 pp 1, 8

[Report by Janis Silis: "The Latvian Republic Ministry of Defense Has Studied the Disposition of Russian Troops"]


[Text]

Figures from Latvia and Russia on the Composition of Troops in Latvia Differ

Janis Silis, Riga, 15 January. On the basis of the Vienna treaty on conventional forces in Europe, the Russian Ministry of Defense has submitted to the Latvian Republic Ministry of Defense a report on the numbers and arms of its troops. The figures presented differ from the information available to the Latvian Republic Ministry of Defense.

The document submitted by Russia provides information on eight military units of Russia's Army present on the territory of Latvia, made up of 16,174 men. Latvia has information on 681 military units with personnel numbering 27,000. Russia reports 54 tanks, 89 armored vehicles, 73 armored personnel carriers [APC's], 62 self-propelled howitzers, 210 combat aircraft, and 8 helicopters. In turn, the Latvian side has information on 29 tanks, 73 armored vehicles, 12 antiaircraft artillery pieces, 36 self-propelled howitzers, 50 combat aircraft, and 11 helicopters.

Russian Army's Sites in Riga as of 1 January 1993




Key:

1. Base compounds
2. Headquarters of Army groups and units
3. Intelligence and counterintelligence organizations
4. Anti-aircraft subunits
5. Navy base
6. Military factories

7. Ammunition dumps, weapons and military materials depots
 8. Hospitals, sanatoria
 9. Motor transport subunits, vehicle parks
 10. Military offices, administrative and economic sites
- Latvian Republic Deputy Defense Minister
[Signature] Valdis Pavlovskis

Russian Army's Most Important Sites in Latvia as of 1 January 1993



Наиболее важные объекты российской армии в Риге
Карты — Министерство обороны ЛР

Key:

- | | |
|--------------------------------------|--|
| 1. Tank and motorized infantry units | 7. Intelligence and counterintelligence organizations |
| 2. Artillery units | 8. Technical troop subunits |
| 3. Anti-aircraft missiles subunits | 9. Ammunition dumps, weapons and military materials depots |
| 4. Cruise missiles | 10. Territories occupied and used by Armed Forces Latvian Republic Deputy Defense Minister |
| 5. Airfields | [Signature] Valdis Pavlovskis |
| 6. Navy bases | |

The Russian document contains no information on air defense troops, naval forces, border troops, and intelligence and counterintelligence troops deployed in Latvia, nor on the Skrunda ABM radar, the cosmic radiation tracking station in the Ventspils region, or the enormous ammunition dumps at Tsekule, Vangazhi, Garkalne, and Mangali, or other facilities, it is said in a statement issued by the Latvian Republic Ministry of Defense.

Deputy defense minister Valdis Pavlovskis stated in an interview for DIYENA that the maps available to the Latvian Republic Ministry of Defense clearly show places where military forces are located that are still occupying

Latvia, occupying an area of 70,000 hectares. With support from outside, these forces are quite adequate "in the event of a crisis to bring back the past, overthrow the government, and so forth." V. Pavlovskis noted as particularly dangerous the newly created military formation of the Russian Army—the 25th Independent Motorized Infantry Brigade (3,000 men), which at this time is deployed in Dobeles and Adazi. "This means that if necessary they can attack Riga from both sides, and not even have to force the Daugava," Pavlovskis said.

Another similar military formation has been created in Strautini in the Aluksnenskiy region (the 482nd Motorized

Infantry Regiment), and it could probably be transferred to the Dobeles brigade. Attention is also drawn to the deployment of three unmanned STRIZH-type aircraft (winged missiles) at Martsiene, which in addition to photographic, television, and video equipment can carry explosives (100 to 200 kg). The range of these cruise-missile lookalikes may be 1,000 km according to the experts. If it falls on the territory of a city, this kind of apparatus could destroy an entire block.

Russia Forms 25th Separate Motorized-Rifle Brigade in Latvia

934K0145C Riga RIGAS BALSS in Latvian 19 Jan 93 p 2

[Official announcement by Latvian defense minister T. Jundzis: "Announcement from the Latvian Defense Ministry"]

[Text] On 1 Jan 1993, the 25th Separate Motorized-Rifle Brigade was formed on the basis of the Russian Armed Forces' 54th Junior Specialist Training Center stationed at Adazi and Dobeles, Latvia. The brigade's order of battle includes three tank battalions, three motorized rifle battalions, three self-propelled artillery battalions, a communications and medical battalion, and other combat-support subunits.

The battalions are equipped with shortwave radios, thus providing the brigade's headquarters with command and control over a distance of several hundred kilometers. This means that a very powerful rapid deployment combat unit is being formed in Dobeles.

Considering the brigade's structure, heavy armaments, and convenient location, one can conclude that the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces intends two important strategic missions for this unit:

First, to create a constant threat to Riga, the capital of Latvia; to destabilize the political situation; and in the event of a political crisis—together with anti-government groups within this country—to overthrow the government.

Second, in the event of international military-political complications in Europe, to support a rapid strike in the direction of Riga by the very powerful force concentrated in Kaliningrad, in order to cut a swath through Lithuania and Latvia in one day's time; by taking Riga, Russia would be able to reach all of its geopolitical and strategic objectives throughout the Baltic region.

Russia's endeavors to realize its secret plans constitute a gross violation of the 1 Feb 1992 communique on the withdrawal of forces. In unilaterally forming a new military unit on Latvian soil, Russia has illegally included the unit in the data-exchange document drawn up in conformity with the Vienna CFE Agreement, thereby in effect making the 25th Brigade's stationing in Latvia an internationally recognized fact.

This is a gross violation of international law and contradicts the Helsinki and Munich agreements on the accelerated withdrawal of Russian forces from the Baltics. At the same time, such conduct on the part of Russia is in complete accord with Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev's statement in Stockholm, where he reminded the European foreign ministers that Russia will use all means available to restore the Baltics as constituent parts of Russia.

UKRAINE

Lt-Gen Olenovich: Disorganization of Military Science

Aims, Players, Means, Assumptions

93UM0403A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian 13 Jan 93 pp 1-2

[Interview with Lieutenant-General Ivan Fedorovich Olenovich by NARODNA ARMIYA correspondent Lieutenant-Colonel Nikolay Gorenko under the rubric "Topical Interview": "Scientific Approaches Are the Foundation and Guarantee of the Effective Organizational Development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine"]

[Text] The scientific community of the armed forces of Ukraine is troubled by the fact that the processes of the organization of military-scientific research at the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and the emergence of military science, as the chief conditions for ensuring the scientific substantiation of decisions being made for the organizational development of the armed forces of Ukraine, have been dragged out.

The absence of an approved conceptual framework of military-scientific research and the essential structure of scientific institutions in the armed forces of Ukraine, legislation on state military-technical policy and the standard documents ensuring its fulfillment have led to the fact that the final development and adoption of guiding documents for the concrete organization and pursuit of military-scientific research in the armed forces of Ukraine have not yet been carried out. And that is forcing the use of outmoded standard documents of the former Union that do not confirm to contemporary conditions.

The danger is appearing—in view of the lack of a military doctrine and well-founded operational-strategic requirements toward the armed forces in general and toward the combat arms and services of the armed forces in particular—of the unbalanced development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The problem is moreover aggravated by the lack of a sufficiently developed mechanism for the independent expert appraisal of proposals for development programs for the armed forces overall.

The fact that a unified body for the administration of military science is lacking also cannot fail to evoke concern. This is leading to a breaking or weakening of

the ties between research in operational-strategic and military-technical areas, and making more difficult the efficient distribution of functions in the development, creation and procurement of arms and military hardware among the combat arms and services of the armed forces.

The scientific potential of the NIUs [scientific/research institutes] and higher educational institutions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is being insufficiently utilized. Large losses of scientific personnel are perceived as an impending catastrophe. The overall number of scientists in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, for example, deceased by more than 15 percent over the period from January 1992 through January 1993.

The reasons are all the same: the protracted process of the formation of scientific structure in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, substantial differences in pay for scientific and scientific-pedagogical personnel in military and civilian scientific organizations and higher educational institutions, the inadequate sophistication of military scientific institutions and scientific subdivisions of higher educational institutions in experimental scientific equipment and efficient computer technology, and the absence of the right of military scientists and pedagogues to hold more than one position at once or perform paid consulting and expert appraisals...

So then, one of the main reasons for this state of affairs in the scientific work of the Armed Forces of Ukraine up to the present day, as was stated at the beginning, is the lack of an accepted conceptual framework for organizing it. A draft conceptual framework was submitted for the consideration of the Military Collegium of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine the other day. NARODNA ARMIYA is publishing here an interview with one of the chief developers of the draft, Lieutenant-General Ivan Fedorovich Olenovich, chairman of the Expert Scientific Council of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, academician and doctor of technical sciences.

Résumé

Lieutenant-General Ivan Fedorovich Olenovich, born in 1934, Ukrainian, higher education. Completed the Odessa Artillery School imeni M.V. Frunze in the first category. After service in the field, studied at the Kiev Higher Artillery Engineer School imeni S.M. Kirov, which he completed in 1964 with a diploma with distinction and the qualification of engineer-electrical mechanic. He remained in the problems laboratory of the Armaments Department. He prepared and defended a dissertation for the rank of Candidate of Technical Sciences devoted to researching the dynamics of the disturbed motion of complex technical systems while continuing his basic activity. He organized, at the same time, the Laboratory of Gas-dynamic Research and headed the scientific area on the theory of analyzing non-linear dynamic systems apropos of the disturbed motion of special systems and aircraft.

He worked in the same department as an instructor and senior instructor in 1968-74, deputy in 1974-82 and then

chief of one of the leading departments of the Military Academy of Ground Forces' Air Defense.

I.F. Olenovich successfully defended his dissertation for the academic degree of Doctor of Technical Sciences in 1978, in which the methodological foundations for a systematic synthesis of complex technical processes in the early stages of development were developed. The results obtained were made inherent in the development and production of one such complex. He was awarded the academic title of Professor in 1980.

He worked as Deputy Chief of the Military Academy of PVO for Educational and Scientific Work starting in 1982. He has been First Deputy Chief of the Academy of the Armed Forces of Ukraine since December of 1992.

I.F. Olenovich has published more than 160 works with a total volume of more than 280 printed sheets, including seven author's certificates, two monographs and seven books and textbooks. More than 25 percent of the works were done by him without a co-author.

I.F. Olenovich is a major scientist who successfully combines the theoretical elaboration of problems and utilization of the results of basic research inquiry with organizing the adoption of that scientific work into programs for the development of armaments and military hardware. He is overseeing a number of complex scientific topics in the most important and priority areas of basic and applied research.

He has prepared 39 candidates and six doctors of sciences.

[N. Gorenko] Ivan Fedorovich, who was directly engaged in the development of this draft conceptual framework?

[I.F. Olenovich] The conceptual framework for the organization of scientific work in the Armed Forces of Ukraine was developed jointly by the Expert Scientific Council of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and the Center for Operational-Strategic Research of the Main Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The Chief of the Center is AINU Academician, Candidate of Military Sciences and Docent Major-General Vadim Aleksandrovich Grechaninov.

Among those taking part in the development of the conceptual framework were the Chief of Military Education and Chairman of the Commission to Reform Military Education and Science, Major-General Yuriy Mikhaylovich Prokofyev, the Chief of the Kharkov Military University, Lieutenant-General Vladimir Borisovich Tolubko, the chief of the Kiev Institute of the Air Forces, Major-General Valeriy Vasilyevich Gulyayev, the deputy chairman of the Expert Scientific Council of the Ministry of Defense, Colonel Tsezar Nikolayevich Sultan, the deputy chief of the Center for Operational-Strategic Research of the Main Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Colonel Georgiy Fedorovich Kostenko, the deputy chief of the Scientific-Research Center of the Military Academy of Ground Forces PVO, Colonel

Valeriy Dmitriyevich Kokhno, the deputy chief of the Scientific-Research Department of Kharkov Military University, Nikolay Semenovich Kosilo, and other scholars. The conceptual framework was approved by the Expert Scientific Council of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and the Commission to Reform Military Education and Science.

The basic provisions of the conceptual framework are inseparably linked with the creation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the necessity of scientific substantiation for the decisions being made on questions of the country's defense and with the specific conditions of the emergence of military science in Ukraine.

INFORMATION. About one percent of the total personnel of the Armed Forces will be employed in the system of scientific-research institutions of the Ministry of Defense after its complete development, according to the calculations of specialists. The total spending will be about 0.4 percent of the military budget. The corresponding values for other developed European nations, by way of comparison, are an average of two and three percent.

The proportionate annual spending per employee in the system of military-scientific research and in academic science in Ukraine are roughly equal, which confirms the feasibility of the concept...

[N. Gorenko] Does the conceptual framework reflect only the views of the developers you named?

[I.F. Olenovich] No, it contains an aggregate of provisions reflecting the views of the military leadership of Ukraine on the organization of military science and the creation of conditions that provide for the effectiveness of military-scientific research and the efficient utilization of its results, both in the interests of the armed forces and of the nation as a whole.

[N. Gorenko] Ivan Fedorovich, I understand that I am asking a difficult question, but we'll get nowhere without it, as they say: it is interesting and important for all of us to know how the aim and tasks of military science in the Armed Forces of Ukraine were formulated.

[I.F. Olenovich] Military science, as is well known, is the aggregate of knowledge about the nature of wars, the general laws and principles of armed struggle and the organizational development of the armed forces, the forms and methods of preparing for combat operations of various scope and ways of averting wars. It must be considered in multi-dimensional fashion, since military science encompasses the military aspects of national security, the military arts—strategy, operational arts and tactics, the organizational development of armed forces, military economics and the command and control of armed forces, as well as social problems and the psychology of interpersonal relations in military collectives, armaments, the theory of the branches of the Armed Forces and rear support, military training and indoctrination and military history.

[N. Gorenko] The subject of military science, that is, is armed struggle and averting war?

[I.F. Olenovich] Quite true. And the chief aim of military science here consists in devising objective conclusions and recommendations for decision-making, founded on efficient methods of research and the achievements of scientific and technical progress, on questions of providing for the defense of Ukraine.

[N. Gorenko] Thank you. Let's dwell on the tasks, if you please...

[I.F. Olenovich] The basic tasks of military science are:

- researching possible sources of military danger, the nature of contemporary warfare, trends of change in it and effective methods of averting war;
- uncovering general laws and developing the principles and methods of preparing for and waging armed warfare (operations [operatsiy], combat operations [boyevykh deystviy]), and for the command and control of troops (forces) and their comprehensive support;
- analyzing general laws and principles for the organizational development and training of armed forces to repel armed aggression, and determining their force (numerical) composition, organization and technical sophistication;
- researching problems of combat and mobilization readiness, and indoctrinating and training the personnel; and
- substantiating ways of developing the armed forces, the theory of the military arts and the means of armed struggle.

If one were to try and formulate the chief task, it consists of devising proposals and recommendations defining the foundations of the military doctrine and military policy of Ukraine.

INFORMATION. Work on organizing military-scientific research (MSR) started at the moment when the Ministry of Defense, at a conference of the chiefs of higher educational institutions, posed the task of developing proposals on military education and science in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The Deputy Chief of the Military Academy of Ground Forces PVO [VA PVO SV] for training and scientific work, Lieutenant-General I.F. Olenovich, organized an initiative group to develop a conceptual framework for military-scientific research and the structure of the scientific institutions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. It included scholars from the VA PVO SV, KVVAIU, VITRA PVO, KVIRTU PVO, KVVIUS and other higher educational and scientific-research institutions.

[N. Gorenko] What—within the framework of ensuring the defensive capability and military security of the country—principal directions of military-scientific research does the conceptual framework contain?

[I.F. Olenovich] There are quite a few. But they are all main ones. I think and hope that the newspaper will not skimp on space, and will publish the full list of them... So then, they are:

- analysis of the military-political situation in Europe, the trends in its development and the military policy of Ukraine;
- research on problems of the military security of Ukraine, and the selection and substantiation of ways of achieving it with a regard for foreign experience;
- assessment of the geostrategic position of Ukraine from the standpoint of determining the basic operational directions and capabilities for the disposition of groups of forces and the basing of air and naval forces;
- assessment of the human and material mobilization resources of Ukraine, substantiation of the essential size and structure of the Armed Forces, the system for manpower acquisition for them and the standard organizational structures of large formations and units;
- development of proposals for the structure and arrangement of the system of command and control of the Armed Forces in peacetime and wartime, and for the automation of command and control of troops and weaponry;
- substantiation of the degrees of combat readiness of troops (forces), the structuring of a unified system to warn of a military attack, the substance and time frames for the principal measures for bringing troops (forces) to various degrees of combat readiness and convert the country's economy from a peacetime to a wartime footing;
- substantiation of the substance, procedure and time frames for the execution of measures to create and place mobilization reserves on the territory of the country;
- elaboration of the fundamentals for the preparation and waging of operations, the fundamentals of the application of the branches of the armed forces and the arms of service in operations, military regulations and manuals;
- elaboration of the principal areas of military-technical policy in the interests of equipping the armed forces with modern arms and military hardware, programs of development for promising technologies, and seeking out and realizing new principles in the development and creation of military hardware;
- elaboration of proposals for balancing the defense industry with the requirements of the armed forces, with a regard for opportunities for the conversion and reconversion of the economy of Ukraine;

—substantiation of measures to re-organize the system of combat and operational training of the troops, train and indoctrinate the personnel and train military cadres; and

—elaboration of proposals to develop the infrastructure, prompt preparation of the territory of Ukraine and improve the system of lines of communication in the interests of resolving the tasks of defending the country.

[N. Gorenko] Military scientists should by rights undoubtedly know all of these areas, as they say, to the full. Ivan Fedorovich, what are the principles for the organization and performance of military-scientific research?

[I.F. Olenovich] They rely on the general principles of state scientific and technical policy. They may be formulated as such:

- the organic unity of military-scientific and military-technical progress with the economic, social and spiritual development of society;
- the integration and balancing of the military-scientific, military-educational and military-economic potentials of the country;
- the intelligent combination of centralization in the elaboration of scientific policy in the military realm and decentralization in the implementation of that policy;
- the planning and execution of military-scientific research using the dedicated-program approach on a competitive-contract basis;
- the paramount support of scientific and technical areas and projects that provide for the resolution of important problems in the defense of the country, via the selection of scientific priorities and the concentration of efforts and resources on them;
- the balancing of basic and applied research and the comprehensive stimulation of innovative activity in the military-scientific and military-technical spheres;
- the assurance of cost recovery and profitability for military-scientific research, via the utmost utilization of its results through the market for scientific and technical products in the interests of the economic and social development of society as a whole; and
- the widespread involvement of self-managing social and scientific-and-technical organizations, participating in the elaboration and implementation of military-scientific and military-technical policy.

INFORMATION. The group worked to elaborate the conceptual model for reforming military education. The basic provisions for the concept of MSR pertaining to the integration of military education and science were reported at the organizational meeting of representatives

of higher educational institutions stationed on the territory of Ukraine. A commission was formed there on the reform of military educational and science, headed by Major-General Yu.M. Prokofyev. The composition of that commission was approved by the Chairman of the Commission of the Supreme Soviet on Issues of Defense and National Security, V.V. Durdinets.

[N. Gorenko] Ivan Fedorovich, the principal requirements toward military science are its close links with practice, the concentration of efforts on solving paramount problems of the defense of Ukraine, the priority development of the most promising directions of military-scientific and military-technical progress, the operative utilization of the results obtained for the practical resolution of defensive tasks... Proceeding from that, how has the conceptual model taken into account the initial base for the organization of military science?

[I.F. Olenovich] We have taken a whole series of factors into account on that plane. The presence of a legal foundation on basic questions of defense organizational development, for example, or the concentration of basic military-scientific potential at higher educational institutions and the possibility of involving the mighty scientific potential of the Academy of Sciences, sector institutes, scientific-production associations and the civilian higher educational institutions of Ukraine in resolving the tasks of military science. The conceptual framework assumes the creation of a system of scientific-research institutions and organizations in the Armed Forces that would meet the conditions of the full national independence of Ukraine. A mechanism is being set up to plan military-scientific research and manage it, and the scarcity of financial and material resources will disappear... All of this, in the view of the developers, will also ensure the accomplishment of the principal demands toward military science.

[N. Gorenko] Ivan Fedorovich, what are the foundations for the organization of military-scientific research proposed by the conceptual model?

[I.F. Olenovich] We assume that an integral system of military-scientific research will take shape in the course of realizing the conceptual model. It will comprise the foundations of the organization. I think that the research will develop along such lines as the development of an overall plan for the development of the Armed Forces in accordance with the interests of national security and the development of the military-political climate around the world. Second, in the direction of elaborating the forms and methods of the possible application of the armed forces (military-theoretical research). And, the third direction, the accumulation of military scientific and technical potential and the development of arms and military hardware (military-technical research). I think that if those areas are organizationally supported, the foundations of the system of military-scientific research will be laid down. Scientific-research institutions and organizations of the Armed Forces, complemented by outside institutions and organizations brought in to

resolve military-scientific tasks, will undoubtedly make up the backbone of it, as it were...

[N. Gorenko] And what manpower and resources will be used to conduct the research?

[I.F. Olenovich] The leading role in ascertaining and formulating the basic scientific problems connected with defense organizational development and in researching the most important aspects of armed struggle and questions of averting war is relegated to the Center for Operational-Strategic Research of the Main Staff (TsOSI GSh) of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. That is, as they say, the main strike force. The TsOSI, in accordance with the conceptual framework, will take part in elaborating the military doctrine and strategy for averting war and in determining the basic directions for the organizational development of the Armed Forces. Problems to be researched include military security, military strategy, the operational arts and the command and control of the Armed Forces, the efficient utilization of human and material resources, the determination of operational-strategic requirements toward arms and military hardware and the development of programs of military-scientific research. Scientific-methodological supervision of scientific-research institutions and organizations centrally subordinate to the Armed Forces will also be accomplished, and the research they pursue will be coordinated.

The conceptual model also assumes such structures as a Committee on NIOKR (scientific research and experimental design). The selection of the main executors and monitoring of the fulfillment of the work, supervision of the testing of experimental prototypes and preparation of proposals for the arms program all lies with the Committee for NIOKR of the Arms Directorate of the Ministry of Defense.

The conceptual model assumes that the principal executor of scientific research will be the Central Scientific-Research Institute of the Armed Forces (TsNII VS), which is administratively subordinate to the Main Staff of the Armed Forces. It is intended to pursue research on the scale of the armed forces and the branches of the service. The TsNII MO includes scientific centers on problems of the military arts, arms and military hardware, problems of rear support, modeling and war gaming, information and forecasting.

The conceptual framework also relegates a large role to the Academy of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. It will, in interaction with the TsOSI GSh, TsNII VS and other scientific institutions and organizations, pursue research in departmental areas and on issues of military education. Two scientific-research departments are currently being created at the academy—one on problems of the command activity of higher command personnel of the Armed Forces, and the other on problems of national security.

The conceptual model also proposes that the Planning Institute of the Ministry of Defense and the proving

grounds be independent scientific institutions conducting research in the interests of the armed forces as a whole. We are planning that quite a bit of research in the interests of branches of the armed forces and the arms of the service will be conducted by the scientific (scientific-research) centers of the military universities and institutes. Problem-oriented scientific-research centers (laboratories), special design bureaus and temporary collectives could also be created to perform scientific, planning and design work in individual priority areas.

Military-scientific groups (MSGs) could be created under the directorates of the Ministry of Defense, the Main Staff, the operational commands and the commanders-in-chief of the Air Forces, Air Defense and Navy. Their main purpose is to establish contacts with scientific subdivisions of the Armed Forces, first and foremost through the influence of the practice of combat and operational training for the troops and their everyday activity on the development of military science, devising proposals to develop the branches of the Armed Forces and arms of the service and coordinate research in their interests, gather and analyze the results of scientific activity in the corresponding bodies of command and control, large formations and units. The structure and size of the groups is determined by decision of the corresponding commanding generals (superior officers).

INFORMATION. The Ministry of Defense, in order to accelerate the processes of resolving issues connected with the organization of MSR and the development of arms and military hardware, in October-November 1991 created a group of military and civilian scientists and specialists with the task of developing a conceptual framework for military-technical policy, the structure of the system of scientific-research institutions and the principles for the organization of MSR. That group was headed by Lieutenant-General I.F. Olenovich. The statute on the group was approved by the Ministry of Defense on 20 Nov 91.

One of the tasks entrusted to it consisted of preparing a Statute on the Expert Scientific Council (ESC) of the Ministry of Defense. It was approved by the minister of defense in November of 1991.

The documents developed by the group were reviewed by the Commission to Reform Military Education and Science. The structure of the system of scientific organizations and their principal tasks were reported to the minister of defense, and were approved by him.

[N. Gorenko] You have touched on an important question—gathering and analyzing the results. How will that be accomplished?

[I.F. Olenovich] The gathering, analysis, systematizing and storage of military-scientific information and its provision to the whole system of military-scientific research, according to the conceptual model, will be accomplished by the scientific center for information and forecasting that is part of the Central NII [Scientific-Research Institute] of the Armed Forces. The scientific center for modeling and war games that is part of the

Central NII will be a unified tool for joint research on issues of strategy, the military arts and tactics, the development of arms and technical and rear support. The gaming of operations (combat operations) using mathematical models will be accomplished based on it, using a whole set of automated workstations in the interests of performing research tasks, the operational-strategic training of the leadership of the Armed Forces and the training of attendees at higher educational institutions. The leading role in the creation of software and program support for the whole system of military-scientific research under the conceptual framework belongs to the center for modeling and war gaming.

We are also planning that the subdivisions of the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, sector NIIs, scientific-production associations and civilian higher educational institutions will be able to take part in the fulfillment of the scientific programs of the Ministry of Defense.

[N. Gorenko] Ivan Fedorovich, how does the conceptual model propose the management of military-scientific research?

[I.F. Olenovich] The management of military-scientific research will be accomplished by the Ministry of Defense on the basis of existing legislation, the edicts of the President of Ukraine, decrees of the Supreme Soviet and Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and the resolutions of the Defense Council and the Council for National Security.

The functions of organizing military-scientific research are performed by bodies of the central apparatus of the Ministry of Defense, the Main Staff of the Armed Forces and the commands of the Armed Forces and their staffs.

These bodies will perform the tasks of devising and pursuing military-scientific policy in the realm of organizational development and employment of the Armed Forces of Ukraine—selection of the most important directions of research, determination of the aims and formulation of programs of research, preparing proposals for the leadership of the Ministry of Defense on the optimal ways of realizing them, planning research and posing tasks to scientific-research institutions and organizations of the armed forces, and concluding contracts with outside parties to perform military-scientific research. It also includes monitoring the course of the performance of the work, summarizing and analyzing the results of research, preparing proposals for the leadership of the Armed Forces on their effective utilization and developing proposals for improving the structure of scientific-research institutions, for the purpose of bringing them into conformity with the requirements that arise.

Decisions on the most important questions of organizing and carrying out military-scientific research are made by the Collegium of the Ministry of Defense.

They undergo independent expert scientific appraisal, in order to raise the objectivity of the evaluations of the

research areas and programs and the most important scientific results and conclusions.

The official body of expert appraisal is the Expert Scientific Council of the Ministry of Defense. It has the status of a legal person, and is endowed with the authority to create *ad hoc* expert groups of highly qualified military specialists, supervise their work and submit their conclusions to the corresponding bodies of the Ministry of Defense.

The overall supervision of the planning of military-scientific research and its execution is exercised by the Main Staff of the Armed Forces. Responsibility for the management of military-theoretical research is entrusted to the Chief of the Main Staff of the Armed Forces, and for the management of military-technical research to the chief of the Arms Directorate of the Ministry of Defense. The bodies for everyday supervision of military-scientific research are the TsOSI of the Main Staff in the sphere of military-theoretical research and the Committee on NIOKR of the Arms Directorate in the military-technical sphere respectively.

Bodies for collegial supervision (scientific and scientific-technical) and councils intended for devising recommendations and proposals on a democratic basis for managing the activity of the indicated institutions will be created in all scientific-research institutions of the Armed Forces.

[N. Gorenko] Will those offices you cited be interacting?

[I.F. Olenovich] Yes. Interaction among the scientific-research institutions of the Armed Forces, in accordance with the conceptual framework, will be implemented in a three-level structure.

The first level is represented by the TsOSI GSh and the Committee on NIOKR, the second by the Central NII of the Armed Forces and other scientific-research institutions that are centrally subordinate, and the third by the scientific institutions and organizations of the higher educational institutions.

Scientific-methodological supervision will be exercised downward from above, and will consist of the higher levels providing the lower with the initial data and summary evaluations necessary for the coordinated choice of directions for research and ways of resolving scientific problems. The feedback is via the lower levels providing the higher with their own scientific results.

The interaction of scientific-research institutions and organizations of the Armed Forces with the subdivisions of the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine will be accomplished through a section for defense problems under the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences, with the scientific-production associations, sector institutes, civilian higher educational institutions and through the appropriate ministries and directorates.

The scientific-research institutions and organizations of the Armed Forces, in the interests of coordinating joint

research and exchanging the results of it, interact with the subdivisions of the Safety Service, the Border Troops, the National Guard, the Civil Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine.

The chief coordinator of the research is the Scientific Committee of the Armed Forces (NK VS), headed by a deputy chief of the Main Staff of the Armed Forces and chairman of the Scientific Committee of the Armed Forces. The committee includes the heads of directorates in the Ministry of Defense and the commands, representatives of the Cabinet of Ministers, the defense industry, the heads of the TsOSI GSh, higher educational institutions and sections for defense problems under the President of the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. The NK VS discusses and prepares for the confirmation of the Collegium of the Ministry of Defense plans, programs and proposals on issues of military science. The committee relies in its work on the conclusions and recommendations of the TsOSI GSh, the Committee for NIOKR and the Expert Scientific Council of the Ministry of Defense.

Support for the everyday activity of the scientific committee is entrusted to the apparatus of the Expert Scientific Council.

Inherent in the conceptual model is the fact that the general contractor for the performance of research is the Main Staff of the Armed Forces. The staffs of the commands, the Education Directorate and the socio-psychological act as customers in their areas. The bodies supporting interaction among the customers and the performers of the research are the TsOSI GSh, the Committee on NIOKR and the corresponding military-scientific departments and groups.

The TsOSI GSh, in interaction with the Committee on NIOKR, every year develops recommendations on the principal directions of military-scientific research. The recommendations are submitted to the Scientific Committee of the Armed Forces, the directorates of the Ministry of Defense, the staffs of commands, the TsNII VS and other scientific institutions and organizations, in order to study them and prepare proposals on the subject matter of military-scientific research for the coming year.

Draft programs for research, including on a competitive basis, come from all agencies, institutions and organizations with a vested interest in their realization to the TsOSI GSh, where they are studied and coordinated and a draft combined research program is formulated in conjunction with the Committee on NIOKR and the Expert Scientific Council on the Ministry of Defense.

The decision on the substance and tasks of military-scientific research for the coming year, both in the interests of the armed forces as a whole and in the interests of the branches and arms of service, is made at an expanded session of the scientific committee.

The combined program of military-scientific research is considered at the Collegium of the Ministry of Defense. The program, approved by the collegium and the minister of defense, is the basic document defining the subject matter of the work being performed by the scientific-research institutions of the armed forces and outside executors for the coming year along with the deadlines for its fulfillment and the procedure and the amounts for financing it. This program is the legal foundation for the customers of research to enter into contract-agreement relations with the executors.

[N. Gorenko] In short, how does the conceptual framework propose military-scientific support for the realization of the programs of scientific research?

[I.F. Olenovich] In two principal areas.

The first area consists of operational-strategic and other research on the problems of organizational development of the armed forces as a whole, support for which is entrusted to the TsOSI GSh and the Central NII, as well as research on issues of the operational arts and tactics of the branches of the armed forces and the arms of the service, the directorates, intelligence, communications and EW, support for which is performed chiefly by the scientific centers of the higher educational institutions.

The second area is military-technical. The Committee on NIOKR and the Central NII accomplish military-scientific support for arms systems in general, and the scientific centers of the higher educational institutions the support for the arms systems of the branches of the armed forces and the arms of the service, as well as individual prototypes of arms and military hardware. The problem-oriented scientific-research centers provide military-scientific support for individual prototypes and constituent assemblies (items) of arms and hardware.

The overall coordination of military-scientific support for research programs is accomplished by the Scientific Committee of the Armed Forces...

INFORMATION. The last discussion of the provisions of the draft conceptual framework was held at an expanded session of the ESC of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine on 25 Mar 92. Present at it were the acting chief of the Main Staff, the heads of Ministry of Defense directorates, representatives of the armed forces commands and chiefs of scientific-research institutions and the higher educational institutions of the Ministry of Defense. Also taking part in the session were deputies of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine, representatives of the State Committee for the Defense Industry and Machine Building and the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. Thirteen of the 216 participants were academicians, 41 were doctors and 86 were candidates of science.

The session of the ESC gave preference, by an overwhelming majority of the votes, to the structure of the scientific-research institutions proposed by the Expert Scientific Council, declining the alternative version for

that structure. The decision of the ESC, adopted on 25 Mar 92, was approved by the minister of defense.

[N. Gorenko] Ivan Fedorovich, a little about the training of military-scientific cadres. How is that problem reflected in the conceptual model?

[I.F. Olenovich] The training of military-scientific cadres is planned in the interests of staffing the scientific-research institutions, organizations and higher educational institutions of the Armed Forces with scientists and specialists. The training of military scientists is through doctorates and graduate studies at the higher educational institutions, the Center for Operational-Strategic Research and the Central NII and at scientific centers, as well as through the seeking of academic degrees. The preparation and defense of dissertations is conducted chiefly within the framework of the scientific-research NIOKR work being performed on the most topical and promising areas of organizational development of the armed forces.

Specialized councils to confer academic degrees at institutions and organizations of the Ministry of Defense were formed by decision of the Higher Certification Commission of Ukraine. The awarding of academic degrees and titles to scientific specialists in the Armed Forces is under the procedure stipulated by the Higher Certification Commission of Ukraine. The preparation of degreed military researchers in various areas of military science will also be accomplished in special divisions of the corresponding higher educational institutions of the Ministry of Defense.

[N. Gorenko] A few words regarding the economic aspects of organizing military-scientific research in the Armed Forces...

[I.F. Olenovich] The conceptual framework envisages the mechanism for financing military-scientific research to be both budgetary and market sources through the dual (in the interests of the armed forces and the non-military sphere) utilization of the results of the research. The principal source of financing for the military-scientific research will be budget appropriations for defense allocated from the state budget, and received by the scientific-research institutions and organizations through contract-agreement relations with customers. Some of the expenditures for military science will be returned to the budget of the Ministry of Defense via the sale of research on the nationwide market for scientific and technical products.

[N. Gorenko] Is a contract basis envisaged for the mutual relations with non-military structures?

[I.F. Olenovich] Yes. But the fulfillment of orders under contracts (agreements) with outside organizations by the scientific-research institutions of the Ministry of Defense is permitted only in the absence of detriment to the basic activity. The placement of orders at outside organizations for the performance of military-scientific research is allowed only when necessary within the limits

of the financial capabilities of the Ministry of Defense, or on a mutually advantageous basis.

[N. Gorenko] And how will the labor be paid?

The labor of generals, officers and non-commissioned officers at scientific-research institutions and organizations of the Ministry of Defense will be paid in accordance with the rate scales established by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine for scientific workers, with a regard for supplemental monetary payments for academic degrees and academic titles. Incentives for innovative activity in the sphere of military science are in accordance with the Law of Ukraine "Fundamentals of State Policy in the Sphere of Science and Scientific-Technical Activity."

[N. Gorenko] And, finally, the stages in the realization of the conceptual framework...

[I.F. Olenovich] The creation of a system of military-scientific research in the armed forces is planned to be carried out in three stages.

Being created in the first—1992—are NIIs under the functioning of the TsOSI GSh, the Central NII of the Armed Forces, the Expert Scientific Council and the Committee on NIOKR. The organizational groups of the scientific centers at higher educational institutions have been created and have set about their work to prepare and launch the corresponding institutions. The existing scientific-research institutions of the Armed Forces are continuing to function. The planning of research and the selection of cadres to staff the scientific institutions for 1993 are being implemented.

The launch of the directorates and departments of the scientific centers within the limits of the sizes stipulated for 1993 will be accomplished in the second stage, in 1993. The Scientific Council of the Armed Forces and the military-scientific groups under the corresponding directorates and commands will be created. The development and coordination of programs of research will continue, programs approved earlier will be continued and the selection of cadres to bring staffing levels up to the 1994 norms at scientific institutions is being conducted today.

The third stage, in 1994, will see the accomplishment of the full launch and functioning of scientific institutions in accordance with the approved structure. Their staffing with personnel, the deployment of the physical plants and support and servicing subdivisions will be completed...

[N. Gorenko] Thank you, Ivan Fedorovich, for your interesting and substantive discussion!

[I.F. Olenovich] Thank you to the editors for the attention to, and understanding of, the problem of creating conditions for the efficient and scientifically substantiated organizational development of the armed forces of Ukraine. A request in that regard. Please accommodate our invitation to the broadest segments of the public to take part in discussing the problems we have touched on.

We will be exceedingly grateful for your suggestions for improving the conceptual framework.

We ask that those suggestions be sent to the address of 252048, Kiev-48, Vozdukhoflotskiy Prospekt, 28, Expert Scientific Council of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.

Conceptual Model of Nation's Security Plan

93UM0403B NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian
13 Jan 93 p 2

[Article by Yevgeniy Yakovlevich Kvartsev, Gennadiy Aleksandrovich Murashin and Mikhail Ivanovich Melnik: "A Conceptual Model of National Security for Ukraine"]

[Text]

2. State Security: Problems and Solutions

The section "The Concept and Substance of National Security" could in essence comprise the theoretical foundation of the whole conceptual model. It sets forth the system of views of this problem, statements that carry various information on security, that can be distinguished from each other in form and substance. The section also includes an aggregate of interconnected proposals, the sequence and order of presentation of which makes it possible to judge the structure of the conceptual model.

The inclusion in the orbit of scientific knowledge of foreign-policy and intra-national processes that are occurring around the world and in the republics of the former USSR is leading to an awareness of the deeper essence of new phenomena—such as the concept of the national security and national interests of the state, the goals, tasks and types of national security and the principles for ensuring it, as well as the threats to national security, their classification and the criteria for evaluating the degree of danger. All of these phenomena should be gnosiologically assimilated not only by this section, but also by the whole conceptual model.

The substance of the very concept of national security in the conceptual framework could thus be expanded as a result of analysis of the principal traits of the modern era, including the region of the former USSR, with it becoming comprehensive, multi-tiered and defined as the aggregate (system) of state legal and social guarantees that provide protections against external and internal threats, the ability to withstand unfavorable influences from without and providing for those internal and external conditions for the existence of the state that guarantee the opportunity of stable, all-round progress for a society and its citizens.

The national security of Ukraine is consequently deemed to be to ensure the protection of the constitutional order, the rights and freedoms of citizens, state sovereignty,

territorial integrity and the natural environment against external and internal threats.

The national security of Ukraine is closely linked with the conception of its national interests, reflecting the higher interests of all of society as opposed to the interests of groups of citizens or individuals. The conceptual model must note in that regard that the fundamental national interest of Ukraine consists, first and foremost, in the formation of a genuinely democratic, law-governed society in which the political, social, economic and spiritual interests and rights of all of its citizens based on the utilization of those material goods that are possible at the current stage of civilization and have vitally important significance for the stable functioning and development of the people of Ukraine.

The traditional interpretation of the national interest is quite broad, and is associated by and large with the attainment of such goals as the existence of nations as free and independent states, ensuring growth in the economy and national welfare, averting military threats or encroachments on sovereignty, retaining allies, achieving an advantageous position in the international arena etc.

The concrete expression of the national interest is the postulation of the goals and tasks of the foreign- and domestic-policy directions of the country.

In practice the national interest, as ultimately expressed in the government policies of this or that country, inevitably takes on a subjective nature as well. This phenomenon is reflected in the choice of possible ways of achieving goals in various realms. And that is natural, as natural as the fact that the vitally important national interests of sovereign states that do not coincide cannot be subordinated to the interests of some single state or group of states. Because each state in the world community has its own national interests that are characteristic of it, that are regarded by it as vitally important based on its own national values. The national interests of Ukraine on this plane are understood to mean the concrete historical social relations and convictions, the material, cultural and historical values, that have vitally important significance for the stable functioning and development of the state. The determination of the vitally important national values is the political task of Ukraine. They should have their own constitutional codification.

The task of determining the most suitable correlation of national requirements and capabilities can be solved, in our opinion, provided that overall human interests and values lie at the foundation of mutual relations among nations in the world community. It is essential only to coordinate vital national interests and try to balance them with a regard for common, objective international interests at any levels of communities of nations; its achievement should be the objective interest of every state and member of society individually.

The pursuit of priorities of national interest in accordance with the interests and aims of other nations will create a world founded on collaboration, mutual understanding and interdevelopment.

The creation of a new priority in relations among states in the world community therefore requires the conscious participation, with good will, of each of them in the process of forming world consensus.

Proceeding from that important methodological provision, the national interests of Ukraine could be categorized according to several principles. **By the extent of importance to society**—vitally important, important, peripheral. **By the degree of stability**—short-term, medium-term, long-term. **By functional spheres**—political, economic, military and humanitarian, among others. The opinion is taking hold that the importance of interests as a whole corresponds to the degree of their stability, that is, vitally important national interests are long-term, important ones are medium-term and peripheral ones are short-term. That is even though sometimes in practice short-term national interests prove to be vitally important, and long-term ones secondary.

One must nevertheless keep in mind that under conditions of a dynamic international system, short-term national interests do not replace long-term ones; they are just superimposed on them, and complement them.

It is important that the conceptual model actually delineate the vitally important external and internal state national interests of Ukraine. This is a complicated task, and its accomplishment is possible only based on a solid foundation of analysis of many of the key problems of Ukraine that have arisen since the proclamation of its Declaration of Independence.


If one were to speak of the vitally important interests of Ukraine in brief, they are in principle reduced to one thing—ensuring survival in the broadest sense of the word, assuming a degree of personal and material independence that is acceptable to all social groups; the preservation of a rationally understandable territorial integrity and national-political stability; the integration of Ukraine into the world economic community, and its provision with sources of raw materials and natural resources and their sale; assurance of access by Ukraine to the seas and oceans; resurrection of the traditional lifestyles of the people of Ukraine, with their possible evolution; affirmation of the sovereignty of the state in the sphere of international relations and foreign policy, as well as the principal institutions, values and other most important characteristics of the social order.

Next it would be logical to define in the conceptual model, in our opinion, the basic directions for the realization of the national interests of Ukraine at a given period in the building of the state, and to subdivide them into economic (foreign-economic), political-ideological and military (defense) capabilities.

СОНБУ (1)

СОПРЕНТИРОВАНА НА ПРАКТИЧЕСКУЮ
КООРДИНАЦИЮ ВСЕХ ВИДОВ ДЕЯТЕЛЬНОСТИ
ГОСУДАРСТВЕННЫХ И
ОБЩЕСТВЕННЫХ ИНСТИТУТОВ С ЦЕЛЮ
ПРЕДОТВРАЩЕНИЯ, ВЫЯВЛЕНИЯ И
УСТРАНЕНИЯ ЯВНЫХ, И ПОТЕНЦИАЛЬНЫХ
ВНУТРЕННИХ И ВНЕШНИХ
УГРОЗ, ПРЕДСТАВЛЯЮЩИХ ОПАСНОСТЬ
ДЛЯ ДОСТИЖЕНИЯ
СТРАТЕГИЧЕСКИХ ЦЕЛЕЙ УКРАИНЫ:—
ПОСТРОЕНИЕ ДЕМОКРАТИЧЕСКОГО
ПРАВОВОГО ГОСУДАРСТВА.

В ЦЕЛОМ ОБЩАЯ СОНБУ
ОБРАЗУЕТ ЕДИННЫЙ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННО-
ПРАВОВОЙ МЕХАНИЗМ, ГДЕ
КАЖДАЯ ЕЕ ПОДСИСТЕМА РЕШАЕТ
ЗАДАЧИ И ФУНКЦИИ ЗАЩИТЫ
ЖИЗНЕННО ВАЖНЫХ ИНТЕРЕСОВ
ГОСУДАРСТВА В ПРЕДЕЛАХ
ПОЛНОМОЧИЙ,
ОПРЕДЕЛЯЕМЫХ ЗАКОНОДАТЕЛЬСТВОМ
УКРАИНЫ.



Key:

1. The system for ensuring the national security of Ukraine is oriented toward the practical coordination of all types of activity of state and social institutions with the aim of averting, ascertaining and eliminating clear and potential internal and external threats that pose a danger to the achievement of the strategic aims of Ukraine—the building of a democratic and law-governed state. The system as a whole forms a unified state legal mechanism, where each of its subsystems performs the tasks and functions to protect the vitally important interests of the state within the limits of the authority defined by the legislation of Ukraine.
2. System for ensuring the national security of Ukraine (overall):
3. Bodies with general authority [read down]: Supreme Soviet, Cabinet of Ministers, Defense Council, ministries, agencies, others
4. Law-enforcement bodies: general courts, Constitutional Court, bodies of the procuracy, bodies of justice, internal-affairs bodies, others
5. Bodies with special authorities: National Security Service, Ministry of Defense, Committee for Intelligence, Committee for the Protection of the State Border, specialized services of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, others
6. Social institutions: DOSA, stations for protecting public order, other
7. The state-legal mechanism—requirements toward the system for ensuring the national security of Ukraine: operativeness, reliability, stability, professionalism, viability

It would be important to indicate in the conceptual model that the protection of the national interests of Ukraine is ensured by such state guarantees as the maintenance of a minimum defensive sufficiency, the creation of a well-developed and stable economy, the priority observance of human rights and freedoms, the protection of the environment, the inviolability of state sovereignty and territorial integrity and other guarantees. The social guarantees are expressed in the attainment of general national consent, and are based on the system of prevailing institutions.

The conceptual model, with regard to the vitally important national interests of Ukraine, should formulate the political goals and tasks of the state in the sphere of national

security. The following should be formulated in the conceptual model as such aims today: the development of Ukrainian statehood; the formation of a civil society founded on principles of market economics; the building of a law-governed state; the demographic, genetic and cultural resurrection of the Ukrainian nation; the ecological protection of the people; the formation of a mechanism for foreign relations based on the balance of national interests as the foundation for the reinforcement of stability and the prevention of international conflicts; and, civilized entry into the system of collective and international security. It would be expedient to delineate the following types of national security: political, economic,


ecological, informational, military, scientific and technical, the security of cultural development (national-cultural, socio-cultural) and other types of security (nuclear, intellectual, food, security of trade). A description of the basic types of security that reveals the substance of it is given in the conceptual model with a regard for a comprehensive understanding of the problem of national security and its assurance.

The policy of the state that makes it possible to find the optimal correlation among these types of security, for the purpose of creating favorable conditions for social development, could be called the national-security policy of Ukraine. Its essence is the top of a triangle whose base is the policy of military security. Its basic aim and highest sense is ensuring the protection of the vitally important interests of Ukraine and, ultimately, the unrestricted development of the individual and the flourishing of society and the state.

The problem of security, touching on all sides and aspects of the vital activity of society and the person, has a complex structure and requires its own awareness with a regard for the utilization of a system of methodological principles. Chief among them are humanism, the equivalence of national interests, legality, glasnost and the equality of all before the law, the mutual responsibility of the state and citizens, effectiveness and suitability, parity and dynamics, among others.

The significance of principles is also inestimable because they not only provide a new understanding of the nature of national security for the present day, but also open up the possibility of foreseeing essential changes in those realities in the near and distant future.

Such a social phenomenon as threats to national security, their categorization and the criteria for evaluating those threats merits special attention. The national security of Ukraine as a systematic social formation is called upon to



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2. Types of national security
3. informational
4. scientific and technological
5. economic
6. political
7. ecological
8. military
9. security of cultural development (national-cultural, socio-cultural)
10. other types of security: nuclear, intellectual, food, trade security

serve, first of all, to prevent and repel threats that actually exist or are likely to exist and, second, should in essence be suited to those threats and correspond to the principle of sufficiency. The system of national security, in a case where such conformity is lacking, becomes economically wasteful and, on the political plane, could become a separate source of threat to the national interests of other states.

To be more concrete, a disruption of the equilibrium between the system of guarantees of national security and clear or potential threats leads, on the one hand, to the democratization of society and the collapse of social structures and, on the other, to unwarranted repressions within the state and conflicts in international relations.

Proceeding from that, a threat to the national security of Ukraine is understood to mean a clear or potential change in its constitutional system, a change in the stable state of social relations or the environment, in which the normal existence of people and the functioning and development of society itself is disrupted.

The conceptual model must focus attention on the fact that a new assessment of threats to national security and the degree of their danger is one of the cornerstones in devising a new policy for the security of Ukraine as a state. They may be categorized and evaluated therein according to the following features: by the likelihood of realization as **clear**, that is, those whose danger is obvious to the national interests of the people of Ukraine, and for which the prompt taking of immediate measures is necessary, and **potential**, those threats that could become an object of danger as the result of activity, the activeness of a person that contradict the established norms and rules for behavior in society.

According to the location of the sources, they are **internal**, that is, they take shape within the confines of the objects of national security (the sources are located on the territory of the state), and **external**, that is, they arise outside the confines of the objects of national security (the sources are located outside the boundaries of the state).

According to their relation to the person, they are **objective**, *i.e.* they take shape and are realized regardless of the desire and will of people and their activity, and **subjective**, *i.e.* they are a consequence of the conscious and purposeful activity of people and social institutions (intelligence-subversive and criminal, among others). The type features of human activity are political, economic, ecological, military and socio-cultural, among others.

According to consequences, they are **nationwide**, *i.e.* the consequences of the realization of the threat are reflected in the state of the whole nation or the majority of its subjects, **local**, *i.e.* consequences whose realization is reflected in the state of some region, populated area etc., and **individual**, *i.e.* consequences whose realization is reflected in the existence of an individual subject or pertains to a certain sphere of human life.


The conceptual model must emphasize that threats to the national security of Ukraine can have various degrees of significance and variety, as the result of which they are not some single, definite and constant aggregate. Their combination (variety) could appear or disappear, increase or decrease during various historical periods. This is objectively conditioned by the dialectical process of development of natural and social phenomena, giving rise to these or those contradictions. They can be transformed into sources of threats, and could contain the danger of destabilization of social relations in Ukraine.

That same section of the conceptual model should also name the possible threats to the vitally important interests of Ukraine. Such threats in the **military-political sphere** could thus include encroachments on the foundations of the constitutional order, territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, as well as interference in its internal affairs; the use of territory for subversive activity against third countries, or manifestations of political extremism and terrorism; sabotage of the organizational development of the armed forces or the pursuit of military reform, and disruption of the defensive capability of the state and the fighting ability of the army; the danger of military attack; the inflaming of interethnic conflicts and the weakening of the morale and political spirit of personnel in the armed forces; involvement in military conflicts or shows of force (including nuclear blackmail); and, the divulging of state and military secrets, among other things.

In the **economic and ecological spheres**, they are undermining international economic collaboration and the currency and financial system; infringing on the property rights of the state or natural and legal persons; slowing the conversion of defense industries and the development of information technologies; sabotaging the transition of the economy to market relations; trade and economic blockades and disruption of technological processes; destruction of the environment and sabotage of measures of ecological protection; disrupting regimens and technologies or other dangerous types of production; the spread of epidemics that threaten the life and health of people, and other threats.

The reliability of the vitally important interests of Ukraine depends first and foremost on creating an efficient **system to ensure national security** and mechanism to realize it. The second section is devoted to that problem. The activity to ensure national security in it, in our opinion, should be considered in both the broad and the narrow senses.

In the former case, as a method of protecting the vital activity and development of the statehood of Ukraine via timely and suitable reaction to all possible threats of an internal and external nature. The sense of that reaction consists of prompt influence on the sources of threats that pose a danger, with the aim of neutralizing and eliminating them.



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2. national security of Ukraine
3. concept
4. threat, categorization
5. assessment
6. categorization and assessment of threats and degree of their danger, by traits:
7. by likelihood of realization: a—clear; b—potential
8. by location: a—internal; b—external
9. by relation of person toward them: a—objective; b—subjective
10. by type traits of human activity: a—political, economic, ecological; b—military and other
11. by consequences: a—nationwide, local; b—individual

In the latter case, as the constantly implemented activity of the system of state power of organizations and institutions of general and special authority, as well as combined structures. This activity is expressed in the

implementation of legislatively codified functions to detect and assess possible sources of threats to the national interests of Ukraine, as well as to localize and eliminate them.

The system for ensuring national security consequently includes the supreme bodies of state power and administration, local representative bodies and their executive state bodies and law-enforcement and special bodies of state administration, as well as the institutions and other structures created by them that possess relative independence and perform strictly defined tasks and functions inherent to them in the realm of national security.

It is understandable that state bodies, being an integral system, interact among each other—as well as with social associations, labor collectives and citizens—in the area of ensuring national security, at the same time as they are resolving the tasks and functions of national security. It seems possible to subdivide this overall system of national security into a) **bodies of state power and administration with overall authority** (Supreme Soviet of Ukraine, Cabinet of Ministers, Defense Council, ministries and agencies, among others); b) **law-enforcement bodies** (the Constitutional Court, general courts, bodies of justice and internal affairs, among others); and c) **state bodies with special authorities** (the National Security Service, the Ministry of Defense, the Committee for Intelligence, the Committee for the Protection of the State Border, the specialized administrations and services of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the organizations to assist the army and stations for protecting the public order, among others).

The system for ensuring the national security of Ukraine as a state and political superstructure in the structure of presidential authority is thus oriented toward the practical coordination of all types of activity of state and social institutions with the aim of averting, ascertaining and eliminating clear and potential internal and external threats that pose a danger to the achievement of the strategic aims of Ukraine—the building of a democratic and law-governed state.

The effectiveness of the functioning of the system to ensure the national security of Ukraine is conditional upon the nature of the requirements posed toward it. There are many of them. **Operativeness, reliability, stability and professionalism**, however, are among the important requirements posed toward the system for ensuring the national security of Ukraine.

Col-Gen Bizhan on START, Compensation for Nuclear Weapons

934K0295A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 7, Feb 93 p 4

[Interview with Colonel General Ivan Vasylyevych Bizhan, first deputy minister of defense of Ukraine, by ARGUMENTY I FAKTY correspondent D. Makarov; place and date not given: "The Army of Ukraine Is Not an Army of Ukrainians"]

[Text] *Until his appointment to the position of First Deputy Minister of Defense of Ukraine, Colonel-General Ivan Vasylyevych Bizhan held the promising position of Deputy Chief of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, but to everyone's surprise he left for Kiev to begin to build the Army of Ukraine. ARGUMENTY I FAKTY correspondent D. Makarov speaks with him.*

[Makarov] When you left Moscow, Ivan Vasylyevych, a scandal probably broke out.

[Bizhan] Yes. For a long time they did not want to let me go. Finally they sent me here on temporary duty to "coordinate interactions between the General Staff and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine." I never returned from that duty.

And after that, every time I went to Marshal Shaposhnikov, still USSR Minister of Defense at the time, about the transfer to Ukraine of officers who had expressed a desire to serve here, I received a flat refusal.

[Makarov] How do you explain such a position on the part of the Ministry of Defense?

[Bizhan] By the fact that people there simply did not want to believe that the independence of Ukraine was a reality and that the processes acquiring statehood going on here are irreversible.

And then: The General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces is the quintessence of the military intellect of the former Union and is an immense asset, which Russia is trying to take all for itself, and we asked them to share this asset, the more so, I repeat, among officers of the General Staff if there were those who wished to transfer to Ukraine.

When 9,700 officers announced that they did not want to take the oath to Ukraine, they were immediately given the right to return to Russia.

[Makarov] And from there?

[Bizhan] And from there the process of transfer of officers and warrant officers is still continuing. About 17,000 have already transferred, and we have a report projecting the transfer of a total of 37,000. I think this figure will grow even more.

[Makarov] Is it mainly Ukrainians who are returning?

[Bizhan] Citizens of the Republic are returning. The Army of Ukraine is not an army of Ukrainians. Representatives of all nationalities living on our territory participate in it.

[Makarov] Some people think Ukraine was in too much of a hurry to declare itself a nuclear power. Up to this point, strategic weapons have served as an instrument for deterring aggression and, taking into account the possible territorial claims on Ukraine from the neighboring states, it could continue to play this role.

[Bizhan] As early as 1990, the Republic Supreme Soviet adopted the Declaration of State Sovereignty, where it is written that Ukraine would be a nonnuclear state in the future. Now President Kravchuk has sent documents to the Supreme Soviet for consideration of the START (SNV) Treaty.

At the beginning of 1992, when the question of the composition of strategic nuclear forces arose, Ukraine was prepared to include nuclear weapons and systems for servicing them and end the problem there. But then it was suggested to us that these forces might include even motorized-rifle divisions and all aircraft, including military transport, as well as the Black Sea Fleet. And then came statements to the effect that the Black Sea Fleet had been, was, and would be Russian, and soon there followed the same kinds of statements about the Crimea and Sevastopol. One gets the impression that someone in Russia is forgetting about the Helsinki Final Act, which guarantees the permanence of borders in Europe. Therefore when agreeing to the destruction of nuclear weapons on our territory, we had to guarantee the integrity of Ukraine.

The problem of compensating Ukraine for the cost of the nuclear weapons also deserves a fair solution. For all the weapons were created by the common labor of the USSR, including the people of Ukraine.

[Makarov] How many officers and warrant officers without apartments do you have?

[Bizhan] Somewhere around 60,000. But in spite of all the difficulties, in 1992 we fulfilled the plan for the construction of housing by 100 percent. And that means 12,800 apartments. The Ministry of Defense adopted a decision that all funds we receive from the sale of military equipment and property in foreign currency and karbovantsy are to be used for the construction of housing. We have purchased a number of completed apartments from the administration of Kiev for foreign currency. In about two or three years the housing problem should become considerably less crucial.

[Makarov] Which weapons and in what quantities will Ukraine sell, and to whom?

[Bizhan] It is not the Ministry of Defense that decides on the sale of weapons. That is the government's prerogative.

Military Doctrine: Priority on LICs, Air Power, NIOKR

93UM0372B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian
29 Dec 92 p 3

[Article by Candidate of Technical Sciences, Lecturer, Colonel Ibragim Gabidulin, under the rubric: "Point of View": "Military Doctrine and the Armed Forces"]

[Text] We would like to state our opinion on certain issues that affect Ukraine's military doctrine, the discussion of which recently occurred at a Supreme Soviet session.

The absence of clear tenets of the military doctrine and precise conceptions on the essence of the military threat that are its basic element and does not permit us to substantively resolve the tasks of Ukrainian Armed Forces military structural development that can result either in an intolerable weakening of the defense capability or in an exorbitant burden of excessive military expenditures.

We think that the problems examined here and certain preliminary proposals on military doctrine and the development of the Ukrainian Armed Forces will cause interest in their discussion both among the military and also among other interested specialists.

Primary Approaches to the Development of Ukraine's Military Doctrine

In the period of radical transformations that are being conducted in any state, the political and military leadership needs to rely upon the appropriate system of scientifically-grounded views on the problems of preventing war and preserving peace, the structural development of the armed forces and their preparation to repel possible aggression to make decisions on issues of military structural development and the radical reorganization of defense structures.

The changes that have occurred in the world require Ukraine's political and military leadership to reflect upon and to once again work out the content of military policy and doctrine.

This situation is characteristic not only of our republic but also of all states of the CIS and the world who are members of various military and political blocs to which articles in recent years attest.

Let's initially dwell upon the definitions of "doctrine" and "military doctrine".

We understand doctrine to be teachings, a scientific or philosophical theory, or a political principle.

Military doctrine—is a system of officially adopted fundamental views and tenets on issues of the country's defense in the state at this period of time that are mandatory for fulfillment by all state organs, including military. It expresses the state's attitude toward war, it defines the nature of possible military missions with which it may be faced, the techniques to attain them, and the main directions of military structural development.

The doctrine totally encompasses a large circle of issues and it is simply impossible to set them forth in a single document. However, the fundamental tenets of a political and a military-political nature can be set forth in a separate document similar to the way in which it was done in the WTO [Warsaw Treaty Organization] (1987), NATO (1991) or in the former USSR (1990).

While proceeding from this, it is advisable to set forth only the approaches to the formation of the most important tenets and of the general content of Ukraine's

military doctrine and not the doctrine itself which still has to be refined after the discussion at the Supreme Soviet session.

The military doctrine is reflected in the political and military-technical foundations.

While formulating the political bases of the military doctrine, it is necessary to define the state's attitude toward war and the employment of military force; Ukraine's national interests and the factors that oppose them; the nature of the military threat, its dimensions and sources and also the possibility of a military threat; the probability of preventing war, and the forces and weapons required to do that; the military-political goals of war; and, probable enemies and allies.

The military-technical aspect of military doctrine in the most general form must provide an answer to the following basic questions: what is the strategic nature of the possible war for which we need to prepare; and, what are the methods of its conduct and what Armed Forces do we need to have to do that.

Until the present time, primary attention in military doctrines was devoted to the tenets on world nuclear and conventional war. Insufficient attention was devoted to local wars and low-intensity military conflicts and military operations for the restoration of stability within a country were not examined at all. In the new military doctrine, we hope that these issues will receive proper attention and comprehension. This has been caused by the fact the outbreak of a world war, conventional and all the more so nuclear, is improbable and military actions and local wars are most probable according to the majority of military experts.

However, the possibility of the nuclear weapons proliferation can once again increase the probability of the outbreak of nuclear war, to which the appearance on world markets of nuclear raw materials and technologies from the CIS countries attests.

Finally, we still need to dwell on one important tenet. While substantiating the techniques for conducting combat operations, the military doctrine must take into account the laws of armed conflict, that is, the tenet must precisely, clearly and unambiguously reflect that, if the enemy has begun aggression or armed combat, the armed forces must select and carry out those forms and techniques of combat operations that are the most effective in the given situation: both offense, defense, and the conduct of fire strikes against the enemy, no matter where he is located, and they must be inflicted including and primarily against the territory of the aggressor country and against his most important military and economic facilities.

Certain military experts propose rejecting such concepts as "defensive doctrine", "defensive strategy", and "defensive armed forces" as has been done, in particular, in the United States and NATO, where they talk only about doctrine, strategy and the armed forces.

Classification of Military Conflicts

Analysis of military conflicts permits us to define their essence, the causes of their emergence, and to seek the methods and techniques for their resolution at the early stages of development, and also localization (suppression) at later stages.

A conflict is understood to be a clash of sides, opinions, or forces.

Military conflict—this is a clash of forces with the use of arms.

The internal situation of the state can be destabilized by conflicts on ethnic or religious grounds, by a civil war, or by intervention by the Armed Forces in these processes. These operations are called "military actions". In the foreign literature, these combat operations have received the designation "low-intensity conflicts". They include: peacetime combat operations, regional insurgent operations, peacekeeping measures, and combating terrorism or narcotics trafficking. Rendering assistance in support of stability and deterring conflict escalation are the Armed Force's primary goals here.

Local war is the next type of military conflict in this classification. It is conducted with the limited participation of the Armed Forces and with the extension of combat operations to relatively small territories and pertains to medium-intensity military conflicts. Here we must stress that local wars are fraught with escalation into major military clashes both as a result of escalation and also for their use by the ruling circles of individual states as a pretense for carrying out large-scale aggression.

Experts regard large-scale wars as high-intensity military conflicts. They can be conducted both with the employment of nuclear and conventional forces. But, as we already pointed out above, the probability of the outbreak of such wars has been substantially reduced at the present time. However, large-scale war with the employment of conventional weapons can escalate from a local military conflict or because military aid has been rendered to one or several countries that have been subjected to aggression.

The analysis and classification of military conflicts that has been conducted allows us to shift to the analysis of possible combat operations under modern conditions.

Some Ideas on the Possible Nature of Combat Operations

While proceeding based on what has been set forth above, we can assume the following nature of combat operations which Ukraine will possibly have to conduct.

Of all the types of armed conflicts, the most probable is the use of the Armed Forces in military actions. A political struggle in different regions of Ukraine, events in the countries of the world and in the CIS republics directly or indirectly attest to this trend and the political leadership needs to apply enormous efforts and patience

during the resolution of these conflicts, be they on religious or ethnic grounds, while preventing the involvement of armed formations in the conflict.

The use of the Armed Forces during active operations with terrorist groups and joint operations with other countries while combating narcotics trafficking is also possible. In these cases, we need to stress once again that rendering assistance to internal troops and the guard in support of internal stability and deterrence of the escalation of conflicts is the primary goal of the use of the Armed Forces.

Furthermore, judging by the government's statements that Ukraine will not join military blocs or organizations and also by declaring the republic's territory a nuclear-free zone, the nature of combat operations for protection of its borders and territory from infringement from without will be, in our view, local in nature and will be conducted with the limited involvement of the Armed Forces and with the expansion of combat operations to relatively small territories adjacent to its state borders. However, a military conflict with a state that does not border Ukrainian territory has also not been excluded.

We think that we cannot exclude from examination major aggressions against Ukraine with the use of conventional weapons. This is confirmed by the fact that the developed countries have powerful, effective, precision-guided air attack weapons and a certain priority of their development. Under certain conditions, combat operations may begin in air and sea space and with the conduct of strikes by air and naval forces. Combat operations by means of introducing enemy ground forces formations with the simultaneous conduct of strikes from the air and sea has not been excluded.

The analysis that has been conducted provides the capability to define the requirements toward the Ukrainian Armed Forces structure.

The Primary Directions of Ukrainian Armed Forces Military Structural Development

Ukraine's military doctrine must permit the selection of main priorities in the development of weapons systems so that we ensure the maximally effective use of limited resources while considering technical equipping and also the methods and techniques for employment of foreign countries' troop formations under conditions of Armed Forces reductions.

As we all know, the Ukrainian Armed Forces will consist of ground defense forces, air defense forces (consisting of the Air Force and the PVO [Air Defense] troops), and the Navy.

First of all, emphasis must be made on effective utilization of industry's existing potential for the creation of mobile ground and air defense forces and the Navy with

the broad utilization of precision-guided weapons during the structural development of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Heightened attention must be devoted to the development of operational mobility systems, especially aircraft systems, and also various types of air transportable weapons for the rapid maneuver by troops on threatening axes and in areas of possible conflicts.

The priorities in the development of the services of the Ukrainian Armed Forces must also be changed. In previous wars and military conflicts, the Air Force, as a rule, carried out the tasks of supporting and supplying ground troops operations. At the present time, as combat operations in the Persian Gulf and in local wars have demonstrated, the Air Force is capable of conducting independent offensive air operations, while carrying out the missions of a strategic scale and of essentially resolving the fate of the entire campaign in local wars. They devote particular attention to gaining superiority in the air.

Existing reality also insistently recommends that we have military space systems in the air defense troops that should be tasked with the following missions:

—early warning on ballistic missile launches;—the conduct of all types of reconnaissance (electronic, infrared, optical and others) and the transmission of data to reconnaissance centers;—the organization of space communications;—the support of navigation of various military facilities using satellite beacons;—meteorological support; and,—surveying the Earth's natural resources to efficiently develop topographical maps of areas of impending combat operations.

Combat operations in the Persian Gulf region demonstrated the increased role and significance of military space systems.

We must note that we need to consider the criteria of the sufficiency of defense when defining the composition and strength of the Armed Forces. The most frequently utilized indicators in these cases are:

- the permissible degree of the state's military-economic effort that is characterized by the ratio of the volume of military consumption to some summarized indicator or other of the country's economic activity—the gross national product (GNP), national income, the state budget, and others;
- and, the permissible degree of the state's mobilized effort that is characterized by the ratio of the portion of the population that has been conscripted into the Armed Forces to its total strength.

We all know that an economically strong, prosperous state (with GNP growth of 3% or more per year) in peacetime cannot expend more than 6% of GNP on defense. At the present time, the United States, Great Britain, Germany, and France have approximately these

expenditures. While considering Ukraine's current economic situation, we will not be able to expend the previous sums on the development and maintenance of its Armed Forces.

While speaking about the second indicator, we must point out that under a military-economic effort of 6-7% of GNP, the rational strength of the Ukrainian Armed Forces can total up to 1% of the country's total strength. This approach is also characteristic for many highly developed countries.

The structure of the Ukrainian Armed Forces is in the formative stage and we need to consider both the experience of the development of other countries' Armed Forces and also the specific features of the geopolitical location of its territory.

What Conclusions We Would Like to Make at the End of This Article

1. Military doctrine is one of a state's important documents that define the direction of the development of its Armed Forces during the period being planned.
2. In Ukraine's doctrine that is being developed, the greatest significance must be devoted to low- and medium-intensity military conflicts as the most probable in the modern era. In the opinion of the majority of military specialists and politicians, the emergence of large-scale combat operations with the employment of conventional, and all the more so nuclear forces, is improbable.
3. We need an assessment of the military threat to Ukraine's national interests and the determination of probable enemies and allies. All of that substantially affects the structure of the Armed Forces and the primary directions of the development of its component elements. As analysis has shown, the primary trends of development are: an emphasis on the development of mobile forces as part of the ground and air defense troops and also the Navy that ensure the airlift and sealift of personnel, arms, and military equipment within Ukrainian territory and outside its borders, if its Armed Forces will nevertheless be included in international peacekeeping forces as it is occurring, for example, right now in Yugoslavia or while Ukrainian Armed Forces participate in regional conflicts as part of countries' unified forces as it occurred, for example, in the Persian Gulf region.
4. Although success in war is attained through the joint efforts of all services of the Armed Forces, the task of ensuring the least losses leads to increasing the emphasis on weapons for conducting air strikes and to increase the duration of the air campaign. All of that results in the substantial development of the air defense troops and precisely the Air Forces. Particular attention is being devoted to gaining superiority in the air.
5. Increasing the coordinating functions of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense for NIOKR [Scientific

Research, Experimentation and Design Work] in the improvement of arms and military equipment. This is primarily associated with the reduction of appropriations for the purchase of arms, with the conduct of research and development for the development of new models, with conversion of industry's defense enterprises and with the increase of the cost of arms. Despite existing difficulties, we need to conduct both applied and fundamental research to maintain the Armed Forces at the proper level.

Series on National Armies Examines Ukraine Armed Forces

93UM0336A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
13 Jan 93 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Lieutenant Colonel Anatoliy Dokuchayev, under the rubric: "National Armies: A Commentator's View": "The Power of the Golden Trident"]

[Text] Of course, there are enough problems in the Russian Army that are worthy of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's attention. But we promised our readers that we would not be restricted by them. And we are keeping our word. Last year we described the beginning of military structural development in the CIS countries under the rubric "National Armies: The View From Within". And now you will certainly be interested to learn about how the formation of these armies is progressing. We are opening a new series of articles with notes on the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

And so, let's talk about the army that was one of the first armies in the CIS that was begun to be built on the wreckage of the Soviet Armed Forces. Kiev began to create an army within the borders of the former USSR before everyone else. On 24 August 1991, all units deployed on the republic's territory were subordinated to the Supreme Soviet by the parliamentary decree "On Military Formations in Ukraine". The Ministry of Defense was created on that same day. Accelerated development of legal documents of a military nature began. By January 1992, the republic essentially had a complete legal base for the creation of the Armed Forces. Supreme Soviet decrees were being adopted in turn—"On the Ukrainian Armed Forces Defense and Structural Development Concept" and "On the Ukrainian Defense Council", laws—"On Defense", "On the Ukrainian Armed Forces", "On the Ukrainian State Border", "On the Ukrainian Border Troops", "On the Ukrainian National Guard", and "On Social and Legal Protection of Servicemen and Their Family Members".

In December, the Commonwealth heads of state declared—each republic has the right to create its own Armed Forces. And Ukraine immediately (3 January 1992) began its realization. The troop formations, other than the units that the republic included in the Commonwealth Strategic Forces, formed the national army. Operational command and control of the three military

districts, the air armies, and the PVO [Air Defense] army shifted from Moscow to Kiev. The process of administering the Ukrainian oath to officer and rank and file personnel began at the same time—in Kiev they understood that division-sized and smaller units are strong not only through combat equipment and training but also through moral spirit.

In a word, as of today in the 100,000 officer corps there are practically none of those people left who did not take the Ukrainian oath. Right now the national characteristic is being developed—from a cap badge on the service cap to a unit Battle Flag (the golden trident is appearing everywhere). Indeed, the military ranks have remained as before with the exception of the highest rank. The rank of General of the Army of Ukraine has been introduced (so far, it has not been awarded to any Ukrainian military leaders). The socio-psychological service has been tasked with the patriotic education of personnel. There are departments at army and division headquarters, and individual specialists at units and subunits. The Ministry of Defense newspaper—NARODNA ARMIYA, created based on the Kiev Military District newspaper, has been functioning for several months already. Besides it, two military district and nearly 10 large circulation newspapers are being published.

Moral spirit is being raised not only through words but also with money, even though it is still not yet quite solid. Recently, the republic Cabinet of Ministers adopted a decree on increasing salaries 2.5 times and allowances for rank 1.5 times. They envision payment of monetary compensation to those for whom "issuance of foodstuffs at government expense has not been provided for". Military personnel without apartments will now be paid cash in the amount of actual expenditures to sublet housing.

The Law that is in effect in Ukraine "On Pension Support of Servicemen and Internal Affairs Organ Leadership and Rank and File Personnel" serves as a kind of incentive. A pension of 50% is granted to officers, naval and army warrant officers, and extended service military personnel who have begun to serve on contract and who have 20 years of service and for those who have been released for retirement due to age or because of illness—55% of the corresponding monetary salary, plus, in addition to that, 3% of those same amounts for each year of service over 20 years.

Ukraine has acquired a powerful military machine—second strategic echelon regiments and divisions, the most combat capable units that are equipped with modern weaponry—in the inheritance from the USSR Armed Forces. One hundred seventy-six silo-based MBRs [intercontinental ballistic missiles] (RS-18 and RS-22) with 1,280 warheads are deployed on republic territory. And also several dozen strategic bombers, including the latest TU-160—they have 600 nuclear warheads. In accordance with the agreements on the

Strategic Forces, all ballistic missiles must be disassembled by the end of 1994 and the strategic bombers must be transferred to Russian territory. Ukraine confirmed its status as a non-nuclear power in May 1992, having signed the Lisbon Protocol along with Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and the United States. Tactical nuclear weapons (approximately 2,600 warheads) were withdrawn to Russian territory by June 1992. However, the steps recently undertaken by Kiev attest to the fact that Ukraine is on the path toward establishing control over nuclear weapons.

Ukraine has also acquired a solid portion of conventional weapons. The approximate strength of the division-sized and smaller units that have gone to Ukraine is 470,000 men (taking into account personnel of all military structures—up to 700,000). The three military districts (Carpathian, Kiev, and Odessa) consisted of 20 motorized rifle and tank divisions. A coastal defense division (subordinate to the Black Sea Fleet), several airborne assault divisions, three special capability artillery divisions, and hundreds of special purpose units and subunits were also located in the republic. There were 230 fighter aviation aircraft and 620 ground attack aircraft in the aviation divisions of the four air armies. Division-sized and smaller units of an independent PVO army, missile attack warning system, reconnaissance, and communications facilities are also deployed on Ukrainian territory... The list of arsenals and munitions storage areas is significant. Specifically, half of the combat reserve for the "Tochka" modern tactical missile system are located in them.

All of that exists, everything functions and operates. However, Ukraine alone cannot stretch that quantity of weaponry into the distant future and therefore Kiev is undertaking practical steps to invest these weapons in new forms. The army and navy structural development concept has been developed and is being implemented. Officials cite different numbers for the future strength of the Armed Forces but more frequently within the framework of 200,000-230,000 men.

They plan for the Armed Forces to consist of three services—ground forces, air defense forces, and naval forces. It has been declared that missile-space troops have begun to be created—there are specialists and resources to do that. Two operational commands—Western and Southern—are being created in place of the three military districts—Kiev (ceased its existence on 1 November 1992), Carpathian and Odessa.

The Ground Forces will be structurally part of army corps (7-8 combined arms divisions, 6-7 motorized rifle and tank brigades, 6-7 artillery brigades and 2-3 army aviation brigades). Ukrainian military leaders have also promulgated other variations of the Ground Forces structure and organization.

The Air Defense Troops will consist of three aviation groups consisting of bomber, fighter, and military-transport regiments. They assume that fighter aviation

will also carry out air defense tasks. All PVO units, including antiaircraft missile and radiotechnical units, will be part of a new Armed Forces service, possibly as a combat arm.

1993 is emerging as an important year for reform—a series of issues associated with qualitative transformations must be resolved this year. Equipping division-sized and smaller units of these two reformed Armed Forces services does not appear to be a difficult matter. Today the Ukrainian arsenal is rich. Units have the following equipment in their inventories (with the latest modifications): Tanks—T-72 and T-64; armored vehicles—BMP-1 [armored personnel vehicle] and BMP-2, BTR-70 [armored transport vehicle] and BTR-80, and BRM-1K [armored reconnaissance vehicle]; artillery and rocket systems—2A65 and 2S19, BM-21 and 9P140; "Tochka" S-200 and S-300 tactical missile systems; and, helicopters—MI-6, MI-8, MI-9, and MI-24. There is also a wide assortment of combat aircraft: MIG-25, MIG-29, SU-24, SU-25, SU-27, and YAK-28. And much more.

Naval forces are being created based on ships and units of the Black Sea Fleet—an agreement on the principles of the formation of the Russian Navy and the Ukrainian Naval Forces based on the former USSR's Black Sea Fleet between Ukraine and Russia was signed between Ukraine and Russia on 3 August 1992. The sides came to an agreement that the fleet is subject to being divided—a transition period until 1995 has been established to do that. Structurally, the Navy will consist of brigades, ships, an aircraft formation and coastal defense troops.

The republic also has border troops, a republic guard, railroad troops and civil defense troops.

A new Armed Forces manning and performance of service system and an officer cadre training concept are being introduced. The Law "On Universal Military Obligation and Military Service" that was adopted in March 1992 and also the Law "On Alternative (Nonmilitary) Service" that was adopted in December 1991 are the basic legal acts here. The army and navy are being manned through the commissariats by conscripting citizens and voluntarily—on contract. A reserve is being created to bring the troops up to the prescribed personnel strength levels during mobilization.

The term of military service for soldiers and seamen, sergeants and NCO's, who are serving based on conscription is 18 months (for individuals who have a higher education—12 months), and on contract—three years; for female servicemen in the positions of soldiers and sergeants—no less than three years; for naval and army warrant officers—no less than five years; for officers who have been called up for military service from the reserve—for two years and, for those personnel who voluntarily enter military service from the reserve—no less than three years. Upon completion of terms of service, it can be extended based upon a new contract—for a term of no less than three years each time—until the attainment of the maximum age.

And now about military educational reform. As you know, there were 34 military VUZs [military educational institutions] on the territory of the republic in 1991. Today their number is being reduced. A Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers decree that was adopted in August 1992 provides for the opening of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Academy in Kiev, a military university in Kharkov, a Ground Forces Institute in Odessa, and a Naval Institute in Sevastopol. They plan to create a Unified Ministry of Defense Institute and also military construction and military engineering departments, and a military medical section under certain civilian VUZs.

We need to point out that even right now there are sufficient highly-trained military specialists in Ukraine. In the person of hundreds of officers-graduates of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Military Academy (today—the Russian Armed Forces General Staff Military Academy), thousands of graduates of other Soviet military academies who enjoy deserved prestige among military personnel of the entire world. In a word, Ukrainian Minister of Defense Colonel-General Konstantin Morozov, First Deputy Minister Colonel-General Ivan Bizhan, and other individuals of the highest leadership each have two military academies behind them. We need to take into account that officers from other Commonwealth states armies are continuing to arrive in Ukraine. As of 1 December, 12,000 officers had been transferred. This is a total of just 10% of that number whose arrival is anticipated. Competition has not been excluded for the vacancies that are opening.

And therefore we need to assume that the combat readiness of regiments and divisions will not be significantly reduced even in today's difficult socio-economic situation that has developed in Ukraine.

BELARUS

Law on Defense

93UM0399A Minsk NARODNAYA HAZETA
in *Belarusian* 27 Nov 92 p 2

["Law of the Republic of Belarus on Defense"]

[Text] The Republic of Belarus, based on the Declaration of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Belarus "On State Sovereignty of the Republic of Belarus," repudiates war or the use of military force as an unacceptable means of achieving political and economic goals, and it recognizes the necessity of preserving peace in relations between states and peoples, equal security, and territorial integrity.

The Republic of Belarus, while giving priority to political dialogue, reserves the right to use all its economic, diplomatic, and military capabilities in the realization of a military policy of a defensive nature for purposes of averting and halting aggression.

Section I. General Provisions

Article 1. Foundations of the Defense of the Republic of Belarus

The defense of the Republic of Belarus is a system of state measures of political, economic, legal, and military nature carried out for the purpose of ensuring the readiness of the Republic of Belarus to repel aggression; to defend the citizens of the republic, independence, and territorial integrity; and to stop encroachments on the sovereignty of the Republic of Belarus.

The defense of the Republic of Belarus is one of the most important functions of the state and is a matter for all the people.

Questions of the defense of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Belarus, military force generation, leadership of defense and the Armed Forces, and military cooperation with other states are under the jurisdiction of the Republic of Belarus in the person of its highest organs of state power and leadership.

Organs of state power and leadership, enterprises, associations, institutions, and organizations independent of form of ownership, subordination, and management conditions, public associations, officials, and citizens of the Republic of Belarus take part in providing for the defense of the Republic of Belarus and bear responsibility for the performance of tasks entrusted to them within bounds established by legislation.

For purposes of an armed defense, the Republic of Belarus has Armed Forces as well as border forces, internal forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Belarus, and civil defense units.

The creation of other armed formations not stipulated by legislation of the Republic of Belarus is not permitted.

Article 2. Organization of the Defense of the Republic of Belarus

Organization of the defense of the Republic of Belarus includes:

- elaboration of military policy of the state and military doctrine and development of military science;

- legislative oversight of questions of defense and military force generation;

- provision for military and political cooperation with other states and coordination of efforts to prevent aggression and international conflicts;

- mobilization preparation of ministries, agencies, state committees, their directorates and departments of an economic profile, and state enterprises for functioning in wartime, as well as preparation of the population and territory of the state for defense;

provision for the defense of the State Border of the Republic of Belarus, execution of measures of civil and territorial defense, and preservation of state and military secrecy;

development of the structure the Armed Forces and provision for the necessary size and training of them, maintenance of their high combat and mobilization readiness, and cooperation with other states in the military sector;

development and implementation of a military-technical policy of the state and the supply of the Armed Forces with arms, military equipment, and other material resources;

coordination in the interests of defense of the activities of state organs, enterprises, associations, institutions, organizations, and public associations.

Article 3. Legislation on the Defense of the Republic of Belarus

Legislation on the defense of the Republic of Belarus is based on the Declaration of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Belarus "On State Sovereignty of the Republic of Belarus" and the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of Belarus and consists of this Law and other acts of legislation of the Republic of Belarus in the defense sector.

Section II. Powers of Organs of State Power and Leadership and Obligations of Enterprises, Institutions, and Organizations in the Defense Sector

Article 4. The Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Belarus

The Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Belarus is responsible to the people of the Republic of Belarus for ensuring a reliable defense of the state and the execution of international agreements on defense as well as for the development and execution of military policy and military doctrine of the state in accordance with the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of Belarus. It is authorized to decide all questions in the defense sector within the jurisdiction of the Republic of Belarus.

The Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Belarus:

performs legislative regulation in the defense sector and military force generation;

determines foreign and domestic policy in the area of ensuring the security of the republic;

coordinates the activities of state organs in the defense sector; ensures execution of the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of Belarus and laws of the republic concerning questions of defense and security;

approves for submission to the Chairman of the Security Council of the Republic of Belarus military doctrine of the Republic of Belarus and a concept for force generation and development of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus;

determines the size of the Armed Forces, border forces, internal forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Belarus, and units of civil defense;

approves for submission to the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus the volume of budgetary allocations for defense;

approves the military oath and military regulations;

creates the Security Council of the Republic of Belarus and defines its makeup and powers;

hears reports of the Chairman of the Security Council of the Republic of Belarus on the state of defense of the Republic of Belarus as well as reports of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus, his deputies, the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Belarus, and other officials of the republic on questions of defense;

introduces martial law on the territory of the republic or in certain of its regions and declares a state of war or general or partial mobilization; makes decisions on cancellation of martial law, ending a state of war, and concluding peace;

recommends to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus a Minister of Defense of the Republic of Belarus;

defines measures for the social and legal defense of servicemen, persons released from compulsory military service, and members of their families;

manages questions connected with the State Border of the Republic of Belarus and establishes its regime;

defines basic areas of cooperation of the Republic of Belarus with other states in the military sector and ratifies and renounces international agreements of the Republic of Belarus on such cooperation.

Article 5. The Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus

The Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus, within the bounds of its powers, bears responsibility for providing for the defense of the Republic of Belarus and executing agreements with other state on questions of defense.

The Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus:

performs leadership in the building of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus and guides the activities of the Ministry of Defense, other ministries, and state committees and departments with regard to provision for the defense of the republic;

defines the structure of the Armed Forces as well as border forces, internal forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Belarus, civil defense units, and other military formations and the deployment and stationing of troops;

defines in elaborated state plans for economic and social development and the republic budget volumes of material and technical resources, food goods, uniforms and equipment, budgetary allocations for defense, and the performance of scientific research and experimentation and design work in the defense sector and conversion;

guides the execution of state plans for development, orders, and deliveries of arms, military equipment, and other material resources stipulated by international agreements and treaties;

defines the yearly groups of citizens who are subject to call-up for military service and musters;

performs leadership in the training of citizens prior to military service, their call-up for military service, and the accumulation of military training resources, and issues decrees on the call-up of citizens for military service, on the discharge into the reserves of compulsory-service servicemen, on the call-up of persons subject to the military service obligation for musters, on the call-up of citizens for mobilization and during wartime, and on a procedure for discharges with regard to demobilization;

establishes procedure for performing military registration of conscripts and persons subject to the military service obligation;

promotes persons of the higher officer ranks and demotes and renews these promotions; designates and changes the high command element of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus;

creates and dissolves higher and secondary military educational institutions, scientific research organizations of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus, and military departments of higher educational institutions, and defines procedure for the training of military personnel at higher and secondary elected institutions;

guides civil defense;

approves mobilization plans for the national economy and accumulation of material valuables in the mobilization reserve; guides mobilization preparation of the national economy, mobilization development, and transition to a system of operations under conditions of wartime, taking into account international agreements;

establishes tasks with regard to the preparation and transfer to the Armed Forces of vehicles, means of communication, and other material and technical equipment in the event of declaration of mobilization and in wartime;

makes decisions on the creation on the territory of the Republic of Belarus of defense facilities and establishes procedure for their use;

concludes and renounces international treaties of the Republic of Belarus in the military sector in the name of the Government of the Republic of Belarus or in the name of the Republic of Belarus on questions which

pertain to the jurisdiction of the Government of the Republic of Belarus and ensures execution of international treaties for joint defense from aggression;

makes decisions and organizes their execution on questions of provision of housing, consumer services, materials, and financing of servicemen, persons released from military service, and members of their families.

Article 6. The Security Council of the Republic of Belarus

The Security Council of the Republic of Belarus is the highest collegial coordinating organ, created with the goal of determining military policy of the republic in the sector of security, strategy, and principles of military force generation, and it guarantees defense of sovereignty, the defense potential of the Republic, its economic situation, and the rights and freedoms of its citizens.

The Security Council of the Republic of Belarus:

operates on the basis of the Declaration of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Belarus "On State Sovereignty of the Republic of Belarus," the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of Belarus, and existing laws of the republic;

in emergency situations and with the beginning of war, the Security Council submits a proposal to the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Belarus on the introduction of a state of emergency and, on the decision of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Belarus, takes upon itself the performance of functions of state government and leadership and provides for necessary measures to stabilize the situation or to repulse military aggression in accordance with existing legislation;

in accordance with the situation, submits a proposal to the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Belarus with regard to use of a contingent of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus;

hears reports of persons of the organs of state government and leadership, enterprises, institutions, organizations, and military formations on the performance of functions and tasks entrusted to them concerning questions of defense and security.

The Chairman of the Security Council of the Republic of Belarus is the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Belarus.

Article 7. The Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Belarus

The Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Belarus is the organ of state leadership of the Republic of Belarus which performs guidance of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus and local organs of military leadership, and it bears full responsibility for their development and preparation for performance of defense tasks.

The Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Belarus:

evaluates the military and political situation and prepares according to established procedure careful proposals for the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus on questions of defense;

carries out cooperation with the armed forces of other states;

develops and presents to the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus drafts of state programs for the force generation and development of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus and the development of arms and military equipment and proposals on allocations for the requirements of defense;

guides the development of military science and organizes and carries out military-scientific research;

develops proposals on the state order for the creation, manufacture, and repair of military equipment and other military property and performs control over their development, testing, manufacture, and quality of production; participates in the performance of conversion;

determines the number of personnel of the arms and branches of forces, large strategic formations, combined units, and units of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus, and provides for, within the bounds of its powers, the training and disposition of military personnel and promotions;

performs leadership of operational-tactical, combat, and moral-psychological training of troops;

organizes military-patriotic education of personnel of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus;

participates in the organization of mobilization preparation of the national economy of the Republic of Belarus and control over the preparation of enterprises, institutions, and organizations and their execution of mobilization tasks established by it;

supervises the execution of existing legislation on questions of the training of citizens prior to military service;

plans and organizes training and retraining of persons subject to military service obligation, call-ups of citizens for compulsory military service, discharges into the reserves of servicemen who have served the established period of service, call-ups of persons subject to military service obligation for musters, and mobilization in wartime and demobilization;

issues, in instances stipulated by legislation of the Republic of Belarus, normative acts concerning questions of defense, and oversees their execution;

provides the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus with all types of material/technical equipment and support, social and legal guarantees for serviceman, and pensions for servicemen released from military service, and renders aid to families of servicemen who have been

killed (have died) with regard to employment, housing, and material and financial support in accordance with existing legislation;

carries out measures to memorialize those who have fallen in the line of military duty.

Article 8. Local Organs of State Power and Leadership

The local organs of state power and leadership:

ensure execution of the requirements of the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of Belarus and existing legislation on questions of defense by all officials and citizens;

resolve tasks with regard to providing for the requirements of defense and mobilization readiness, organize on contract principles the production and delivery to troops by enterprises under their jurisdiction of goods made to order, electricity, and heating, and apportion plots of land for defense needs;

present to military units, institutions, and training facilities of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus official lodgings and housing and municipal, consumer, and other services in accordance with existing legislation;

organize, in accordance with existing legislation, the call-up of citizens for compulsory military service and provide for the holding of training musters of persons subject to the military service obligation, training of the youth prior to call-up, and military-patriotic education of the population;

ensure the execution of legislation concerning social and legal protection of servicemen, conscripts, persons subject to the military service obligation, and members of their families.

Article 9. Obligations of Enterprises, Institutions, and Organizations with Regard to Providing for Defense Requirements

Enterprises, institutions, and organizations, independent of form of ownership, execute state orders and contracts for the production and delivery of arms and other output for defense needs and the performance of scientific research and development, create and keep in readiness necessary mobilization capacity and reserves, execute military transport obligations and other tasks in accordance with mobilization plans, and bear expenses for defense needs defined by existing legislation.

Article 10. Obligations and Rights of Citizens in the Defense Sector of the Republic of Belarus

The defense of the Republic of Belarus is the constitutional duty of each citizen of the Republic of Belarus.

Citizens of the Republic of Belarus are obligated to defend the interests of the state, increase its might, and prepare themselves for defense of the Fatherland.

Universal military obligation and voluntary enlistment of citizens in military service are established.

Citizens of the Republic of Belarus who take part in providing for the defense of the Republic possess socio-economic, political, and personal rights and freedoms stipulated by legislation of the Republic of Belarus, with exceptions and restrictions resulting from distinctive features of the performance of military service duties.

Servicemen of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus are granted additional rights, and they are entrusted with responsibilities resulting from distinctive features of military service in accordance with existing legislation.

In its relations with servicemen and other citizens who execute the duties of military service, persons discharged from military service, invalids and war veterans, partisans, soldier-internationalists, their families, and the families of servicemen who were killed or died during military service in peacetime, the Republic of Belarus guarantees the realization of rights and freedoms stipulated by legislation, protection of their honor, dignity, health, and life, and recognition of their services.

Article 11. Public Associations. The Defense Sports/Technical Society

Veteran and youth organizations, other public associations, and the mass media contribute to the patriotic education of citizens of the Republic of Belarus, improvement of defense and patriotic work among the population, and strengthening of the defense of the republic.

The Defense Sports/Technical Society (ASTT) carries out training of citizens of the Republic of Belarus for labor and defense of the Fatherland, develops technical, aviation-based, and applied military types of athletics and technical production of the youth.

By order of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Belarus, the Defense Sports/Technical Society of the Republic of Belarus trains on a contract basis specialists for the Armed Forces, Border Troops, Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Belarus, and units of Civil Defense as well as, on the basis of economic accountability, personnel of mass technical professions which are of applied military significance.

In wartime the Defense Sports/Technical Society takes part in universal mandatory military training of the population of the Republic of Belarus.

Activities of public associations directed at undermining the defense and combat readiness of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus are prohibited.

Section III. Economic Support of the Defense of the Republic of Belarus

Article 12. Preparation of the Economy to Provide for Defense. Material Support

Responsibility for preparation of the economy of the Republic of Belarus for defense is entrusted to the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus.

The Republic of Belarus provides for the material requirements of defense and equips its Armed Forces with everything necessary by agreement with other states.

To satisfy defense requirements, scientific potential and existing capacity are used for the production and repair of arms and equipment; preparation of labor resources is carried out; a system of financial and material support, orders, contracts for the purchase of arms and equipment, economic normatives, privileges, and sanctions is formed; measures are taken to prepare the economy to function under wartime conditions; and mobilization material resources are created among the forces and at bases of the state reserve, state enterprises, and organizations. The nomenclature and volumes of reserves of materiel which are created and the procedure for their distribution to the Armed Forces and for other defense requirements are developed by the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Belarus together with the appropriate state organs and are approved by the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus. The Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus creates the necessary conditions for the production and priority delivery of materiel for defense needs. When necessary, facilities and property which are not state property may be used to provide for the requirements of defense and for mobilization training in accordance with legislation.

Material reserves for mobilization are inviolable and may not, without special permission of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus, be released or loaned out for ongoing requirements of the national economy. The release of materiel is performed by troops free of charge only with the declaration of mobilization.

Preparation of the economy for operations under conditions of wartime is carried out in advance (in peacetime), for which are created, according to procedure established by the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus, military mobilization organs within the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Belarus and other departments and ministries as well as at enterprises, institutions, and organizations, independent of form of ownership.

Article 13. Granting of Land for Defense Requirements

Land for defense requirements for constant or temporary use is granted according to procedure established by existing legislation.

Article 14. Financial Support

Expenditures for defense are made using moneys allocated by the Republic of Belarus for the maintenance of the personnel of the Armed Forces, training of youth prior to military service, the performance of scientific

research and experimentation and design work, the purchase of arms, equipment, and materiel, capital construction, pension benefits, mandatory state personal insurance of servicemen and persons subject to militia obligation for the time they attend musters, and mobilization training organized in the interests of defense. The procedure for the financing of mobilization training is established by the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus.

Section IV. The Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus

Article 15. The Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus

The Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus are a military state structure. They are designated for the armed defense of the Republic of Belarus and the protection of its State Border, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Belarus and existing legislation.

Section V. State of War, Martial Law, and Mobilization. Territorial Defense

Article 16. State of War. Wartime

A state of war is declared in the event of a military attack (aggression) on the Republic of Belarus and is suspended with the conclusion of a peace treaty between the parties that were fighting.

Wartime begins with the declaration of a state of war or the beginning of military actions. The beginning of wartime is the day and hour of the declaration of a state of war or of an attack (aggression) on the Republic of Belarus. The end of wartime is the declared day and hour of the end of war.

In the event of a sudden attack on the Republic of Belarus, the military command element and organs of state power and leadership are obliged to take all measures to repulse the aggression without waiting for a declaration of war.

Article 17. Martial Law

Martial law on the territory of the republic or in certain of its regions is introduced with a declaration of a state of war or threat of attack (aggression) on the Republic of Belarus.

With introduction of martial law, the powers of the military command element are expanded: By decision of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Belarus, it may be entrusted with the functions of organs of state powers and leadership in the sector of defense.

In a period of martial law, the rights of enterprises, institutions, organizations, and citizens are restricted in the interests of defense, while the powers of law enforcement organs are expanded.

When the threat of military attack (aggression) recedes or a state of war comes to an end, martial law is lifted.

The regime of martial law is defined by the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Belarus.

Article 18. Mobilization

With the declaration of a state of war or martial law, a general or partial mobilization is declared for the performance of planned measures with regard to a mobilizational expansion of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus and the transition of sectors of the national economy (general mobilization) or some of its parts (partial mobilization) from peace to war footing.

Procedure for the performance of mobilization is defined by legislation of the Republic of Belarus.

Article 19. Territorial Defense

Territorial defense is a component of military and state defense measures of the Republic of Belarus.

Territorial defense is organized for purposes of protecting and defending the State Border of the Republic of Belarus and important facilities and communications from the attack of an enemy or that of his assault and diversion-reconnaissance units and of establishing and supporting a regime of martial law, and it is performed by the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus together with border forces, internal forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Belarus, and the Committee of State Security of the Republic of Belarus. The tasks, organization of territorial defense, and procedure for interaction of its participants are defined by the Security Council of the Republic of Belarus.

Section VI. International and Legal Obligations of the Republic of Belarus in the Sector of Defense

Article 20. Observance by the Republic of Belarus of the Norms of International Law and Cooperation with Other States in the Sector of Defense

In the organization and performance of defense, the Republic of Belarus observes norms of international law and treaties of which it is a participant.

Cooperation of the Republic of Belarus with other states to provide for joint defense from aggression and support of international peace and security is constructed in accordance with provisions of the Charter of the United Nations on the right to individual and collective self-defense.

Section VII. Liability for Violation of Legislation on the Defense of the Republic of Belarus

Article 21. Liability of Officials and Citizens

Officials of enterprises, institutions, organizations, state organs, and citizens guilty of violating legislation on the defense of the Republic of Belarus are punished according to procedure established by legislation.

[Signed] S. Shushkevich, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Belarus
3 November 1992
Minsk, No. 1902-XII

BALTIC STATES

Latvian Officers' Assembly Speeches Reported

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[Article by Gaitis Grutups, with excerpts of speeches by Dainis Turlais, Juris Vectirans, Talavs Jundzis, et al. : "First Latvian Officers Assembly After Fifty Years!"]

[Text] [Center of page]

Colonel Dainis Turlais, Commander of the Defense Forces

Lieutenant Colonel Maris Ansons, Defense Forces Headquarters, Air and Anti-Air Defense Administration, Aviation Section Senior Engineer

Command Captain Janis Adamsons, Naval Forces Administration, Senior Officer

Colonel Viktors Sviklis, Border Guard Brigade, Deputy Commander

Major Leonids Lasmanis, Daugavpils Border Guard Battalion, Chief of Staff

Juris Vectirans, Chief of Security Services of the Republic of Latvia

Girts Kristovskis, Chief of Staff of the National Guard

Andrejs Krastins, Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia

Arvaldis Lilientals, Chief of Staff of the Defense Forces

Edite Sondovica, Head of the Cultural Sector of the Ministry of Defense

Jazeps Ancans, Deputy Attorney General of the Republic of Latvia

Andrejs Galvins, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Ministry of Internal Affairs

Lieutenant Gunars Arbidans, Rezekne Border Guard Training Center, Company Commander

Lieutenant Colonel Peteris Bruveris, Defense Forces, Chief of Medical Services

Talavs Jundzis, Minister of Defense of the Republic of Latvia

Lieutenant Peteris Kalnaracenis, 5th Jelgava Border Guard Battalion, Chief of the Personnel Department (see page 7)

Janis Skrodelis, Chief of Staff of the Valmiera Battalion (see page 7)

Lieutenant Nikolajs Prikulis, Ludza Border Guard Battalion (see page 7)

Lieutenant Dainis Greitans, Defense Forces Headquarters, Battalion Company Commander (see page 7)

The officers assembly was held on November 20, at the Suzos Defense Forces Intelligence Battalion Club. It proceeded in a sharp and concrete style, with problems being raised. Nevertheless, mutual goodwill prevailed in the air. "Two years ago, when, together with the men of a certain voluntary peace keeping unit, we started to form the First Police Battalion of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which was the first armed unit to swear allegiance to the renewed nation of Latvia, I could not have believed that in such a short period of time, I would have the honor of participating in our armed forces officers assembly", said Juris Vectirans, Chief of Security Services of the Republic of Latvia, during intermission.

Of course, there were also some minuses to this honorable initiative—the representatives of the National Guard, leading members of the Defense Ministry administration, the majority of invited deputies and government officials were missing. Hopefully, future response to national defense matters, and officers will be on a higher level.

I apologize to those who were presenters, and participated in the debates, for the fact that the excerpts of their speeches may not have been selected or accentuated in the manner they wanted. Therefore, I invite the honorable commanders and officers to express their opinions and ideas to the newspaper, so that the "Tevijas Sargs" can publish these in a more qualitative manner. These excerpts from the speeches don't say much about the idea of an officers' club. There was little difference of opinion on this matter - everyone supported this idea, in principle. Commander of the Defense Forces, Dainis Turlais clarified that, in contrast to the present day Russian Army Officers Assemblies, which in one or two instances has become an alternative to the military leadership, a destabilizing situation, our officers' club will be truly devoted to providing information on culture, ethics, sports, and the sciences. Family members of the officers will be able to participate. The military sports activities leader, Colonel Vikelis, added that it would be desirable for the National Guard and Security Services officers to join the club; this was supported, in principle.

Due to a misunderstanding, Girts Kristovskis, Chief of Staff of the National Guard, did not have an opportunity to participate in the assembly. Nevertheless, he also has a viewpoint with regard to this conference, which we will now present: "Unfortunately, from the entire National Guard, I was the only one invited to this officers assembly. Am I really the only one from the whole National Guard considered to be an officer? A few years ago, under the soviet system, the majority of members and commanders in our current headquarters were

officers in the reserves. Some may have only been lieutenants, but there were others who were quite a bit higher. Our company advisers are officers—leaders in battle—with war experience.

In order to do away with these barriers and lack of cooperation, in our new bill on the National Guard, we propose to institute military ranks for officers in the National Guard, which would correspond to those in the Defense Forces.

The leadership of the National Guard is totally convinced of the significance of our job, and we have no fundamental disagreements with the Defense Forces. Personally, I have proposed to the Defense Council, as well as to the Supreme Council Defense and Internal Affairs Commission, that, without waiting for any specific war situation crisis to occur, it is necessary to appoint a Commander of the National Armed Forces, who could be Mr. Turlais. He could then form a group, which would be consistently dedicated to guiding the cooperation among the various components of the armed forces. This cooperation would have competent guidance. The law passed on the defense of the nation is satisfactory, and since it exists, we must realize it, without delay.

The concept of an officers' club is also supported by us in the National Guard. We could take a lesson here from the student fraternities, which Latvian army officers also belonged to, in the past."

[Center of page prepared by Gaitis GRUTUPS]

DAINIS TURLAIS

"The state is a full-bodied union of a free people, established for their rights and interests"—said Hugo Grotius, Dutch scholar, and one of the founders of international rights. His book "Laws of War and Peace", which was written at the beginning of the seventeenth century, is still well respected today.

What is the modern definition of a state? A political organization, through which a people's democratic power is realized (as opposed to the Marxist-Leninist definition—economic ruling class political power apparatus). It includes power structures, a specified territory and inhabitants. One of the most important functions of a STATE is national security. We understand this to mean a preparedness to defend oneself against external or internal aggression or armed conflict. This level of preparedness, in turn, is determined by the state's economic, technological, moral and military potential. This, in turn, is most directly described by the state's ability to mobilize, its offensive and defense weapons, its army's (armed forces) readiness and ability to fight.

"For military proficiency, overall, and for each military leader, individually, we have the right to require that the political directions and inclinations do not come in direct conflict with the military means (army—D.T.)... political inclinations are a goal, war—only a means, and

a means can never be considered with a goal. The greater the political goal, the greater is the attention paid to the means. The further the political goal moves away from war, the more war becomes merely politics." That is according to Klazevics. We also have to keep in mind that war is at least a two-sided process, and when one state refuses to go to war, this does not mean that the threat as been eliminated.

What is today's national state and international security proposal? What questions must it address? What is to be protected—the state, the national peoples, the inhabitants, the union of states? Who is being protected against—is there an enemy—who is it? What will be used for protection—economic means, political means, force? How to protect—what is the strategy, what are the tactics? These are the questions that our state's political administration must answer.

The Roman historian, Cornelius Nepos (94. - 24. 1st century B.C.) has said: "... If you want peace - prepare for war". Politicians should not confuse the postulates: "war cannot be allowed" with "war cannot occur". Statistics from the prior year, unfortunately, show that the threat of conflict is real. From World War II until the year 1990, there have been 160 armed conflicts. Furthermore, the number of these conflicts has risen sharply during the 1990s, and they are relocating to Europe. The policy of Russia—it is not at all a policy of weakness; its policy rests on positions of strength.

Those who wish to see Latvia look like Marijas iela, full of private spice shops, do not need a state, and do not need an army. Those who allow the national budget to fall lower than the budget of an individual company are least concerned with national security and defense. The defense of the state cannot be privatized, it cannot be solved on the public level.

What has been accomplished by the Republic of Latvia Defense Forces, and how, and where are the improvements in the reserve activities?

The theoretical and legal foundations for the creation of our Defense Forces have been laid. The most important is—the adoption, on November 4 and 5 of this year, of the laws "On national defense", and "On the Defense Forces". Before that, national defense proposals were worked out, discussed, and accepted by the Supreme Council, which, in addition, have gained wide international recognition. Regulations have been worked out (on internal order, the guard, discipline, weapons), as well as a military terminology dictionary, the Ministry of Defense orders on uniforms, meals, and many other standardizing acts, without which life in the Defense Forces would be impossible.

To complement the legal foundations, appendices to the criminal code elective steps must be worked out and submitted, regarding measures for the prevention of draft evasion, loss of weapons, drinking while on duty, and concerning the responsibility of Border Guards in overstepping the authority of their service, and for using

weapons. And finally, we should put an end to the speculations that the Defense Forces are going to create a Military Attorney General's office; thus, army matters will also have to be investigated by the Attorney General of the Republic of Latvia. It is possible that there will be some necessary structural changes. Practically speaking, the question on the material responsibility for the Defense Forces has not been resolved. Laws are needed on national armed forces service, on the length of service, on the social guarantees for soldiers, on the status of soldiers, on soldiers' pensions, and on a non-military service.

In speaking about the theoretical foundations, there is still an awful amount of work left. I have great expectations that the National Defense Academy will be actively working in this area. What are the major problems here? First of all, what do the battle capabilities, and level of preparedness of the Defense Forces have to be. Second, the strategies, operative proficiency, and tactics of the Defense Forces. Third, the numerical make-up and counter-balance, weapons and technology of the components of the Defense Forces: suitability to the territory of the state and preparedness for the interests of defense, and other very important problems in the military sciences.

What have we formed? The Border Guard Brigade, with eight battalions; including the Riga border check point, and five training centers. From the time activities were started until November 1, there have been 2.8 million people checked at the borders. The arrivals were 380 thousand automobiles, 3,127 ships, 1,978 airplanes; the respective departures were 386 thousand, 3,233, and 1,995. Detained were 313 illegal border crossings. Border crossing points have been set up on highways, railroad stations, airports, and sea ports.

A training center has been set up in Lilaste, and the naval forces have started operations. Thirty ships have been checked, 6 foreign ships have received warnings, and one Russian naval fleet vessel has been fined with a penalty of 62 thousand rubles.

An air space control group has been created, and aviation technology training has started.

Next, the Commander of the Defense Forces discussed the matters of provisions. Using our nation's resources, the soldiers have been fed, and have been outfitted with infantrymen's firearms and ammunition; and clothing, for the most part, consists of clothes and shoes manufactured in our own country. Speaking about the problems with staff training, education and work, Dainis Turlais stressed that there can be no state without an army, and no army without officers. And furthermore, an officer's honor rests on his self-esteem and hard work. Receiving an office, a rank in the service, when it is earned, is the result of hard, bitter work, and thus deserving of its honor. Assistant officers, sergeants, must be trained seriously. This is the basis for discipline. It is first necessary for the instructor, himself, to display a certain outward appearance, behavior, manners, politeness,

strength. The Latvian officer must be an aristocrat of his own making, in the best sense of the term.

Next, the speaker mentioned certain officers, who had to be relieved of their higher positions and service in the Defense Forces, because they could not be trusted to perform their duties, specifically because of a lack in their character.

Touching on problems of salaries, Dainis Turlais said that right now the situation is such that we want to buy quality goods for a cheap price. That doesn't work. Everyone knows their worth, and wants to get paid in accordance to their abilities—and this is also the way it should be. In our nation, such values as self-sacrifice for the good of the state, duty, allegiance, reliability and professional knowledge, risk, and national pride are not properly respected.

Speaking about technical materials and financial matters, the Commander of the Defense Forces expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that a financial plan is not being developed, and therefore funds are being wasted irrationally. Since he assumed his position, he has not once signed an approval form for a purchase. The matters are being handled by a single person, in an incompetent manner, using middlemen, whose reputations are doubtful. In this respect, he has specific complaints about the Border Guard Brigade. Dainis Turlais said that he will serious follow-up and insure that the provisions for the battalions are made in accordance with the order defined by the plan of the Ministry of Defense Provisions Administration.

Discussing the cooperation with the municipal and district governments, the Commander of the Defense Forces express regrets about the lack of understanding with respect to the need for an army. There have been instances when we have been equated with the military occupation forces, and have been asked to pay rent for the land. The Defense Forces have not received any of the sports bases that were taken over from the Russian military. Furthermore, there should be strong cooperation in terms of constructing buildings in the border areas, and providing officers with apartments.

In cooperating with the other National Armed Forces structures, said the Colonel, questions should be reviewed on joint patrols, planning and training, as well as the training of officers, awarding offices and service ranks according to a standardized system.

In the international area, as the speaker noted, we need agreements, which would regulate cooperation on the borders, as well as agreements with Lithuania and Estonia in cases of military-political crises. Cooperation

with NATO, according to the Commander of the Defense Forces, should continue to be a major goal for our military-political direction, although it should not be idealized, and viewed as a provider of our nation's safety.

MARIS ANSONS

Three major problems have to be resolved with regards to the Republic of Latvia Air Space Defense and Control:

1) A proposal has to be worked out and cooperation established among the neighboring countries with respect to air space defense systems. A system of information has to be formed, together with the Border Guards, Naval Forces and Police;

2) Air space defense requires a great deal of funding. The Ministry of Defense, within its means, does not have enough resources;

3) No staff is being prepared, although the training could be performed right here in our country.

In addition, the Lieutenant Colonel mentioned that this year, Russian aircraft has illegally crossed our national border at least 131 times. There is a lack of equipment and funds to check the violators.

JANIS ADAMSONS

Because our sea borders are poorly patrolled, the activities of contrabandists are costing Latvia a monetary equivalent of tens of millions of rubles per day. We lack the funds to do our duty properly. Heading into sea with the present patrol boats is dangerous, because, according to their physical makeup, they were built for inland waters. In addition, we don't have life boats; this hampers the boarding and control of ships at sea.

Major complaints have been lodged against customs, which does not control ships, although an agreement has been reached with the Russian military naval fleet command, allowing customs to also control Russian military vessels.

In discussing the training of sailors, the Command Captain recommended the creation of a professional Latvian military fleet.

VIKTORS SVIKLIS

The Border Guard Battalion was established in December of last year, as per orders by the Minister, while the brigade headquarters—only after several months—in February of 1992. As a result of fate, only one fifth of the members are professional officers, and Border Guard specialists are totally in the minority. This current style of operations is undesirable, because there is a lack of military competence. The structure of the operation must be transformed, so that with a smaller number of people, the brigade's operations and provisions duties could be performed in a much more professional manner.

Also, Mr. Sviklis recommended allowing Border Guard inspectors to carry firearms on their person, because the criminals, contrabandists, can be expected to retaliate; and also to speed up defining of the status of the Border Guards, because right now the uncertainty is bad for the people's morale.

LEONIDS LASMANIS

For the most part, we are receiving provisions thanks to our own resources, or by the Ministry of Defense's Armament and Provisions Administration. The latter is working, but it really doesn't know the Defense Forces needs. As of right now, we still don't have any mine launchers, nor grenade throwers, nor night viewing apparatus, clubs, handcuffs, nor are there any standardized forms for documents, which were promised a while ago.

Training of Border Guards is occurring at a minimal level, because there is still a lack of professional officers, as well as training instruments, and surveillance means. As of now, we are not clear about the routine to follow in the border areas, and on what basis to make requests.

Transport vehicles should be turned over to the battalions, and not left in the Ministry's motor pool.

JURIS VECTIRANS

Finding myself here with you, I feel the closeness of our Service. Together, we have taken the road to strengthening our nation's defense, and we still have a distance to go. Listening to the speakers, I have come to some interesting conclusions. How can it be, that the Commander of the Army of the Defense Forces is unable to operate on the appropriated budget, and cannot plan the development of the Defense Forces! In what other country can you see this happen? There were also some other questions that caused me to wonder. I think these should be brought up at the highest level. Mr. Pavelnieks, like myself, is a member of the National Defense Council, where we will most likely be dealing with the problems you have mentioned. We heard here that the mobile regiment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs is, at present, the best armed military unit. Yes, the regiment is ready to perform not only police duty, but also military-type assignments. However, all of the military divisions of the Defense Forces also should have been armed in such a manner.

Naturally, it is nice that this regiment is armed in this manner, but this could be looked at in a different light: apparently, the administration's attitude here was somewhat different. It saw to it that this mobile force was given the resources, that people were trained, and that enough highly qualified professionals were attracted. They are receiving assistance. This shows a lot about where our administration's priorities are.

I know that gathered here is a strong nucleus of Latvian patriots in uniform. And we have not assembled here for someone to poke fun at us. We must have our say about defense and security matters in a forceful and clear manner. And we are not just thinking about ourselves, but about the nation, the Latvian people.

What can we expect, if on the holiest day for soldiers—Lācplēsis Day—only short news fragments are televised showing excerpts from the parade at the Freedom Monument. And I know for a fact, from the letters to the Supreme Council, that the people are writing, thinking about, and showing interest in their army, their soldiers. But television devoted only a few moments to this day.

Our service was allocated quarters in Ciekurkalns, in one of the best and newest military buildings in the capitol. In May, we took this building away from the Russian Army, and now, due to a lack of funds, we can't even maintain it in storage. And that is directly because the resources allocated to the Security Service in the second half of the year were three times less than we had requested. And we were only asking for the bare minimum. Now, it seems that we have been given fifteen million for renovations, but we can't get this money out of the bank.

In speaking about weapons, Colonel Vectirans mentioned that Latvia is saturated with weapons, and the majority of them, moreover, are in the hands of criminals. In addition, he mentioned that there is no reason for us to think about any sort of weapon manufacturing, because not only in Europe, but throughout the world, the weapons market is over-saturated, and the prices vary. They are even accessible to us.

In speaking about the Border Guard, Mr. Vectirans reminded everyone that the Border District Police, the National Guard—these are the actual forces with which the Board Guards must work. But, for instance, the Ludza District Police Headquarters only owns a few assault weapons.

In conclusion, the chief of the Security Service wished the officers stamina and success in continuing their service, in the face of the difficulties of renewing a nation.

ANDREJS KRASTINS

I would like to talk about a vital matter, which we all encounter in all walks of life—this is the inability to determine the priorities: what to devote our attention to first, at any given moment. With respect to the National Armed Forces of Latvia, this applies to our preparedness for battle at this time.

We can create handsome headquarters, a National Defense Academy, think about transportation and construction, about renovation, but, if the National Armed Forces are not prepared for battle, then all of things mentioned previously are absolutely for naught.

Naturally, along with this preparedness for battle, we need the parades and all the rest to raise our spiritual moral and allow our friends and non-friends to understand that such Defense Forces exist; but if at zero hour, the respective headquarters have not prepared standard situation appraisal plans, if the respective divisions are not ready to fulfill their duties, then these current external shows are for naught. In the present political situation in the Baltics, we are not protected, for one moment, against aggressive actions against the Republic of Latvia, against its borders. A question must be posed here—will the Border Guard Brigade, the Intelligence Battalion, or other subunits be ready at a specific time to contain some angry Russian army garrison, will they be able to hold back a technologically well-armed column that is approaching some nationally significant strategic point, etc? This is the most vital matter, and the nation's people are relying on us for this.

ARVALDIS LILIENTALS

I would like to direct your attention to the fact that at present the Defense Forces headquarters has no communications system, and there are also no specialists at the Defense Forces headquarters to create one. If anyone knows of any good communications specialists, please send them over, so we can settle the matter. Speaking about apartments, despite resolution No. 377 of the Council of Ministers, requests remain unaddressed. In Valmiera, the apartments left by the Russian army have been sold. Apartments are also for sale today in Aluksne, and the same is true in Jelgava. In order to prevent the Defense Forces from remaining without apartments, the Ministry of Defense must quickly form a group to deal with this matter, to represent us in providing apartments for our present and also future needs.

EDITE SONDOVICA

The officers' club won't be a place where fists are banged on the table, and shouts of "to heck with it" are heard. This will be a place where officers come to relax, not settle their accounts. As the leader of the Latvian Officers Association, retired First Lieutenant, Mr. Zarins remembers, in his time, each major army division had its own officers' club, as well as a garrison officers' club. In these, lectures were read, languages and dancing were taught, holidays were celebrated. The officers' clubs also had a court of honor, which doled out its blessings, for instance, to the newly married wives of officers.

JAZEPS ANCANS

I must admit that, as of the present, the Defense Forces have not received enough help from the Attorney General's office. We will be activating criminal matter investigations that relate to soldiers.

In the near future, with your help, we will have to work out a new chapter in the criminal code that relates to military crimes. Legislation should not be permitted to lose touch with real life in the barracks, in training, and overall, in the service.

Our nation does not need its own Military Attorney General, although a Military Inquiry Institute will be needed, which could prepare investigations of crimes and accidents.

A very acute question concerns the cooperation and coordination of activities by the military structures of the National Armed Forces. This matter must be settled immediately by the State's Defense Council.

ANDREJS GALVINS

We must take advantage of all of our options in order to coordinate arms provisions as well as to solve the social questions, and many other service-related matters. Like you, we are also having problems with apartments. Russian officers are illegally selling their apartments before they leave, and as a result, our boys have to suffer under uncomfortable living conditions.

Not long ago, I attended a similar conference of police officers in Lithuania. The nation's President, Prime Minister, and other high national officials were present from the start to the end of the conference. In Latvia, unfortunately, military matters do not receive such attention.

GUNARS ARBIDANS

Stronger requirements should be promoted in the training of soldiers, as well as officers. The issuing of hats and gloves should not be permitted during the time intended for studies. We lack visual aids for teaching, such as grenade and mine dummies.

PETERIS BRUVERIS

I am concerned that the question of national life and health insurance has not been resolved. We have already had cases of severe disability, trauma, we have had several violent deaths, but we don't have the appropriate documentation to determine, in these cases, what the extra compensation awards should be, as is accepted practice in the rest of the world. In addition, the Chief of Medical Services stressed that the activities by the Medical Commission of the National Services Administration should be strictly regulated, because if mistakes are allowed here, then they will be very expensive in the future.

TALAVS JUNDZIS

We should have more of such assemblies where the leadership of the Ministry of Defense speaks less and listens more to you. The problems are many, but everything can be measured according to at least two criteria—recognizing that, which has been done, and thinking about that, which has not been done. Although in the beginning, it seemed that the main deficiency was monetary, material things—at the beginning of the year, we had no weapons, no ammunition—we have now started to realize that what is needed is specifically the

development of intelligent, human values within ourselves. A thought was raised here that, without money in your pocket, you can't be an aristocrat, but I cannot fully agree with this.

As long as fate still allows me to do something in this direction, I will fight for the goal of making Latvia's officers true aristocrats. But this fight, as you can realize, is impossible without your support and concern. Let's start to raise our spiritual, and moral consciousness. If we have soldiers and our officers walking around the streets like "bums", if you will forgive my language, then how can I demonstrate to the Supreme Council or administration that these men deserve a decent salary? Thank God we have been able to establish some sort of respect at present. Maybe such changes didn't come from reading the newspapers, but after a three hour telephone survey, when 44 people called me, letters started coming in and are still coming, and they are all supportive of the fact that we are on the right track, and by are experiencing the formation of the Latvian Army, along with us.

"Tevijas Sargs" could also be more active in reporting information about what we are doing. I personally have a major complaint against newspapers.

In addition, I would like to say that, in connection with the adopted laws "On national defense" and "On Defense Forces", regulations of salaries are being worked out. I can't promise you the sky, but we will definitely raise them, and create a favorable system of compensation.

Of course, we are now in the midst of a major monetary crisis, and I urge you to follow strict economizing measures in gasoline consumption, as well as in all other matters, up until the end of the year.

It is true that we don't know how to handle money economically, and therefore a special system has to be developed, which would essentially require every commander to show how he intends to spend each ruble in the next year. These matters will be examined at the next meeting with my colleagues, and a lot will be much clearer, as should be the case for the second year of operations.

I invite you to celebrate Christmas together with the officers, enlisted men, sergeants, and family members!

RESOLUTION BY THE OFFICERS ASSEMBLY OF THE DEFENSE FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF LATVIA

Recognizing that the Defense Forces are the predominant component of the Latvian National Armed Forces, the officers assembly of the Defense Forces resolves and proclaims:

—The officers of the Defense Forces of the Republic of Latvia thank the people of Latvia, considering the complicated present day political and economic conditions, for the enormous efforts they have devoted to the creation of a national defense system, and confirm

their unbending loyalty to their nation and its people, resolve to fulfill with honor their most revered duty—to strengthen the security of the Republic of Latvia and its people, protect the independence of the Fatherland, sparing no effort nor life;

—Latvian officers do not participate in the battles among political parties, realize and are convinced that the Defense Forces cannot be allowed to become instrumental in such battles, but must only serve the Latvian nation and people in the interests of defense, not allowing earlier mistakes to be repeated;

—The officers of the Defense Forces support the renewal of Latvian army traditions, in order to promote the formation and cultivation of professional officers, in accordance with social, moral and ethical principles, respecting and honoring the position of officer;

—The officers of the Defense Forces draw the attention of the Supreme Council and Council of Ministers of the Republic of Latvia to the social and everyday problems of the officers and their families, the resolution of which problems could raise the battle preparedness and military discipline of the Defense Forces.

The general assembly of the officers of the Defense Forces of the Republic of Latvia resolve:

—To promote, among the officers of the Defense Forces, professional development, training activities and social activities, physical preparedness, and the creation of a mutually friendly relationship, through sports activities, with other groups of officers from other National Armed Forces of the Republic of Latvia, and to found the officers' club of the Defense Forces of the Republic of Latvia.

PETERIS KALNARACENIS

In our battalion, the most painful problem is the impropriety in salaries for Border Guards. Are these supposed to be salaries? A re-enlisted soldier receives the same amount as a retiree. The Chief of Staff of the Battalion receives less than the company's first sergeant. These two positions differ radically in terms of duties, and the respective salaries are in reverse proportion to the duties. The same situation exists for the chief of the border control point, who receives more than his battalion commander.

Luckily, our battalion commanders don't pay particular attention to these salaries, although, it would seem that the matter bothers everyone, without exception.

In our battalion, the need has already arisen for a second computer, which could be used for keeping track of inventory, because the first computer is used almost exclusively for creating a data bank on transport vehicles that cross the border. We are prepared to work together with Interpol in finding stolen automobiles.

JANIS SKRODELIS

We don't have a legal precedent for operating in the borderland areas. The job of marking the border in situ and creating borderland belts is progressing too slowly. The Border Guards are very poorly equipped—they even lack flashlights and other basics. Radio communication is weak, and they need clubs and handcuffs, especially those who serve at the Lugazi border station.

There is a lack of dedicated young people of good character; this is very important to the commander, because Border Guards usually work in small, separate groups.

NIKOLAJIS PRIKULIS

We are lacking measuring devices, and so we cannot effectively control cargo, find hidden metals, or measure the radiation levels of goods. The situation sometimes turns dangerous, and therefore it would be desirable for Border Guards to have bullet proof vests. Cooperation with customs and the police is poor. The Border Guards are often times like a starved cat, who catches a mouse, brings it to the fat tomcat (customs agent), which is crouched on the wall and doesn't even want to eat the mouse.

The battalion lacks medicine for its members. The group commander does not receive additional pay for leading the group.

DAINIS GREITANS

My company received a group of new enlisted men in June. Since that time, they have shot nine cartridges, plus three more times, together with the other boys—three cartridges per three times. This sort of training in shooting is sufficient only for guys with a talent for being snipers. It is too little for preparing a company for battle.

Then there is the problem of laundry. We take baths four times per month, and thus change our laundry at these four times. This translates out for our battalion to 100 thousand rubles per month, or 1.2 million rubles per year. With ten battalions, this is already twelve million. An incredible amount. I don't know how to solve this problem, but it needs to be solved.

Denmark Offering Military Training Assistance to Lithuania

93EN0132Z Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE
in Danish 23 Jan 93 p 6

[Article by Nils Eric Boesgaard: "Danish Military To Help Former Enemies"]

[Text] *The Danish defense system has offered to train a number of Lithuanian junior officers in modern leadership and instruction skills at the Army Combat School and the Sergeants' School in Odense, according to the Defense Command.*

Denmark has offered Lithuania help in building up the country's new defense force. This is the first time the Danish Armed Forces will provide direct military assistance to a former enemy state in East Europe.

The plans, which are now being formalized, were first discussed when Lieutenant Colonel Valdas Tutkus, Lithuanian defense chief, visited his Danish colleague, General Jorgen Lyng, in September, according to Commander Per Moller of the Defense Command.

The Danish defense system has now informed Lithuania that it can offer junior officers a number of courses in instruction methods. "They will be trained in ordinary leadership skills—something we think we are good at," Moller said.

The courses, which will begin in the fall at the earliest, will probably be given at the Army Combat School in Oksbol and the Sergeants' School in Odense.

They will be taught in Russian and the Danish instructors will be officers who speak Russian themselves or are assisted by the Armed Forces' own interpreters from the ranks of the so-called linguist officers.

"Finally, the Lithuanians will also be given an opportunity to enroll one of their officers at the Defense Academy. But although he will be allowed to turn in written assignments in English or German, for example, he will be expected to know enough Danish to follow the regular instruction," said Cdr. Moller.

Lithuania Hopes to Participate in NATO Naval Maneuvers

934K0324C Vilnius LETUVOS RITAS in Russian
12-19 Feb 93 p 5

[Unattributed article: "Lithuania Has Expressed a Desire to Participate in NATO Naval Maneuvers"]

[Text] Poland, along with the NATO countries, will take part in the first naval maneuvers of the Baltic states. A representative of the National Defense Agency of the Polish Republic, Lieutenant-Colonel Leshek Zelo, has reported to the PAP agency.

The BALTOPS-1993 maneuvers will take place on June 16-18 of this year in neutral waters, as well as the territorial waters of Denmark and Germany. The Navy of Poland has been invited to take part in them by the Commander of the American Fleet in Europe.

Lithuania, according to the report, has also announced its desire to participate in the maneuvers. Russia has still not given an answer to the invitation to take part in the exercises.

More on Lithuania's L-39's From Kyrgyzstan

934K0324D Vilnius LETUVOS RITAS in Russian
12-19 Feb 93 p 5

[Article by E. Ganusauskas: "The Lithuanian Air Forces Have Bought Their First Jet Fighters"]

[Text] The pilots of military aviation in Lithuania have thus far been flying obsolete An-2 biplanes that were left behind as the legacy of civil aviation, and once in a while were able to upgrade their skills in the Yak-52 aircraft of the Kaunas Air Club.

And now the first jet fighters for the Air Forces of Lithuania have landed at the Karmelava airfield near Kaunas. The republic bought four Czech-produced L-39 Albatross aircraft from Kyrgyzstan. These are trainers. The first L-39 aircraft went up in 1968. It then underwent testing in Czechoslovakia and the USSR for two years. There are several versions of the aircraft, including a combat one with armaments.

The aircraft bought by the Lithuanian Air Forces are two-seaters. The top speed at an altitude of one kilometer is about 900 kilometers per hour. The maximum altitude is 11,500 meters.

The aircraft can fly 850 kilometers without extra fuel tanks, and 1,015 kilometers with them. The aircraft needs 480-530 meters for a takeoff run, and 650-690 for a landing.

As far as we know, some 21,000 U.S. dollars were paid for each aircraft.

Lithuanian Defense Ministry Plans for Former Soviet Base

934K0324B Vilnius LETUVOS RITAS in Russian
12-19 Feb 93 p 5

[Article by J. Pekarskaite under the rubric "Passions of Mars": "Rukla Has Not Yet Been Plundered. Yet..."]

[Text] A group of officials from the Ministry of Defense, headed by Deputy Chief of the Organizational Branch of the Military-Administrative Department A. Butautas, visited the military unit stationed in Rukla. An authorized representative of the government on issues of the withdrawal of the Russian Army from Lithuania, Colonel S. Knezys, had inspected Rukla a little earlier, and admitted that he had not realized the military base was so large. The Ministry of Defense plans to accommodate one battalion numbering roughly 500 men in Rukla.

The military unit should leave before August 31, says A. Butautas, in accordance with the timetable for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Lithuania; that is essentially the last deadline, since according to the agreements the withdrawal of the former Soviet Army should be completely finished by that date. Reinforcements arrived at Rukla several weeks ago, however. An aircraft

carrying soldiers landed at the Kedainiai airfield, 400 of whom were sent to Rukla by truck. This was able to be established by the Jonava Rayon commandant's office and the defense service. Armed fighters from the Ministry of Defense, relates Jonava Rayon commandant Lieutenant V. Jakutis, last night took up positions on both sides of the highway behind the bridge through Neris, while the police were stopping all passing vehicles. There are residential houses not far away. The military column fortunately halted, and 400 soldiers were delivered to Rukla by midnight. Division commander Colonel V. Yevtukhovich commented on this incident that "We asked for permission for 2,000 soldiers to arrive so that they could help us leave, and only 400 came. And now a big scandal has been raised, even though there was agreement at all levels." At just what levels, the colonel did not elaborate.

The group of officials from the Ministry of Defense came in order to become acquainted with the military facility, although the Russian military for some reason doubted that. "Your expedition is of a peculiar nature," Colonel V. Yevtukhovich emphasized several times, pointing at the journalists' recorders. To the question of just what he had in mind, he answered that the military have their dignity, and there is no need to mock them...

The main reason, said the commander of the division, that the guests were greeted so ungraciously was the fact that there is still quite a bit of time until the withdrawal of the unit, and the military are prepared to give an account only over the two months preceding August 31 ("The time will come, and we will open all of the doors and windows"). The colonel said not to rush events along, and then added, "Neither we nor you doubt that we will be leaving this year."

By the way, a little later he cited a second reason that had foregone sitting at his desk and engaging in "office work," i.e. discussing all the details: "the time for attacks has passed," he said, and he had heard about the visit of such a large delegation only an hour ago. No one could answer why it had not been reported sooner. A. Butautas elaborated that he had received the directive to leave for Rukla the night before, and the commandant of Jonava could get in touch with the unit only in the morning.

After long arguments, persuasion and even the suggestion to "take a plane or helicopter and fly around over Rukla," the unit commander promised to prepare a detailed plan of the housing area and a general one of the military facilities in a week or two, as well as giving permission to drive around the military base. An overall view and an overall plan, in his words, would be sufficient to decide how this or that structure could be used. The general plan for Rukla, in the words of the colonel, is a military secret.

V. Yevtukhovich stated that apartments were promised as compensation for the military facilities at the start of negotiations. Now another policy has come along, and

they are proposing in friendly fashion the condition that we let them have 40 percent of the military vehicles, and everything will be fine. "What do you, such a small nation, need an army for?" asked the colonel. "Perhaps to reduce unemployment..." The officials of the Ministry of Defense were silent.

The "tour guide" on the grounds of the military unit, Deputy Division Commander A. Gladyshev, said, "The army is politics, and both you and we are suffering economically." The military are not set up all that badly there in Rukla, but the future is unclear. The unit where they will be transferred is no worse, but there are no apartments. A military person passing by intervened in the discussion and declared that they were also people, but embittered and deceived.

Traces of the coming collapse were evident here and there. There were no windows or doors on the inoperative bathhouse. Several garages had been dismantled. And although the first deputy division commander assured us that the chimneys of little stoves were sticking out the windows because the apartments were poorly heated, there is another version as well: that they are simply taking the cast-iron radiators out of the buildings.

It is well known from bitter experience that if one does not take immediate steps right now, this base will also be plundered, as has already happened in Lithuania. In the words of the deputy manager of Jonava Rayon, E. Sinkevicius, when Rukla opens its gates they will have to lease the buildings for 3—5 years immediately, possibly without competition, since to wait for a decision on privatization would mean to be left without the buildings.

But Rukla is essentially a second Jonava. There is a school, a kindergarten, a polyclinic, stores, post office, cultural hall, hotel, officers' quarters, cafeterias, residential apartments, garages, storage facilities, three boilers adapted to operate using various fuels, and even a newspaper office and cable television. Three apartments in the military base are entirely autonomous, and even enclosed by a fence. One even has its own subsidiary plot. We will hardly be able to look at it. There are, on the other hand, no impediments here (naturally, for a certain fee) to the enterprising people who are freely trucking whatever they want in and out of Rukla.

What will be left after them?

Lithuania Buys Czech L-39 Trainer Aircraft

*PM2402161393 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 18 Feb 93 p 3*

[Valeriy Gromak report under "Events and Commentaries" rubric: "L-39 Has Become Lithuanian Aircraft Too"]

[Text] Vilnius—It can already be said that Lithuania is actively creating its own Air Force and Navy.

Last week the Lithuanian army got its first aircraft—Anfatron L-39's. As is well known, these are trainer aircraft made in the former Czechoslovakia. Lithuania bought them from there last year. They have now turned up at the Russian Air Force's former airfield at Panevezys. The first flights by Lithuanian military aircraft began 16 February.

The newspaper LIETUVOS RYTAS maintains that the Republic acquired these aircraft quite cheaply—U.S. \$21,000 each. The number of aircraft acquired is not reported. But the fact remains that Lithuania is the first of the Baltic countries to start creating its own air force.

The fact that the Republic is actively engaged in building its own armed forces is also borne out by another example. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has already reported that the United States and other NATO countries will hold the Baltic Operations-93 naval exercises in the Baltic 16-18 June. Poland and the Baltic states have received invitations to participate in them.

Poland has already agreed. Now the Lithuanian Ministry of National Defense has also given permission for its naval flotilla based at Klaipeda to participate in Baltic Operations-93. The flotilla (commanding officer—Commodore Raimondas Boltuska) currently possesses three ships: two frigates and one training ship. Plus coast guard launches.

CAUCASIAN STATES

Azerbaijani Purchase of Arms From Israel Alleged *934K0072A Yerevan YERKIR in Armenian 3 Dec 92 p 8*

[Unattributed article: "Israel Sells Modern Weapons"]

[Text] Israel has begun selling modern weapons to Azerbaijan, which for the last four years has been in a continuous state of war against Armenia in connection with Nagorno-Karabakh and which therefore needs modern weapons.

The weaponry and military equipment being transferred to Azerbaijan includes U.S.-made Stinger surface-to-air missiles as well as state-of-the-art communications equipment which is being used to facilitate communications between front-line units. It is highly likely that what Israel is doing is a matter of concern to the Armenian Government, which is searching for means to establish good relations with the Jewish State. A number of countries have refused to respond to Israel's decision to sell arms to Azerbaijan. Official circles within the Jewish State have declined to comment on the matter.

A source within the Armenian Government has stated: "The government of Armenia believes that Israel is selling modern weapons to Azerbaijan. In addition, there are both Israeli advisers and military instructors in Azerbaijan. Azerbaijani military personnel are being trained in Israel."

The U.S. position pertaining to this report is not known at this time, although it is being charged that U.S. weapons are reaching Azerbaijan via Israel. The United States is not showing any inclination to do anything substantial regarding the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict; it has left it up to YeAHKh [not further identified] as well as to the authority of the CIS.

Sources in Washington and Istanbul report that Israel made the decision to sell weapons to Azerbaijan following a visit to Baku by former Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs David [Kimhe]. Kimhe, who had also been an officer of the Israeli intelligence agency Mossad, had gained notoriety for his role in Irangate.

Azerbaijan's president, Abulfas Elchibey, denied the allegation that arms had been received from Israel and stated at a press conference: "We have not requested military assistance from any country. If we begin receiving such assistance from other countries, our level of relationship with them will change. If we begin to receive weapons from Israel or the United States, Armenia would be able to purchase weapons from Great Britain or France, and the war would escalate in intensity. It is my desire to bring an end to the war."

The report of modern weapons being given to Azerbaijan is being announced at a time when Ankara and Baku, in order to prevent Iran from penetrating into the Muslim republics of the former Soviet Union, had addressed an appeal to Israel to participate in resolving issues dealing with the Caucasus and Central Asia.

At the same time, prior to the report concerning military assistance to Baku being made public, it was reported that the United States has agreed to finance Israeli economic programs in agriculture, irrigation, trade and other domains in Central Asia.

This report occurs at a time of efforts by the Government of Armenia directed at improving Armenian-Israeli relations, efforts fostered by the similarity of the historical fates of our two peoples.

With the exception of Turkmenistan, Israel has established diplomatic relations with the newly independent states of Central Asia and the Caucasus, even though it does not maintain ambassadors in all of these countries. The Muslims of the Caucasus and Central Asia, including Shiite Azerbaijan, have great hopes of developing good relations with the Jewish State.

Elchibey stated at the press conference: "We want to encourage the development of Israeli-Azerbaijani relations and invite Israeli specialists to Azerbaijan. Israel can sign treaties with us."

Elchibey adviser [Yafa Gulugade] was a member of the delegation from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan which visited Israel last August. During an interview given to the press, Gulugade, a specialist in Eastern Studies who in the past had served as a diplomat to Egypt and to Algeria, pointedly stated: "I told Perez that

the radicals are seeking to spread their influence. They are spending money, organizing Islamic congresses. In the meantime the West is dozing on, waiting to see how the radical movement will develop. I told him that they must act, not merely stand by twiddling their thumbs. We must establish a fund to spread Western influence. For that we need to establish schools and colleges. We must invite people to study at your universities. The ideas I brought forth on the whole were accepted by Perez."

The Azerbaijanis are proud that they are a civilized Muslim people. They say that they were the first to adopt the Latin alphabet in place of the Arabic alphabet. They note that despite being a Muslim country, men and women have equal rights in their republic.

Many Azerbaijanis complain that because of being Muslims they are being ignored by the West. "When we were part of the Soviet Union, we were on the 'back burner,' and now, because we are Muslims, the West does not consider us worthy of attention," said one of Elchibey's aides. "If things continue this way, and the war does not end, we shall be forced to turn to the radicals for help."

Turkish diplomats complain that their country is the only Western state working to block Iranian penetration into the Caucasus and Central Asia. These regions are at the center of Ankara's attention. "If Turkey had not taken specific steps, those countries would not have received Western aid in a timely manner. Iran is in a

very aggressive mood, and Russia at the present time is too tied up with other matters to deal with this," stated one Turkish diplomat.

Turkish officials believe that Azerbaijan's Jewish community will persuade the Israeli Government to intervene more substantially in the problems of the region.

According to a number of sources, there are approximately 40,000 Jews living in Azerbaijan.

Abkhazia Said To Possess T-72's

*93UM0430A Moscow KURANTY in Russian
No 7, 14 Jan 93 p 3*

[Article by KURANTY Correspondent G. Lolishvili, Tbilisi: "Supertanks 'Seized' Gagra"]

[Text] Yu. Keshelava, intelligence chief on the territory of Abkhazia that is controlled by Georgia, mentioned that the Abkhazian side has T-72 tanks with laser gun-sights and improved electronics. In his words, these tanks were utilized during the seizure of Gagra. One of them was blown up near Ukraina Sanatorium. After completion of the operation, the combat vehicles were loaded on trailers and transported to Bombora military airfield near Gudauta from which they were transported on Russian Air Force heavy transport aircraft from Abkhazia.

MILITARY CONFLICT, FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

U.S. Said Developing Aircraft Born ABM Lasers

*93WC0026A ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian
20 Feb 93 p 6*

[Unattributed Article: "Lasers Against Ballistic Missiles"]

[Text] Researchers in the United States are studying the possibility of beginning work on projects whose realization may lead to the deployment of a high-power laser weapon on board aircraft for use in tactical ABM systems in theaters of military operations.

Wide-fuselage aircraft of the "Boeing-747" type are being considered as delivery systems for high-energy chemical lasers, whereas small military aircraft and

remotely piloted vehicles are being studied as delivery systems for compact solid-state lasers.

The work is being performed at Livermore National Laboratory under the "Defender" project, in the scope of which it is proposed to create a laser weapon capable of destroying ballistic missiles in the vertical flight phase of their trajectory at a range of 100-150 km. At the present time, the laboratory has a small-scale solid-state laser on glass with an admixture of neodim with a length of the emission wave of 1.06 micrometer and a power output of 1 kilowatt.

American specialists hope to raise the power of such lasers to several megawatts, utilizing the experience of Moscow scientists from the "Astrophysics" association, in particular through the technology for the transformation of the wave front guaranteeing limited diffractions and consequently a high quality of the laser beam.

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